ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. 



■J 

ENGLAND & RUSSIA 



A FIFTH EDITION 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, & TURKEY, 



REVISED AND ENLARGED. 



<3C 



LONDON : 



JAMES RIDGWAY & SONS, 169, PICCADILLY. 

1835. 




LONDON : 

PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET. 



/ 



Critical Notices on the Former Editions of 
ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



" A pamphlet has recently been published by Ridgway, entitled Eng- 
land, France, Russia, and Turkey, which we suspect will receive in many 
quarters a deeper, and perhaps more uneasy attention, than is often be- 
stowed upon publications not avowedly from an official source. The ob- 
jects of this work are to demonstrate — \st. The gulf which now yawns for 
the Turkish empire; — 2nd. The ruinous consequences which must follow 
the seizure of Constantinople and the Dardanelles by Russia; — 3rd. The 
facility with which Turkey may even now be saved, by an easy and prompt 
effort of British policy, which would electrify and reanimate the whole 
benumbed frame of the Turkish nation, and paralyze the system of Russian 
encroachment for whole centuries. This pamphlet traces, with a minute 
and elaborate, but powerful pencil, the whole conduct of the Russian 
cabinet during the last few years. No small share of the author's know- 
ledge and acuteness is devoted to the exhibition of the policy to which 
England and France have been betrayed by Russia, and through which 
they have become her unconscious confederates in a -scheme of which the 
profits are exclusively for her. 

" Almost at the first page we see stated distinctly, a general proposi- 
tion, of which the author never subsequently loses sight. W e quote the 
passage, as an introduction only to the more remarkable disquisitions and 
narratives by which it is afterwards illustrated, and the rules of action 
which the author would deduce from it, for the corrections of our former 
errors, explained and recommended. We must soon and seriously return 
to it, partly for its own importance, and in part for the sake of doing 
justice to the knowledge, sagacity, and force, with which it has been 
treated by the yet unknown author." — Times, Dee. 1834. 

" There is an article in The Quarterly Review, No. 105, which is making 
some noise. 1 allude to an extraordinarily well- concocted article on a 
pamphlet, entitled ' England, France, Russia, and Turkey.' Extracts 
from it are being translated for the perusal of the Sultan, who will read 
with pleasure so able an exposition of the interests of himself and his two 
friends; and who will see, with sincere satisfaction, that there are men in 
England who take a just view of his position. J have some authority for 
saying this." — Letter from Constantinople to the Herald, June 2. 

" Having so much matter to compress into a short review, we must con- 
tent ourselves with referring such of our readers as will not take our ipse 
dixit, to the able and eloquent pamphlet, the title of which stands at the 
head of this article, where they will find these positions maintained with 
argument capable of overwhelming all scepticism on the subject." — Foreign 
Quarterly Review, No. XXIX. 

" We earnestly recommend this work to every well-wisher to the human 
race." — Morning Advertiser. 

" ' England, France, Russia, and Turkey.' Such is the title of a very 
remarkable pamphlet, which has just been translated from the English, 
This essay is a vehement placiloyer against Russia. It matters little that 
the advocacy be vehement, so that it is just — that it is true. Truth loses 
nothing of its force from being preached with ardour. This publication, 
with perfect knowledge of the subject, lays bare all the details of the East- 
ern question. The author is thoroughly acquainted with Turkey; and 



Critical Notices, Sf-c. 



the combinations by which Russia has established over Turkey a protec- 
torate menacing to Europe, he denounces to the world, sparing, in bis 
rude frankness; neither the indolence of England, nor the subserviency of 
France, to the designs of Russia."- — Journal des Debats, July 18. 

" The author himself declares that his opinions have not been formed 
in a cabinet, or at a distance from the countries of which he treats — that 
profound conviction has dictated every word — that no syllable has been 
set down without mature deliberation. The oriental question is one 
which is to be considered as one of the most important and most urgent 
that the press has ever yet had to treat. Our cabinet alone feigns not to 
comprehend its weight, that it may escape the consequences of such a 
conviction." — Courrier Franqois, July 25. 

" For the thorough investigation of the questions, and more especially of 
the means by which the Turkish empire may be invigorated and defended, 
we must refer our readers to the translation of the English publica- 
tion, where they are exposed with a remarkable acquaintance with Euro- 
pean diplomacy, and of the state of affairs in the East. There, for the 
first time perhaps, a subject so important to the future destinies of Eu- 
rope, appears developed in all its details." — Constitutionnel, July 19th. 

" The action of Russia on Turkey — the treaty of Adrianople, of Unkiar 
Skellesi — the convention of St. Petersburgh, have been so completely 
laid bare in ' England, France, Russia, and Turkey,' that we need offer 
no remark on the subject ; no attempt has been made to controvert any 
of its positions ; no doubt seems even to remain as to their truth. That 
essay is too succinct to admit of useful citation ; it cannot be analyzed, 
because it is itself a condensed analysis of an overwhelming subject. We 
must content ourselves with urging it on our readers' attention." — British 
and Foreign Review. 

" The effect of this publication on opinion in England is perhaps un- 
paralleled. The question interests now, because rendered intelligible." — 
Foreign Quarterly Review, No. XXX. 

" The analysis of that remarkable document (the treaty of Adrianople) 
contained in the pamphlet from which we have already largely quoted, 
is so able that we must be excused for extracting it." — Quarterly Review, 
No. CV. 

" We must quote a passage from the masterly pamphlet of a gentleman 
to whom this country is indebted for the only practical details ever yet 
published concerning the designs of Russia against Turkey. His reasoning 
derives great force, not only from the unstudied eloquence of his diction, 
but from what is of still more value, his personal knowledge and ex- 
perience." — Morning Chronicle. 



Printed by T. Brettell, Rupert-street, Hdymarket. 



INTRODUCTION 



PREFIXED TO THE FIFTH EDITION. 



IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISLODGING RUSSIA FROM THE 
DARDANELLES. 

A late Royal Duke very fond of whist, was 
also very fond of winning at whist. It often oc- 
curred to him, in arranging his hand, to mistake 
his best suit for trumps. His Royal Highness 
finding seven clubs in his hands, and forgeting 
that the three of diamonds had been turned, would 
exclaim — " Clubs are trumps, I believe," and 
consequently clubs were trumps. 

It would seem that Russia has taken the hint 
from this distinguished personage, and has got 
others with whom she plays to follow the example of 
his kind and amicable associates — Russia always 
plays trumps, or at least tells us that her cards are 
trumps, and consequently she turns the tricks and 
lifts the money. 

Russia not only induces us to permit her to do 
what she wishes to do — not only makes us assist 
her, when she requires our help, but she makes us 

B 



11 



believe whatever she wants us to believe. She ehuses 
that we should believe that she has occupied Con- 
stantinople, and that she voluntarily retired — and 
we do believe it. She also wishes us to believe that 
the occupation of Constantinople having been in 
her power, has been abandoned through her spirit 
of moderation, and through her enlightened con- 
viction that that acquisition would weaken her 
power, so that while we believe that we have it 
not in our power to prevent the occupation, we 
believe that we have it in our power to drive her 
out of it if she were once there. 

The facts stand thus. She did not occcupy 
Constantinople. She could not then, and she can- 
not yet occupy Constantinople. We can most 
easily prevent her occupying Constantinople, but 
when she has brought things to that point where 
she can occupy, it will be impossible for us to 
expel her, unless by such an effort as we made to 
overthrow Napoleon, and by means of some new 
discovery which, like the steam engine at that 
period, will now again give us the power of making 
such an effort. Anticipating neither of these cir- 
cumstances, we say it will be impossible for us to 
expel her. 

We might enlarge on the first point, but we 
will content ourselves with quoting a passage from 
a periodical work which, in a few words, sets at 
rest the question of the previous occupation, and 
shows by what means a real occupation is to be 



Ill 



brought about, and is now bringing about. We 
shall then offer some considerations to shew the 
effects of that occupation on the internal state of 
England — effects which will disincline England 
from acting, even if Russia remained as vulnerable 
as at present, and which we think will put it en- 
tirely out of the question to think of repairing a 
disaster which will have rendered Russia unap- 
proachable. 

" Russia, had she had it in her power when her 
troops were encamped on the Bosphorus, never 
would have retired ; then it was impossible for her 
to have retained possession; she encamped at the 
distance of sixteen miles from the capital, with the 
Bosphorus between, the Channel was commanded 
by thirteen Russian line of battle ships ; the troops 
occupied the Giant's Mountain, in Asia, their tents 
so placed as to make the greatest possible display ; 
sentries on every side forbade approach ; their 
numbers represented as double their real amount ; 
every precaution, in fact, was taken to guard 
against attack, collision, or contact. On the mo- 
ment of embarkation, a breeze that had been blow- 
ing from the south suddenly failed ; the most in- 
tense anxiety was the result, not only to the chiefs, 
but to the whole expedition. Fortunately, a light 
air sprung up, and carried them out of the chan- 
nel. What service did not this breath of air 
render to the fortunes of Russia. But for it, 
Nicholas would not have to boast of the glory of 



iv 

occupying Constantinople ! or the greater glory of 
quitting it ! ! 

J " The troops that Russia can suddenly and 
at once transport to the capital must be sacrificed 
if a single pistol is fired, or a drop of blood drawn; 
she, therefore, dare not— can not attempt to occupy 
until she is invited ; that invitation she is now la- 
bouring to bring about by three causes, or rather 
sets of causes ; — Istly, General rumours of war — 
of occupation spread and repeated throughout 
every province with a pertinacity and a similarity 
most remarkable, producing a feeling of insecurity 
and alarm, arresting commerce and industry, and 
disturbing the action of government, and the idea 
of permanency. 2ndly, By the use she makes of 
her influence over the government, driving it into 
acts, and even crimes, that makes it despised and 
hated — detaching it from the other powers, and in- 
troducing administrative measures that place it in 
opposition to the people, their prejudices, rights, 
and opinions. 3rdly, Through the schism in the 
empire, and all the consequences of the hostile 
position of Mehemet Ali. These causes all acting 
together are now pushing Turkey forward with 
fearful rapidity to that point where all bonds of 
respect and government are dissolved, and revolu- 
tion in the provinces, or revolt in the capital, or 
invasion from Egypt, or all these cases combined, 
will thoroughly disgust the Turks and their tribu- 
taries, with the government, and the Sultan ; and 



V 



Russia will be called in to support the government 
: - — to protect the Sultan — to shield the people — to 
prevent convulsion — to arrest bloodshed. Then 
her intervention will be hailed by civilized Europe 
as an act of charitable humanity ; and those who 
may dread the consequences will be little inclined 
to interfere in favour of a people that licks the hand 
of its betrayer and oppressor. For this peace, that 
is, the progress of causes in action, and the accu- 
mulation of the results of the treaty of protection 
are necessary. Russia cannot enter till she enters 
as a friend ; and though this will soon be — the 
time is not yet come ; and until it comes, collision 
is fatal to her projects. " # 

Now let us suppose Russia occupying Constan- 
tinople, entrenched behind the then impregnable 
Dardanelles, and possessing a hundred sail of men- 
of-war in the channel. f Will England then be 

* See " Diplomacy of Russia," in No. 1, European Review, 
p. 131. 

t " Few persons are aware of the maritime force that will instan- 
taneously be placed at the disposal of Russia, by the occupation of 
Constantinople. Russia, at the close of 1834, had fifty-two men- 
of-war in the Black Sea ; of which sixteen were line-of-battle ships: 
twenty-five new vessels are in construction. She will find at Con- 
stantinople forty men-of-war, of which nine are line-of-battle ships 
and four three-deckers, the day after occupation. She will have, there- 
fore, at her disposal in the channel ninety- two men-of-war, with a 
flotilla of small armed craft, at least as numerous ; and such is the 
activity that reigns in all the arsenals of the Black Sea, that in less 
than two years, one-half of the vessels commenced in autumn last, 



vi 



disposed to make an attempt to expel Russia ? — 
will it be in her power to do so? — and what means 
would be requisite for succeeding in such an 
attempt ? 

will be ready for sea. Thus in a few months she will be ready to 
muster one hundred sail, twenty-five being line-of-battle, within the 
impregnable Dardanelles ; securing her acquisition, having time to 
organise them — having the seas of Marmora and the Euxine to 
exercise in ; having unlimited supplies of all materials within herself, 
ready to her hand, and at a trifling cost. She has at present 
30,000 men employed on board her vessels, or in her arsenals ; she 
will obtain a certain number of seamen from the Black Sea and from 
Constantinople itself ; but her great resource will be the Greek 
sailors ; the seamen of Hydra, Ipezia, Psara, reduced by the peace, 
and the stagnation of Greek commerce, will flock by thousands, 
spurred not only by their necessities, but by a spirit of enthusiasm, 
to hail the symbols of the Greek Church reared above the Crescent. 
A single mass, chaunted in Saint Sophia, will collect every Greek 
seaman from far and near. This is no dream of the imagination ; 
these materials are not to be created — they do exist, ready to be 
employed, and available at a moment's warning. The slightest 
degree of energy — the commonest feeling of self-preservation — will, 
in a month's time, combine these elements for securing her conquest, 
and with one squadron anchored in the Golden Horn, and another 
under the castle of the Dardanelles, who, that knows any thing of 
the topography of Constantinople, of the spirit of eastern populations, 
will be hardy enough to talk even of resistance from within, or of 
attack from without ? 

*' If it be asked, whence the pecuniary means are to come, we 
answer that the expenditure will, to her, be insignificant : such an 
acquisition would be cheaply bought at the expense of twenty cam- 
paigns ; and the expenditure will, perhaps, not exceed the sum she 
lays out in a single year on the Caucasus. Is Russia unprepared 
for such a contingency ? Besides, is it to be supposed that the 



Vll 



The occupation will take place as we have above 
stated — as the means of arresting convulsion and 
bloodshed. This state of things can only be 
brought about by the acts of the Government itself. 
Russia stepping in to restore tranquillity, has it 
in her power — is placed under the necessity of 
changing the course of internal policy that has 
led to convulsion. Even before convulsion has 
taken plaee could she ostensibly assume the pro- 
tectorate of Turkey she would conciliate to her- 
self the goodwill of all classes, by putting an end 
to those abuses into which she herself has led or 
pushed the Turkish Govornment. Occupation, 
therefore, by the causes that lead to it, destroys every 
interest for Turkey in England, deprives England 

treasury of the Seraglio is empty ? Will Constantinople be a less 
rich prize than Algiers ? Are there not many means by which a 
conquering power can obtain money ? And is it not clear that she 
will be able to borrow hundreds of millions of piastres from the 
merchants of all classes, and from the Armenian bankers, who, if 
they do not lend with the zeal of enthusiasm, as many will, will 
contribute from other motives, which Russia knows how to inspire ? 
Will not, moreover, every place of 'Change in Europe offer her 
resources on such a contingency ? While we affect to believe the 
occupation of Constantinople impossible, because of the expense it 
would entail upon her, she, better informed, knows, as who that has 
given the subject a moment's consideration does not ? that, inde- 
pendently of all political gains, she at once lays her hand on an 
enormous treasure, which in itself, if she acquired nothing else, 
might justify all the expenditure she now incurs in furtherance of 
the scheme that is to give her possession of it." 

" European Review" No. 1, p. 126. 



viii 

of every support in Turkey, and of every means 
of acting either on the people or the Govern- 
ment (if it be allowed to subsist), and by its conse- 
quences attaches the Turkish population (the other 
populations are of course hers body and soul) to 
the Russian sway. The whole Ottoman empire 
passes at once from us to her, then our open foe. 
The force, the arms, the frontiers, the fortresses, 
the treasures, and the ships of Turkey now placed 
against Russia, will be placed against us — disci- 
plined, combined, and directed by her. 
, Besides this accession of wealth, strength, and 
■J defences, Russia, by making this stride in advance, 
covers by the occupation of a single passage, a 
frontier of her own of nearly 2000 miles in extent, 
and consequently she can assemble on this point 
the whole force actually engaged in watching this 
line, and in preventing combinations, which in its 
present exposed and precarious state, occupies a 
full half of the disposable forces of the empire. 
Russia can therefore immediately assemble, if need 
be, a couple of hundred thousand men, to be sup- 
ported at the expense of Turkey, on the shores 
of the Mediterranean; which, strong by the na- 
ture of the country, by the divisions of the popula- 
tion and strength of the fortresses, by the fleet, by 
the moral supremacy she will have assumed, by 
the capital*, and perhaps the Sultan as her 

* Constantinople offers no place of assemblage that can be used 
against a garrisoning force ; it is cut into three parts by the Chan- 



ix 

hostage, will render her unattackable, save by a 
body of men not less numerous. 

It may be said that at least six months will be 
requisite for this combination ; but let us suppose 
that until six months after occupation she is vul- 
nerable, will we be prepared in less time to strike ? 
Clearly before a messenger can carry the news 
to London, she will be prepared against every 
possible contingency. 

Russia chooses her own time ; she prepares the %/ 
events, she has them all under her own control. 
She sees on all sides at once ; she cannot miscal- 
culate on such a moment as this. Her whole mind, 

nel. The Russian men-of-war will occupy it and intercept all com- 
munication. By the hilly situation of the place, it is every where 
exposed to the guns of vessels in the harbour, or below the seraglio. 
The subsistences and the water will be in the power of the garrison. 
The seraglio will be occupied, and the Seraskier's palace, so that a 
position is secured in the centre of the Turkish quarter, connected 
with the beach. The land side is commanded, and the communica- 
tions intercepted by the positions of Daoud Pasha and Ramis Chef- 
lic, where strong defensible barracks, which can easily contain 20,000 
men, have been recently erected, and were occupied by the Sultan 
during the alarms of the Russian war. These positions secure as 
effectively the western approach, as the Channel does the others. It 
has been said that such details enlighten Russia on k the state of 
Turkey —the English press enlighten Russia ! It is singular that 
the knowledge of these very details being collected by Russian agents 
30 years ago, urged Selim to hasten his attempt at destroying the 
Janissaries, and was subsequently put forward by the Turkish Go- 
vernment, as its justification for cutting off a body which, in the 
face of such danger, prevented even precautionary measures. 



X 



energies, and resources, are concentrated on it. 
She will be perfectly certain of success before she 
makes the move ; and there is no reason whatever 
for her making the move before she is certain. — 
Match with her knowledge, decision, secrecy, ra- 
pidity, and proximity, our ignorance, uncertainty, 
changeableness, absence of disposable force, and 
distance, and then say if Russia has any thing to 
apprehend from the awakened interests or aroused 
indignation of England — at least until she has had 
time to fortify herself within the Dardanelles, 
and to concentrate at the point of attack her armies 
and her navies ? 

But let us turn to another subject — the effect of 
the occupation of Constantinople on England itself. 

Can England at this moment permit the sub- 
jugation of Persia ? She certainly cannot ; the 
practical necessity she feels in supporting that 
country* is evident in the constant attention given 
to that country both by the Government and the 
East India Company, and the expenditure of nearly 
three millions sterling, in subsidies, &c. — Persia is 
gone the moment the Dardanelles are occupied. At 
this moment Persia is a virtual dependency of Rus- 
sia; she only allows it the appearance of indepen- 
dence, not to awaken England until the Darda- 

* England feels practically the necessity of supporting Persia, 
in consequence of the weakness of Persia; when we allow the 
strength of Turkey to be undermined, then, too, will we feel the 
practical necessity of supporting Turkey. 



xi 



nelles are occupied. Already has Persia ventured 
to tell us that she could not suffer British agents 
to be placed where there were Russian agents : 
" she would not be placed between the upper and I 
the nether millstone, that if unsupported by Eng- 
land, she must not irritate Russia." With the 
moral effect of the loss of Turkey, will come home 
to us the loss of Persia and the accession of both to 
the power of Russia — the consummation of that 
which, without perceiving more than a small portion 
of the consequences, we have been labouring to pre- 
vent for 150 years. And this will be immediately 
felt. It will discourage, not exasperate; if it did exas- 
perate, what material means, ready created, have 
we to make that exasperation effective ? But Persia 
is important, as it involves in its own existence the 
security of India. 

We have hitherto looked on Persia merely as a / 
body which it is necessary to place between our 
Indian possessions and Russia, as a space of two 
thousand miles in traversing which her influence 
(we talk not of armies) was weakened and lost. 
What must that influence become after the con- 
quest of the centre of Islamism, of the capital of 
the East, of the maritime key of all the countries 
that touch or communicate with the Euxine. 
What the effect — not indeed of the subjugation of 
Persia — but of the instantaneous transmission of 
the power and capabilities of Persia into the hands 
of Russia. That neutral space is wiped out of the 



xii 

map. It is converted into a source of imposing 
and aggressive force ; it bears a numerous, patient, 
and warlike people, to be disciplined and moved by 
Russia without inconvenience or expense. Amongst 
whom, too, an Indian expedition is popular by- 
its present attractions, by traditionary associations 
and experience. If a camp of 50,000 men only be 
assembled at Herat, let those who know India 
judge of the consequences ! 

The efforts of England for many years, and her 
money, have accustomed the Persians to European 
discipline ; the first, the most important obstacles 
among Eastern nations have been overcome ; many 
thousands are to a certain degree disciplined, — 
they are, by the universal testimony of all those 
who have had to handle them, the finest mate- 
rials for troops, — docile, intelligent, patient, and 
active, — therefore a very few months w r ould suffice 
to collect such a body of troops on the eastern 
frontier, there to discipline them. These conse- 
quences will be immediately felt in London on the 
occupation of the Dardanelles ; — indeed these con- 
sequences are already anticipated ; they are even 
now certainties in the eyes of those who should 
best understand their meaning. 

Suppose the loss of India is nothing to England, 
— will England submit, can she submit, to the 
precariousness of tenure, to the menace of assault ? — 
she cannot. The considerations above mentioned 
will come home to her with irresistible force, the 



xiii 



moment Constantinople is lost ; she will feel im- 
mediately the necessity of anticipating the disturb- 
ing influences about to be excited against India, 
by sending a reinforcement of British troops, which, 
having to pass round the Cape of Good Hope, may 
take up in their passage the time that may suffice 
for Russia organizing a new Persian army. Sup- 
pose we commence with sending only 10,000 men, 
at the expense of 100/. a man, or with such a 
necessity hanging over us — will we be inclined to 
send another expedition, not a precautionary one, 
but an aggressive one ? Evidently our whole dis- 
posable means w T ill be required for India ; all the 
financial sacrifices we will be inclined to make, will 
be absorbed by preparation in that quarter. This 
will be the case if no real danger exists. The 
uncertainty produced by distance alone, will para- 
lyze our European policy, and put it wholly out 
of our power to employ our resources in any Euro- 
pean contest, however trivial, far less in one where 
our maritime power cannot be brought to bear, 
where an army at least equal to that engaged at 
Waterloo must be transported to a distant field of 
action as the first step, for which 10,000,000/. 
will have to be voted, and 200,000 tons of ship- 
ping to be taken up. 

If to-day England cannot be brought to take 
measures to prevent the catastrophe, how will she 
then be induced to decide on repairing it? If in 
1833 she tamely submitted to the apparent occu- 



xiv 

pation of Constantinople, will she be prepared to 
eject Russia, when she really occupies in 1837 ; — 
when all she looks to now as worth having shall 
have been lost,— when her anxious solicitude will 
be turned to India, — when the question will no 
longer be a maritime, but a land question, — and 
when her whole amount of actual force will be in- 
sufficient? If to-day England, with the moral 
strength of the world at her disposal, cannot be 
brought to take up any position in opposition to 
Russia, — will she then, when the strength of Rus- 
sia is doubled, when Russia has only one point to 
defend, assume the aggressive ? 

But these are not the only effects which the oc- 
J cupation of the Dardanelles will have on England. 
If she does not assume the aggressive, she must 
stand on the defensive, — there is no middle course. 
In what state then is Malta and the Ionian Islands? 
Must they not be strengthened, — must not our ma- 
ritime force in the Mediterranean be placed on the 
footing of war ? If we are on the defensive, — where 
is our European influence ? In what state are our 
finances ? 

Our internal resources must be exhausted by an 
armed and expensive observation in India, the 
Levant, and elsewhere, which must go on increas- 
ing, without benefit, without hope. The question 
will present itself in this form : Shall we expel 
Russia, or withdraw within ourselves ? The first 
will be hopeless ; the second but a declaration of 



XV 



the consequences to England of the occupation of 
the Dardanelles. England cannot exist without 
her foreign influence, commerce, and dominion ; 
and when we are reduced to practical measures of 
defence, by a peaceable and practical alteration of 
the balance of power, it is clear that they have 
passed away from us. 

But these are not the only effects of the occupa-^ 
tion of Constantinople ; — not only the opening 
prospects of commerce, but that which actually 
exists with the Levant, with Turkey, with the pro- 
vinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, with Southern 
Russia, with central Asia, and with Persia, is at 
once annihilated, and the 60 or 70,000 tons of 
shipping so occupied thrown out of employment. 
It is sufficiently well known that Russia, even at a 
great money sacrifice, labours at present to ex- 
clude our commerce from every country under her 
control, or subject to her influence. She has 
arrested the transit trade through Georgia to 
Persia — she blockades permanently the eastern 
coast of the Black Sea — she has forced regulations 
injurious to us on the Turkish Government — she 
has done her best to prevent the introduction of 
our manufactures into the Provinces — she prohibits 
in her own rapidly extending dominions almost 
every article of British manufacture, except yarn, 
which soon also will be prohibited, and uses that 
which she at present imports in working up into 
stuffs to exclude our commerce from central Asia 



xvi 



— to that end Moscow cottons, made of English 
yarn, are sold at Teheran cheaper than they can 
be bought at Manchester; so that while we ap- 
pear to have no commercial interests in that quar- 
ter, we believe we have a good customer in Russia. 
Poland, by her annexation to the Russian tariff, 
becomes impervious to English commerce. So 
will the Dardanelles, and throughout Turkey and 
the Levant commercial regulations, motived per- 
haps on the commercial injustice of England, will 
be promulgated by her authority, cutting us off at 
once from between four and five millions of exports 
and from an equal amount of raw imports necessary 
for the preparation of our exports to Germany, Ame- 
rica, India, China, &c. — but Germany, will it not 
be then entirely subject to the Prussian system ? 
France is already our commercial antagonist. Let 
free trade be destroyed in Turkey — let the Darda- 
nelles be closed to us — and at once our European 
commerce is reduced to the precarious chances that 
the political state of the two Peninsulas may offer — < 
and all this will be effected in peace, as retribution 
for the commercial restrictiveness of England, so 
that we shall neither have an opportunity for re- 
taliation nor a ground for remonstrance. Will 
such a state, with such prospects for our commercial 
prosperity, counteract the depression produced by 
our political prostration ? Will it increase our 
means or our spirit for undertaking a hopeless war, 
which will clearly be beyond our means— in 



xvii 

which, judging by what we see around us, we will 
obtain no foreign support — and in which we will 
be not only without a force sufficient to attack our 
enemy, but without force sufficient to contain (we 
speak not of defending) our colonial empire ? 

To support a struggling friend still on his feet, 
worsted but erect, injured but self-possessed, is an 
easy, a natural, an exciting thing ; but to raise up 
one prostrate, to draw upon oneself the undivided 
hostility, whatever it may be, of his successful 
antagonist, to breathe the breath of hope and 
courage into nostrils from which vitality has 
departed, to prop up the body from which life is 
fled — is a wild, a hopeless enterprise, not an object 
to animate and exasperate, but a sight to sadden 
and depress — such precisely was on England, 
however little admitted, the effect of the conviction 
that a body of troops equipped suddenly in the 
arsenals of Russia, transported in her vessels, 
landed on the Bosphorus, admitted by the Turks, 
received as deliverers by the Sultan, arresting 
invasion, and after restoring peace, preserving the 
throne and saving the empire — voluntarily retiring. 
Was not this the general impression left by that 
event, and by the mode in which Russia succeeded 
in having it believed ? is not such the impression 
very generally at this day ? The natural con- 
sequence of that impression is it not that Turkey 
has been, and is at the mercy of Russia, and that 
she continues to exist merely by the sufferance of 

c 



xviii 



the Emperor ? Who therefore can dream of 
supporting Turkey against its master ! against 
its disinterested protector ! who can credit the 
existence of strength in Turkey — of weakness in 
Russia ? Who can admit or comprehend destruc- 
tive and disorganizing influence used on Turkey 
by her proprietor and defender ? who can admit 
designs on the part of Russia? So much has 
Russia worked out from the mere topography* of 
her encampment on the Giant's Mountain. 

We trust what we have said is sufficient to show 
the objects Russia has in view, in making us be- 
lieve that she has occupied Constantinople, and 
that we can expel her should she be so imprudent 
as to occupy it. 

% This recalls forcibly to our recollection a conversation with a 
man high in office in the Ottoman empire. " The progress of 
Russia/' he observed, " is chiefly owing to a body of engineers which 
she has, and which no other nation has." We expressed our sur- 
prise at this assertion, and our belief that on this point Russia was 
greatly inferior to the other powers. " You have a great deal of fine 
words and science," he answered, "but you never know what ground 
is under your feet. Russia has a body of geographers who under- 
stand the map of Europe, which no other Government does/' How 
much is not Europe indebted, we will not say, to the simple sense 
and singleness of opinion — but to the ignorance of the Turks. 
Had Constantinople been the capital, not of a minor State, but of 
Austria, or even France, might not the Dardanelles have been 
Russian long ago! 



xix 



The demand for a fifth edition of this essay in 
so short a space of time, furnishes the writer with 
an occasion, which he seizes with extreme satisfac- 
tion, of expressing his gratification at the progress 
this question has made. It is not many months 
since he who talked of Russian designs was treated 
as a visionary — since he who talked of elements of 
regeneration in Turkey was set down as an enthu- 
siast — since Russian aggression was considered a 
question of European political principles — since 
Turkey was considered as of no weight in the 
balance of power. These fallacies have separately 
vanished, or at least find no supporters — the con- 
trary convictions have separately sprung up. — 
Russia's designs are no longer considered visionary 
— Turkey's power of regeneration is established — 
Russian aggression is considered a distinct question 
from legitimate and constitutional principles — 
Turkey is felt to be important for the preservation 
of that which exists, and the disposal of that Em- 
pire is considered by all as decisive of that which is to 
be. These distinct convictions, when combined, 
must lead to the practical conclusions, That Turkey \ 
must be saved for the preservation of peace, and 



xxii 



in contradiction with the majority, if not with the 
totality of writers on Turkey. Of course opposite 
opinions must be contradictory ; the objection 
proves no more — and of contradictory opinions one 
must be right and one wrong ; as no attempt has 
been made to shew that they are wrong, no further 
proof of their truth is required than the silence of 
those who have promulgated the reverse. Know- 
ledge is to be arrived at only by study, truth by 
enquiry — study and enquiry imply means adapted 
to the subject-matter. An enquiry into the insti- 
tutions of Turkey requires time, connexion, a pre- 
vious knowledge of languages, intimacies, and 
labour on extensive and remote fields, as condi- 
tions necessary, and yet not fulfilled by the ma- 
jority of those travellers who have furnished the 
materials on which the opinions of this country 
have been formed. The non-fulfilment of these 
conditions leads to the presupposition of error. The 
very boldness of the assertions that have been so 
generally hazarded on the state of Turkish society, 
warrants the suspicion of their being unfounded. 
So true is this that those who have more or less in- 
quired into this question, so vast, so disheartening 
by its difficulties, so encouraging by its novelty, 
are more or less diffident — and the more so in pro- 
portion to their information, in expressing their 



XX111 

opinions or in hazarding conclusions. Still the 
views here stated are not those of one but of several 
individuals, formed distinctly — having examined 
different parts of the question — having been occu- 
pied on fields remote from each other — and whose 
coincidence can only be accounted for by truth. 

The writer takes this opportunity of entreating 
those who may peruse these pages not to think 
that they have before them the exposition of a 
question on which they are to judge — but to 
consider them as a contribution to the scanty fund 
of information that is accessible on a subject which 
demands the most anxious and pressing attention 
of this nation, and the decision of its Government. 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 
RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



CHAPTER I. 

Connection of Turkey and Poland. — On the Dardanelles de- 
pends the Existence of both. — Weakness of Russia there. — 
Strength elsewhere. — Concert of England and France with 
Russia, in undermining Turkey. — Connection of Greek Re- 
volt with the War of 1828-9. — Position taken by Russia, 
1821. — Ultimatum and Withdrawal of her Ambassador. — 
Answer of the Porte. — Declaration of War in 1828. — 
Declares Turkey detached from Europe ; yet guarantees 
the fulfilment of the Treaty of 6th July. — Possession of the 
Dardanelles, necessary to the tranquillity and internal de- 
velopment of Russia. 

A people, great by its numbers, its martial spirit, 
and its disasters, has at length sunk under the 
arms of Russia. If a nation can die, Poland has 
descended to the tomb ; whether or not a day of 
resurrection is reserved for it in other times, — it is, 
now, dead to those motives which interest one 
state in the preservation of another ; its space is 
void in the political map of Europe ; its place is 

B 



2 ENGLAND, FRANCE, 

empty at her council tables. The relative position 
of the other members has been violently deranged ; 
but, though evidently not insensible to its effects, 
they have accepted, without an effort to prevent, 
the catastrophe. 

How did it happen that the two first nations in 
the world, in a state of peace and of closest union, 
should suffer the incorporation with Russia of any 
people whatever, whether guaranteed by treaties 
or not — far less of that people universally recog- 
nised the bulwark of Europe against the organised 
overflow of the Sclavonic hordes ? How could 
such great political interests be overlooked ? How 
could the very cry of humanity be stifled ? The 
difficulty, the apparently overwhelming difficulty, 
of the enterprise, made them turn away their eyes 
from interests that appeared too seriously compro- 
mised to be worth vindicating, and silenced the 
sympathies it was unworthy of them to avow in 
vain. Poland was only to be supported by a war 
with the three northern powers. Its extinction 
was, therefore, not a political necessity, that called 
for instantaneous decision ; it was a calamity, 
lamentable, but irreparable. It became even 
generous to silence, in favour of suffering huma- 
nity, the voice of national interest ; and a French 
minister had the satisfaction, at length, of pro- 
claiming, in a French Chamber, that " order was 
" restored at Warsaw." But the northern league, 
sufficiently powerful to compass the overthrow of 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY, 



3 



Poland, is now strengthened by the vast acquisi- 
tion, and by the moral preponderance resulting 
from success. The struggle is inevitable, unless 
one party or the other sacrifices its interest, and 
submits without a struggle to the consequences of 
defeat. Europe is converted into two hostile 
camps ; their last resources are unreservedly ex- 
pended in preparatives that indicate the deter- 
mination of a speedy rupture, which their pressure 
must hasten. Where then is the arena to be 
opened ? Where are those bristled lines to be 
assailed ? Who is to be the aggressor ? 

Russia herself has offered, in this dilemma, a 
solution that glares in the eyes of Europe, in the 
violence with which she extorted from Turkey the 
Treaty of the 8th of July, which ensured, as far 
as diplomatic bonds could ensure, the closing of 
the mails over the only vulnerable and the most 
vital part of her gigantic body. 

The impulse of France, when the most trifling 
succour would have saved Poland, was arrested 
by the objection, that her armies must pass over 
the body of Germany. Did France not know 
that she could cast her shadow over the sea ? 
Had she no chart of the Euxine — no thought of 
Turkey? No memory of their common and 
historic hostility to the destroyer of Poland ? 

Is the substance of Turkey, too, to be added to 
the growth of Russia ? Is the Mammoth of the 
Sarmatian plains to become the Leviathan of the 



4 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Hesperian seas ? Is another victim to be sacri- 
ficed within so short a space of time on the same 
altar ; and because the same trifling succour is 
again withheld ? Are the remains of Turkey to be 
laid on the tomb of Poland, to exclude every ray 
of hope, and render its doom irrevocable ? 

It is by the Dardanelles that we must reach the 
heart of the Ottoman empire ; it is from the Bos- 
phorus that our fleets must issue, to arrest the 
invader. Invigorate Turkey, you not only save 
her, but repair the disaster her weakness alone has 
brought about*. The existence of Poland is bound 
to that of Turkey. One hand of iron is laid on 
both ; unlock that withering grasp, and both start 
simultaneously to life. The Dardanelles are the 
key to both ; both are to be secured by their pos- 
session, or sacrificed by their loss. 

When some arrangement in the peninsula, some 
protocol in Belgium thwarts her views, when any 
difficulty arises in the Spanish and Belgian settle- 
ments, difficulties created by herself to occupy us 
elsewhere and divert our attention from Turkey, 

* The testimony contemporary with the partition of Poland 
is unequivocal, as to the connection between Poland and Tur- 
key. The successful termination of the Russian war against 
the Turks, in 1774, caused the partition. " But the fate of 
" Poland," says Coxe, " like that of its vassal, the Duke of 
" Courland, must ultimately depend on the event of the pre- 
" sent war between Russia and the Turks." 

Northern Tour, Vol. I., p. 178. 



liUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



5 



Russia thunders menaces and insults from her 
organs in the German press ; parades the greatness 
of her power, the number of her troops, the vast- 
ness of her territory, the strength of her alliances 
and position ; because, here, she opposes an empire, 
a military monarchy, and the whole German fede- 
ration, to her enemy's attack. But let the Ottoman 
question be only hinted at — let but a squadron 
hover near the sensitive part, that haughty power 
is instantly on her knees ; protestations, explana- 
tions, declarations of magnanimity, of loyalty, and 
charity, are sent abroad, to conjure the storm; 
here she feels how little is sufficient to reanimate 
her old Ottoman foe — to unite the now divided 
and hostile parts of that empire — to rally its 
repressed energies — to arouse its smothered ven- 
geance — to detach from her, her subservient allies 
— to bring the war, not to her door, but on her 
hearth ; to concentrate on her single head the 
chances of a war, from which, bursting in the west, 
she was entirely sheltered. The difference of her 
language in both cases characterises the difference 
of danger. In the first, Russia is entrenched 
behind the armies of Germany, which she will ever 
rejoice to see engaged in an exhausting struggle. 
If they are overpowered, she has the entrenchment 
of her latitude, her deserts, and her snows. In 
the other, she is placed on the first rank ; she 
stands there alone, without shelter, without defen- 
sive armour ; and the point of the hostile sword is 
at her breast. 



6 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Such is the question we propose to examine. 
The contingency can only arise, the right only be 
acquired, or rather the necessity imposed, of 
resorting to those final measures, by the positive 
hostility of Russia, and the immediate danger of 
Turkey. It is necessary, first, to examine the rela- 
tions of these two empires to each other, in the 
dispassionate manner that so impressive a question 
demands, and with as much succinctness as one so 
extensive will admit ; nor will we be betrayed one 
step beyond the conclusions to which our own 
imperative and palpable interests lead, either by 
regard to her real weakness, to the use she makes 
of her power and influence, or by resentment for 
her hostility to ourselves. 

It is ten years of continuous disasters, occasioned 
or exasperated by the hostility, open or disguised, 
of Russia, and the errors of France and England, 
that have reduced the existence of Turkey to a 
diplomatic decision between the courts of Europe. 
Here a most important consideration meets us, on 
the very threshold of the question. These errors 
of our cabinets, have they not entirely resulted 
from confidence in the declarations and engage- 
ments of Russia ? Therefore it is, that our measures 
or inaction have become errors. The misfortunes 
for Turkey, the danger for ourselves, follow ; not 
because there was a contest of duplicity between 
us and Russia, in which we were worsted, but be- 
cause we treated Russia as a civilised nation, and 
as an European government. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



7 



The independence of Turkey has been under- 
mined by her, under the mask of common objects, 
common measures, and formal alliance with the 
two cabinets most interested, and which may soon 
be under the necessity of recurring to the last 
resort in its support ; by an unparalleled combina- 
tion of successful delusions, she not only has veiled 
from them her motives and her acts, but has called 
in the aid of their armies and fleets, and the whole 
weight of their moral support, for the furtherance 
of her designs. 

Are the stipulations subsequently exacted vio- 
lations of the previous contract ? Are they blows 
levelled at the interests which motived that con- 
tract ? It may be absurd to ask the question ; but 
Europe has not been accustomed, yet, to see faith 
broken with impunity with great European powers. 
It has not been accustomed to see the interests 
that touch nearest to the political existence of 
England and France, trampled on and insulted by 
any power whatever. It has not yet learnt that 
the will of the Czar of Muscovy is law in Europe ; 
and yet there is no means of avoiding these conclu- 
sions, other, than by supposing that England and 
France have exacted no pledge from Russia, and 
that they have no interest in Turkey. 

But let us take the question such as Russia, at 
this very hour, presents it. She declares loudly, J 
unequivocally, that she has no design on Turkey ; 
and that she has every interest and every wish to 



8 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



maintain the integrity and independence of Tur- 
key. Let us examine, therefore, in detail, how 
that independence has been affected by her acts, 
and by the acts into which she has betrayed Eng- 
land and France ; and if, in the inquiry, we dis- 
cover these acts to be in opposition to her words, 
her motives in contradiction with her declarations, 
we may legitimately infer, that she entertains 
different opinions from us respecting her own 
strength ; that she perceives her objects are, as 
yet, only to be attained by the most impenetrable 
mystery and delusion. The obligation of so 
immense a responsibility to their nation, their 
predecessors, and posterity, may account for the 
Emperor, the Ministers, and Envoys of Russia, 
condescending to have recourse to means, not 
only unworthy of men of personal honour and 
character, and filling such prominent stations in 
society, but (excepting, always, this hard neces- 
sity) disgraceful to men sunk to a low level of 
moral depravity. 

The Greek revolt, parent of the actual pros- 
tration of Turkey, is the most important chapter 
of this mighty scheme. That revolt has pro- 
duced all the fruits which Russia expected from 
it ; but it has produced others, on which she did 
not calculate ; which we never could have most 
remotely anticipated, far less devised*. But that 

* We mean docility of the Turkish mind, reformation of 
the abuses of the government, and a conviction of the ne- 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



9 



this revolt, as the two others that preceded it, was 
the handwork of Russia, is a truism too trite to 
bear repetition. 

We must consecrate a few pages to the con- 
nection between that revolt and the Treaty of 
Adrianople. We shall judge Russia from her own 
mouth. Her first document of importance is the 
the note of Baron StrogonofF, of July 18, 1321. 
A paper so ably drawn up, as almost to make one 
feel gratified in the success of talents worthy a 
better cause. But what must the feelings of a 
Russian be ? What the spirit and enthusiasm 
which must animate the meanest agents of a 
system directed to such mighty objects, so admi- 
rably conducted, and so eminently successful ? 
But these documents should be studied at length, 
and with a full acquaintance with the subject, to 
comprehend their insidiousness, and their moral 
effect on both Turks and Greeks, and on the 
feelings of Europe, thus prepared for the positive 
hostility of the great powers against the Porte, 
which it was their object to produce, and which, 
consequently, was brought about*. 

cessity of associating its interests, and concerting its plans 
and policy with those European nations, the interests of which 
are injured by the progress of Russia. 

* This is the second time that Russia has made the natural 
allies of her prey plunge, themselves, the knife into its heart. 
The judicious Turkish historian, Vasiff Effendi, has this 
remarkable passage. " In these circumstances, the King 



10 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



" Russia saw, in the conservation of the Turkish 
" government, an additional means of consolidating 
" the peace of Europe. It was therefore her duty 
" to condemn every enterprise which could com- 
" promise the existence of this government. It 
" was her duty, moreover, as a power always 
" loyal, always disinterested in her relations with 
" a state, which, for five years, she had unceas- 
" ingly urged to surround itself with the guaran- 
" tees of a religious observance of Treaties, and 
" the absence of every motive of discussion. But 
" Russia did more ; she offered to the Porte a co- 
" operation, franchement amicale, the efficacy of 
" which could not he doubtful." 

The passages in italics convey hints and threats 
very exasperating to the Porte, but the drift of 
which might escape the penetration of an English 
reader. 

" died, and the Republic was soon a prey to internal convul- 
" sions ; the Russians took care to foment them ; they even 
V seduced a faction of the Poles, and had the art to make 
" themselves be called in by them. The Porte sought, by 
" every means, to warn the Republic against these deceitful 
" appearances of friendship ; she pointed out Russia's pro- 
" jects of aggrandisement, and entreated them to be on their 
" guard against so dangerous an ally." A few pages after- 
wards, we find that the Porte, in consequence of the offensive 
and defensive treaty between Russia and Poland " was exas> 
" perated to such a degree, as to declare war against the 
" Republic' 



RUSSIA AND TURKEY. 



11 



" It is with the most lively regret, that Russia 
" sees that her propositions have not been appre- 
" ciated by the Sublime Porte ; that the Turkish 
" Government appeared not to conceive the im- 
" portance of appeasing these troubles, and pre- 
" venting their recurrence ; and that by the system 
" it adopted, it was about to excite, in favour of 
" men who had attacked its authority, sentiments 
" which all people revere ; sentiments of religion, 
" of humanity, of patriotism, of interest, inspired 
" by a nation reduced to despair. 

" The Sublime Porte may easily explain to 
" itself the consequences of such a system. It will 
" find itself forcedly, in spite of the most bene- 
" volent intentions of the powers of Europe, in a 
" state of hostility with the christian world, 

" Now, in the first place, if the disorders, of „ 
" which the undersigned has been forced to retrace 
" the afflicting picture, are to continue, or cannot 
" be remedied, Russia, far from finding a guar an- 
" tee of peace? in the duration of the Ottoman 
" empire, would see itself forced, sooner or later, 
" to accomplish that which command — her insulted 
" religion, her infringed treaties, her co-religion- 
" aries proscribed, 

" Au reste, — the Ottoman ministry must have 
" already judged, by the unanimity of the repre- 
" sentations that have been made to it, that the 
" cause which Russia pleads is an European 

" CAUSE." 

But this note is something more than the ex- 



12 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



pression of a deep and philanthropic interest — 
something more than the proffer of counsel and 
aid to the Porte. Russia's benevolence goes fur- 
ther ; for, apprehending the blindness of the Porte 
to her own interest, this note becomes an ultima- 
tum. Accept my advice, says Russia, or the ac- 
complishment instantaneously of that which other- 
wise, " sooner or later," I shall have to accomplish. 
If, in eight days, the Porte did not " exhauce tous 
" les voeux et realise toutes les esperances de sa Ma- 
" jeste Imperiale," she was to be cut off from all 
communications with Russia ; the minister was to 
retire ; and in this declaration of war, he was the 
advocate of Christianity and of all Europe, and 
threatened the empire with invasion while revolt 
was kindled in its provinces, and hatred and dis- 
trust inspired into its councils against the only 
well-intentioned but ignorant allies who could 
support it. To such a pitch was this unheard-of 
violence pushed, that after fixing eight days for 
the answer, it was absolutely rejected, on the pre- 
tence of the term being expired. The simple 
Turkish detail of this singular transaction deserves 
certainly as much attention as the Russian rhetoric. 

" Howsoever contrary the fixation of such a 
" term, to the rules established between two courts, 
" still the Sublime Porte took to heart to conform 
" to it. Effectively, the eighth day being finished, 
" preparation was made to transmit the answer 
" on the next day, and the dragomans of Russia 
" were sent for, to convey it to the minister. The 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



13 



" dragomans alleged some pretext, and intimated 
" that they would come for it the day after. They 
" did present themselves at the Reis-EfTendi's, and 
" declared that, the term of eight days having 
" expired, the minister could not receive the 
" answer of the Sublime Porte." This is what 
Russia calls rendering to the Porte " the last 
" service she ow r ed it," and in doing which, " the 
" Emperor believes he has fulfilled all his duties 
" jusqu'un scruple* !" 

Before dismissing this document, we must ex- 
tract from it a passage eminently edifying, as 
proving the interest which a mighty government, 
in the midst of the cares attached to its dominion, 
finds time to take in the fate of 500,000 subjects 
of a foreign power. " Public acts devote to punish- 
" ment and to death a people that had hitherto 

* It is singular, that the rupture thus brought about, was 
justified chiefly on the Turkish government not withdrawing 
its troops from the provinces ; from the very provinces that 
had been the focus of the insurrection which Russia had 
offered her troops to suppress ! This was called a violation 
of the treaty of Bucharest ; whilst Russia withheld not from 
subject princes, but from Turkey, the fortresses of Anapa, 
Poti, &c. the surrender of which was stipulated in that 
treaty. Those who wish to know how the English 
Ambassador did " make known to the Divan, the ' pensee' 
" of the Emperor," will find it in Lord Strangford's notes, 
and the Porte's answer ; especially an admirable one of 
February 1822. It is well that we should know how active 
we ourselves have been in wounding Turkey. 



14 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



4< beenjwotected ! by positive stipulations and a re- 
" spect tacit, but indispensable for the other people 
et of Europe. It would be superfluous to cite all the 
" stipulations of His Highness, which attest the 
" exactitude of this assertion. That which is too 
" certain is, that not only the authors of these dis- 
" orders, but the Greek nation en masse, and the 
" sources of its existence and reproduction, are 
" attacked by the measures taken by the court of 
" Constantinople." 

Deep conviction must have surely spoken in 
these energetic expressions — benevolence and 
humanity must be the presiding genii in her 
councils — and late events in Poland a dream. 

It is not for the idle purpose of criminating 
Russia that we quote these passages, but with 
the serious and practical object of proving, by her 
fears, her weakness ; the sole motive which can 
lead her to assume a part otherwise so puerile. 

We certainly will not attempt to analyse the 
Russian declaration of war ; we will merely extract 
a few passages. 

I " His Imperial Majesty expecting, from the 
^ union of the three courts, the prompt cessation 
" of the war in the east, renounced all insu- 
" lated influence, rejected every idea of exclusive 
" measures in this major question. Under his 
" auspices the conferences of Ackermann were 
" opened; they concluded, in an additional con- 
" vention to the Treaty of Bucharest, a convention, 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



15 



" the clauses of which bear the seal of that 
" calculated moderation which, submitting every 
" demand to the immutable principles of strict 
" justice, consults neither the advantages of 
" position, the superiority of forces, nor the 
" facility of success." 

In the answer of the Porte, we have a very 
different version, or, at least, an explanation of 
the meaning in Russia, of " calculated modera- 
" tion." 

" After several meetings, the Russian pleni- 
" potentiaries presented, contrary to the con- 
" vention, a separate document, under the name 
" of ultimatum, demanding that it should be 
" approved and accepted, without alteration. In 
" vain did the plenipotentiaries of the Sublime 
" Porte represent how much such a proposition 
" was contrary to all diplomatic forms, and to the 
" basis of the conference. " Notre mission," 
answered the Russians, " a pour unique objet 
" de faire absolument accepter cette piece" The 
Turks finally gave way, in consequence of the 
official declaration of the Russian plenipotentiaries, 
in the name of their court, " that Russia would 
" in no way interfere with the Greek question. 
" This declaration, consigned in the protocols on 
'* both sides, appeared a pledge of peace and 
" friendship between the two empires, for the pre- 
" sent and the future. The close of the conference 
" was implicitly motived on the said declaration, 



16 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



" and the treaty was concluded, de bonne grace 
" without looking too closely at each of the 
" articles." 

The declaration of war, after expressing the 
regret of the Emperor that his sacrifices were never 
appreciated, nor his moderation understood, thus 
continues : — 

" However, a war with Turkey involved no 
" complication of the relations of Russia and her 
" allies — no compact of guaranteeship — no political 
" obligations connected the destinies of the Otto- 
" man Empire with the reparatory stipulations of 
" 1814 and 1815, under the shadow of which, 
" civilised and christian Europe reposed from 
" its long discords, and saw its governments 
" united by the memory of a common glory*, and 
" by a happy identity of principles and intentions." 

How does she forget, in 1828, that in 1821 she 
spoke to Turkey merely as an advocate of the 
christian and European cause ? The Greek revo- 
lution had produced its effect on Europe, and the 
treaty of July had been signed ; not indeed a 
treaty of her own making, or of her proposing, 
but one to which she merely adhered, from innate 
horror at the expenditure of human life ; and 
gratified the Great Captain of the age, by the 
proof her adhesion afforded, of the influence he 
possessed over her councils. 



* A warning to France ! 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



17 



But, " Russia, by her state of hostility with the 
" Porte, from motives independent of the Treaty 
" of July, adheres, and will adhere, to the stipu- 
" lations of that Act. The duties it imposes on 
" her, the principles on which it is founded, will 
" be — the first, fulfilled with the most scrupulous 
" fidelity, — the second, observed without deviation. 
" Her allies will always find her ready to concert 
" her march with them in the execution of the 
" Treaty of London ; and ever anxious to aid in 
" a work, which her religion, and all the senti- 
" ments honourable to humanity, recommend to 
" her active solicitude ; always disposed to profit 
" by her actual position, only for the purpose of 
" accelerating the accomplishment of the clauses 
" of the 6th of July ; not to change their nature 
" or effects." 

Russia creates the Greek insurrection, denounces J 
it to the Porte, and offers to assist in quelling it ; 
then menaces war in consequence of the severe 
measures taken by the Porte — spreads the revolt 
by these menaces, publicly notified by the depar- 
ture of her ambassador,— brings about the hostility 
between Turkey and Christendom, which she de- 
plores — makes herself be entreated by England to 
enter the alliance, settled by the treaty of July — 
obtains the important advantages of the conven- 
tion of Akermann, by renouncing, in favour of 
Turkey, all further interference in the affairs of 

c 



18 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Greece* ; is then permitted by her allies to seize 
that inestimable moment, when Turkey was appa- 
rently at the last gasp, for making war, so that she 
might bring about the settlement of the affairs of 
Greece. When she has brought about enmity 

" * In April, Russia signed the protocol by which she 
" engaged to interfere in the affairs of Greece. In Septem- 
" ber, she procured the acceptance of the Convention of 
" Akermann, by engaging not to interfere in these affairs. 
" In July, she signed the Treaty of London, renewing the 
" engagements of April, W'ith the addition of a determination 
" to use force if necessary : and in October, her admiral, 
" acting on the nautical interpretation of that document, 
" took part in the battle of Navarino, where the Ottoman 
" fleet was annihilated, in the midst of profound peace, by 
" the three powers who had so lately concluded a treaty of 
" ' peace, mediation and conservation.' Yet a mental reser- 
" vation, of which the Porte accused itself in a letter to its 
" own subjects, was the only intelligible cause of complaint 
" on which Russia could found a pretext for detaching her- 
" self from her allies, and declaring war upon separate 
" grounds. 

" After the battle of Navarino and the departure of the 
" ambassadors from Constantinople, the Porte did not doubt 
" that it was at war with the three powers, and it therefore 
" appealed to the patriotism of the Turks, and called upon 
" them to arm themselves in defence of their country and 
" their religion. At the same time it informed them, not 
" that it had been deceived by Russia, which was the 
" truth, but, that it had deceived Russia, and had signed the 
" Convention of Akermann for the purpose of gaining time." 
—Quarterly Review, No. CV. p. 234, 235. Note to Fifth 
Edition, 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



19 



and hostility between Turkey and Europe, she 
discovers that Turkey is no longer necessary 
to the balance of European power. Generosity 
induces her not to destroy it. She engages herself 
not to " profit by the position" in which her allies 
have placed her, to deviate in no way from the 
stipulations (stipulations of mediation, of peace, 
and conservation) of the 6th July. Mediator in 
Greece, she is belligerent only in Roumelia and 
Anatoly ; but she captures vessels in the Archi- 
pelago, and blockades the Dardanelles ; and she 
subsidises Greece at the same moment, to maintain 
20,000 troops on her frontiers, to paralyse the 
operations of the Turks*. 

Was it for this that Canning devised that me- , 
morable Treaty ? Was it thus that the "influence 
" of Russia in Greece was to be nullified, and her 
" interference in Turkey prevented ?" In the 

* But these men, instead of entering the exposed provinces 
on the border, were restrained in an inaction wholly inconceiv- 
able to them, and productive of more than one disorder. 
Thessaly and the Pindus were ripe for insurrection, and were 
only restrained by emissaries, sent by Capo d'Istria, conjuring 
them, menacing, threatening them with the vengeance of all 
Europe, and promising ultimate deliverance, if they did not 
" ruin themselves, by disturbing the plans of the allies ;" 
using every art and argument to prevent the positive exten- 
sion of the Greek territory, which he seemed so anxious to 
increase in the conferences of Poros. Greece was large 
enough for Russia's immediate objects — too large already 
for her future ones. 



20 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



execution of a Treaty for the maintenance of 
Turkey you have destroyed the chief means of 
defence for a maritime capital — her fleet* ; you 
have made her believe that your object was her 
destruction ; your ambassadors have quitted her 
capital. You have, therefore, according to her 
means of judging, formally, as well as practically, 
declared war. What can follow, save " the results 
" which the Emperor expects from the blessing of 
€S Him whom justice and a pure conscience have 
" never invoked in vainf." 

What other government, even the weakest in 
^ Europe, would venture to urge in diplomatic docu- 
ments, motives of humanity, of philanthropy, or 
religion ? It was reserved for Russia alone to 
prostitute all that is most sacred, most respectable, 
in the conventional terms of intercourse between 
man and man, to the furtherance of projects, enter- 
tained only on the faith of the disunion, the 
credulity, and the ignorance of Europe. Yet it 
has hitherto been her fortune to have her words 
believed and her acts neglected. It has been 

* It is singular how those who have undertaken to be the 
advocates of British interests in the East, think themselves 
bound to vilify and be ignorant of the means by which British 
interests are to be supported; for instance, Colonel Evans 
scoffs at the idea of Turkey being injured by the destruction 
of her fleet. 

f Conclusion of Russian declaration of war, 26th April, 
1828. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



21 



reserved for her alone to conciliate the good-will 
and services of all parties*, and of all sects ; and so 
high does she bear herself on our dissentions, as to 
dare to insult, and to insult with impunity, the 
great powers of Europe, by speaking of the " mag- 
" nanimity of the Emperor." Why is this en- 
dured ? Merely because distant and faint glimpses 
were only caught, at times, of what she was about; 
and no one felt the injury her progress entailed on 
us, or the facilities that existed for restraining 
her. 

" Does any one who is acquainted with the dis- 
" cussions of 1821, and the proceedings of Baron 
" Strogonoff, — with the terms of the ultimatum he 
" presented — with the rude manner in which he 
" rejected the answer of the Porte — and his subse- 
" quent departure from Constantinople, as the 
" Porte truly said, ( without a cause' — can any 
" one, who has any knowledge of this whole trans- 
" action, doubt for one moment, that it was the 
" intention of the Russian ambassador to produce 
" a rupture — or that he would have succeeded, 
" had the ambassadors of France and England 
" been prepared to leave Constantinople as they 
" afterwards did in 1827? Was not the war be- 

* It was the Liberals throughout Europe who supported 
Capo d'Istria ; her first establishment on the Black Sea, she 
owes to Fox out of office. The treaty of Adrianople, the 
declaration of war, to the Tories in office — the Carlists of 
France look to her possession of Constantinople as the signal 
of the restoration of the fallen dynasty. 



22 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



" tween Persia and Turkey, wliich broke out at 
" that very time, undertaken at the instigation of 
" the Russian charge d'affaires at Tabreez, and 
" justified by him in a long note addressed to an 
" officer of the Shah's houshold ? Could it be that 
" so remarkable an apparent coincidence between 
" the views of the Russian representatives at these 
" distant courts was the result of no previous 
" concert ? 

" But the violence of the Russian ambassador 
" was unavailing. The firmness and address of 
" the British government, and the temperate con- 
" duct of the Porte, postponed the catastrophe ; 
" and it was not until the shackles we had forged 
" for ourselves in the treaty of London, had chained 
" us to the side of Russia, and the evil effects of 
" so ill-omened a connexion in such a cause had 
" already prostrated Turkey, that we not only lost 
" the power of preventing a rupture, but found 
" ourselves contributing to the aggrandisement of 
" our rival, and hastening the subjugation of our 
" ally*." 

The war is at length concluded, Russia's mate- 
rial means being at the last ebb ; and the Porte's 
moral means totally exhausted ; still Russia wears 
a menacing aspect after the passage of the Balkan, 
till she extorts a threat from England of cap- 
turing her fleet at Tenedos, She, consequently, 
leaves the impression of the Turkish empire having 



* Quarterly Review, No. CV. p. 231. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



23 



been within her grasp ; and to England, the pride 
and confidence of reflecting that a menace of her's 
sufficed, at any hour, to arrest the progress of 
Russia. Our ambassador newly arrived, and the 
other diplomatists hurried by their alarms a treaty, 
which, if postponed a few w r eeks, would never 
have taken place ; for the Russian corps was fast 
melting away, and the Turkish troops were begin- 
ning to recover from their terror, their delusion, or 
their expectations, according to the motives that 
influenced them, or the means by which they had 
been practised upon. 

Then appeared a manifesto : words, like sun- 
beams, are sent forth, to dazzle the eyes of Europe ; 
and piety and sentimentality unite to celebrate 
the reluctant victories of the Russian arms over 
despotism, infidelity, and barbarism. 

The left bank of the Danube is occupied ; — it is 
to arrest the scourge of humanity — the plague. 
The important fortresses of the borders of Cir- 
cassia are united in perpetuity to the empire — 
it is to arrest the traffic, horrible to Russia, in 
slaves*. The loss of human life has been com- 
pensated by the irrevocable settlement of the 
Greek question — so dear to her allies, so sacred to 
her own sense of religion and of humanity. The 

* The slave trade of Circassia, on the repression of which 
Russia has advanced such great claims on the humanity of 
Europe, is, however, only in name, connected with the state 
of the negro slave, or her own twenty-five millions of degraded 
serfs. In Turkey, slavery means adoption. The slave is one 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



grievances of her own subjects, so long patiently 
borne — are redressed ; and, in fine, the Darda- 
nelles are made entirely free — to the commerce 
of all nations ; still Russia " has remained con- 
" stantly a stranger to every desire of conquest — 
" to every view of aggrandisement*." 

But it may, perhaps, be supposed that the 
extension of the Russian dominion, like our own 
in India, has been brought about by circumstances, 
and is contrary to the principles it has laid down 
for its own conduct. But any one who knew no 
more of Russia than is to be learnt from this very 
, declaration of war, must be aware, after perusing 
, it, that the possession of the Dardanelles ought to 
' be, if it is not, the chief object of the policy of 

of the family ; is united to his master by ties of consanguinity, 
is trusted more than a mere relative ! has open to him 
every career, every dignity, even the seals of Vizir. The 
Circassian women are slaves in Turkey,' as Briseis in the tent 
of Achilles ; the same negro, transported to the European 
colonies, becomes a being supposed as inferior to his white 
fellow-creature in intellect as in position ; transported to Tur- 
key, he may become, he does often become — priest — general 
— pacha. The Circassians of both sexes are now brought 
contraband to Turkey. There is, of course, no violence in 
their slavery. Their ideas may be different from our's, but 
their position is the natural result of that difference. Russia 
talks of putting an end to slavery ! Let Europe look on her 
millions of beings, reduced by their condition to the level 
of brutes, and sunk below that level, by their degradation 
in their own thoughts — by the indignities they suffer without 
revenge. 

*. Manifesto, 1st October, 1829. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



25 



Russia. " The Bosphorus is closed," says Nicholas, 
in his manifesto, 26th of April, 1828; "our com- 
" merce is annihilated." The declaration of war 
continues : — " The ruin of the Russian towns, that 
" owe their existence to this commerce, becomes 
" imminent, and the meridianal provinces of the 
" states of the Emperor lose the only outlet for 
" their produce — the only maritime communi- 
" cation which can, in facilitating exchange, cause 
" labour to fructify, and bear industry and riches." 
This is a large avowal to make ; it no doubt was 
inadvertently made. How can the internal re- 
sources of Russia be developed, without the great- 
est danger to the state, whilst the outlet and inlet 
of iheir products is at the disposal of a power ren- 
dered innately hostile by a long series of encroach- 
ments, embittered by the disgust which has been 
engendered by the mode, and the humiliations 
which have bee'n added to the injury ? If the possi- 
bility of any hostile movement did not exist — if 
there were no such nations as France or England 
in the world — if the rich provinces of Turkey were 
not worth the acquisition — if Russia had no 
interest in forming a marine — if it were not 
necessary for her to prevent the existence of good 
government in Turkey, either for the prevention 
of an agricultural development, fatal to her own, 
or to take all hopes from the various populations 
wrested from Turkey, and who continue subjects 
of Russia only while misgovernment in Turkey 
continues — if, for none of these reasons, each by 



26 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



itself sufficient to justify all her efforts, the posses- 
sion of the Dardanelles were desirable, still would 
it be necessary for the security of the actual com- 
merce of Russia, and must be possessed, before the 
government can permit the extensive development 
of industry which might, at any moment, convulse 
the empire and overthrow the government, in 
consequence of a verbal order of the Reis-Effendi 
to the port captain of Constantinople. 66 The 

I " Dardanelles is for you," said Count Nesselrode ; 

\ " an important question. It is for us a vital one." 
" It is the key of my house," said Alexander. 

But, like the extension of our own dominion in 
India, although ours may grow without hindrance, 
and expand without inconvenience or control, 
even if not preconcerted, the extension of that of 
Russia must be progressive. Russia, tightened, 
constrained by a vast belt, dependent on a hostile 
door-keeper, in sight of a rich booty, and thwarted 
by a great but non-diplomatic power, must, in ex- 
panding, burst that belt — must seek to cut off that 
door-keeper, to reach that booty, and to deceive, mis- 
lead, and upset that power ; nothing can arrest her, 
if even inclined to stop, save good government and 
substantive strength in Turkey. Her intention of 
progress is displayed in her endeavours to deprive 
Turkey of these means of existence, so that its 
subjugation is a necessity for Russia, without^ 
being an object, and being her object, is doubly so. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



27 



CHAPTER II. 

Treaty of Adrianople. — Banks of Danube left uninhabited. — ■ 
Anapa and Coast of Circassia. — The Provinces. — Servia. — 
Privileges of Russian Merchants. — Commercial Claims. — 
War Contribution— Mistake of £400,000 for £4,000,000. 

But we must return to the Treaty of Adri- 
an ople. 

The first article that deserves attention is the 
third. The Delta, at the mouth of the Danube, is 
annexed to Russia, and therefore that river, the 
high way of Bulgaria, of the provinces, and now, 
by the introduction of steam navigation, of central 
Europe, is placed at her disposal, and the opposite 
bank, is to be left uninhabited for the distance, in- 
land, of six miles ; so that it is entirely out of the 
power of the Porte to retain any balancing control 
over it, 

Article IV. consigns to Russia, without ever 
mentioning it, Anapa, the key of Circassia, both 
military and commercial, obtained by treachery at 
the commencement of the war. This acquisition 
cuts off the commerce of three or four millions of 
an independent and warlike population, deprives 
them of some necessaries of life, and of ammu- 
nition ; it intercepts their communications with 



28 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Turkey, and prevents all obtrusion on Europe of 
their claims on her sympathies or interest. 

To this cession is added nearly two hundred 
miles of coast, and three military positions ; more- 
over, two fortresses, one the chief place of a Pacha- 
lick, beyond Georgia ; and this Russia takes with- 
out any views of aggrandisement ; and, secure in 
the ignorance of Europe, without condescending to 
mention names, or specify particulars. 

The separate Act, annexed to Article V., stipu- 
lates the following arrangements for the provinces 
— the nomination of the Hospodars for life ; the 
abolition of the imports in kind, which formed the 
principal source of revenue from the provinces ; 
the expulsion from them of all Mussulmans ; the 
demolition of the Turkish fortress, Giurgova : and 
the establishment of a quarantine, separating them 
from the Porte, and uniting them to Russia. 

This is a species of interference too strange to 
mean any thing less than actual possession. To 
establish, in the provinces of an empire treated as 
independent, a military cordon of this description, 
would, of course, never for a moment be tolerated 
from any other government save Russia. This 
insulated the provinces from Turkey, and gave 
Russia the control of every individual, every 
vessel, every bale of goods, every letter. The 
idea is monstrous, of a quarantine directed by a 
foreign power ; and that it should be so directed 
is provided for. The sanitary establishment is 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



29 



placed under the direction of a Russian agent : 
and the Russian consul, may be translated Roman 
Consul of the provinces. 

Article VI. confirms the stipulations of Aker- 
mann relative to Servia. To the Article itself 
there is no objection to be made ; perhaps, for the 
same reason Russia did her best to prevent its 
execution. An aid-de-camp of the Emperor's 
succeeded so completely in embroiling the question 
of the limits, that grounds of interminable dis- 
cussion would have remained open, for future 
griefs and renewed appeals, had not Prince Milosch 
thought it best to settle the matter in his own 
way, and eject the Turks. 

On the subject of Belgrade, the Emperor was 
referred to ; and his decision was such as to make 
the prince vow never to set foot in that city again, 
and to transfer the capital to Semendria. Finally, 
the settlement between Servia and the Porte was 
arranged a V amiable. The Sultan granted more 
than had been originally demanded, and added to 
the favour by the manner in which it was con- 
ferred, to the astonishment and exasperation of 
the Russian Ambassador*. 

* Prince Milosh assembled the knezes, or village chiefs 
of Servia, to submit to their rejection or confirmation the 
firman appointing him hereditary prince. The Russian 
ambassador, on learning this, allowed himself to be betrayed 
into the most indecent violence. " Does Milosh think himself 
a Bolivar ? " 



30 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Article VII. regulates the privileges of Russian 
merchants. They are to pay only the tariff of ex- 
ternal commerce ; and, having paid that, they are 
to be " molested in no case, and under no pretext, 
" by any prohibition, or any restriction whatever ; 
" nor in consequence of any measure or regulation, 
" whether of administration or of internal legis- 
" lation " But independently of the 3 per cent, 
on exportation, reduced for Russians to less than 
1 per cent., by the depreciation of the currency, 
and the antiquity of Russia's tariff, which she has 
never permitted to be renewed, there are local 
taxes on production ; against which this article 
was levelled. The consequence was, the dis- 
turbance of the whole internal administration of 
the country — the governors, and farmers of 
revenue, defrauded of rights and profits they had 
purchased, were exasperated against the Russian 
proteges; — acts of violence followed, summarily 
taken up by Russia, and a ferment produced, that 
cannot well be conceived as the result of a stipu- 
lation in a treaty with a foreign power. And in 
favour of whom was this monstrous privilege intro- 
duced ? In favour, it will be supposed, of a large 
and powerful body of mercantile men. Nothing 
of the kind. There is not a single native Russian 
merchant in Turkey ! Russia's first object was to 
multiply her proteges. Presently, one-half of the 
exports of Turkey figured as Russian property ; 
previously, Russian protection relieved the privi- 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



31 



leged class from all civil and financial obligations ; 
now, new inducements were added in such un- 
heard-of commercial prerogatives. But a far 
more important object was concealed behind this 
affection — strange to say the least, in Russia, for 
ultra freedom of commerce. The Turkish admi- 
nistration had evinced a disposition of imitating 
Mehemet Ali's monopolies. In its new difficulties, 
the idea recurred, or the suggestion Avas made by- 
some of the agents of all sorts that have occupied 
every avenue that approach every ear of men in 
office. Essays were made ; they were evidently 
infractions of those rights which Russia defended 
with so much acrimony. The Russian proteges 
in common with all foreigners and natives, thus 
exposed to a new vexation, far more oppressive 
than the slight duties from which Russia had 
emancipated them, claimed loudly redress from 
their ambassador. They were told not to meddle 
with matters that did not concern them ! Russia's 
object was attained : the " monopolies," however 
inapplicable the term, were created ; a new abuse 
if not very oppressive, very vexatious, established ; 
a noxious spirit of fiscality introduced into the ad- 
ministration ; every Frank, from one end of the 
empire to the other, exclaimed, " Turkey is lost 
and every employe of Russia added, " What a 
" country would not this be, if in the hands of a 
" civilised government!" 

Article VIII. stipulates the amount of the 



32 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



commercial claims. There is nothing else of im- 
portance, save Article IX., which determines a 
compensation for the war expenses ; which is " to 
" be settled, by common consent," between the 
two courts. 

Here, in this little sentence, lies the pith of the 
v; whole transaction ; this it is, which has mortgaged 
Turkey to her enemy ; this has led to the treaty 
of the 8th of July, to the convention of St. 
Petersburgh, and to the actual peril of the 
empire. 

It is a memorable record of the hurry with 
which so important a treaty was formed — of the 
apathy of the other embassies, and of the facilities 
possessed by Russia of over-reaching her enemy — 
that the Turkish plenipotentiaries conceived or 
were led to conceive, for the transaction took 
place through the intervention of dragomans, that 
a million meant one hundred thousand* ! The 
Treaty was signed by them, and carried back, 
after the ratification, to Constantinople, under 
the impression that the sum due was four hundred 
thousand pounds, not four millions sterling. 

Considering the deplorable state of the Russian 
troops — their utter destitution— the ravages of a 

* The sum is not specified in the treaty first communi- 
cated to the Ambassadors ; but in the annexed act, although 
the commercial claims are minutely as the epochs of pav^ient 
stipulated in the treaty. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



33 



pestilential disease* — and the revolution that had 
taken place in the disposition of the inhabitants, 
and of the Albanian army, with difficulty restrained 
by the Porte from falling on the Russians, the 
discovery, a little sooner, of this error of a cypher, 
might have prevented the necessity of the inquiry 
in which we are engaged ; but regrets are vain, 
except in as far as they may rouse us from the 
inaction that has so seriously and so uselessly 
compromised our interests, and, what is more, 
blinded us to them. 

If such are the circumstances, what becomes of 
the right of Russia to pecuniary compensation ? 
And had she every right in the world to that 
compensation, if it affects the existence of Turkey, 
is it not as imperative on us to nullify this stipula- 
tion, as to prevent the formal extinction of the 
Turkish Government? But some excuse might 
be found for our indifference, if Russia exercised 
the right, devolving on her, by the admission of her 
claim, in such a manner as to allow Turkey the 
means of discharging it. In the position of the 
one empire with respect to the other — a position 
which has admitted a stipulation such as this in 
the Treaty of Adrianople — " If any one of these 
" stipulations come to be infringed, without the 

* When the treaty was signed, not more than eight thou- 
sand were in a state to march, though, in certain Perot 
circles, they were believed fifty thousand strong. 

D 



34 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



" Minister of Russia obtaining prompt and full 
" satisfaction, the Sublime Porte recognises the 
" right of the Imperial Court of Russia to con- 
" sider such infraction as an act of hostility, and 
" immediately to have recourse to reprisals against 
" the Sublime Porte." In such a position, with 
every obligation weighing upon one party, was it 
necessary to possess further guarantees than those 
conferred by the Treaty — by the acknowledgment 
of the debt, and the means of exacting payment ? 
Was it necessary to imprison the body of the 
debtor, and to place him in the impossibility of 
defraying the debt ? In the interest even of the 
debt, he ought to be allowed to arrange his own 
affairs ; but it is evidently not the sum that the 1 
creditor requires, it is the body of his debtor — ) 
while the antagonist, feeling as yet his physical 
strength unequal to the subjugation of his enemy, 
seeks to restrain and divide his powers by fictitious 
bonds, and by the semblance of right to insulate 
him from the common sympathies of humanity, 
from the public interests of Europe. 
^ The Provinces and Silistria are mortgaged for 
the debt ! Silistria is the most important fortress 
in European Turkey. It gives Russia a place of 
arms, in the midst of the Ottoman states, which 
solves by a menace (tacit, if not avowed) every 
difference of opinion between Russia and Turkey 
on questions of foreign policy and internal admi- 
nistration. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



35 



Such are the general stipulations of the Treaty 
of Adrianople — such the thorns which England, 
and the fruits which Russia, has reaped from the 
Treaty of the 6th of July. 

" England had the air of being the soul of an 
" alliance, contracted between her, France, and 
" Russia. However, the only inheritance which 
" a Minister, who had been able to conciliate the 
" interests of his country with those of humanity, 
" left to his successor, was a Treaty of 6th July. 
" His premature death opened a field to other views ; 
" and the great event of Navarin did not lead 
" to those consequences which Europe expected ! 
" Let others inquire if we owe this grand catas- 
" trophe to mere hazard, or to the warlike humour 
" of a brave sailor*." 

Well may Russia exult in the acquisition of 
such immense results with such slender means ; — 
but no! — these admissions are altogether inci- 
dental ; they are without the deep, the intent con- 
centration of her thoughts and energies. Not a 
betraying sound will escape from her lips, not a 
smile steal over her features, until the great day of 
consummation dawns, and the peals of the Darda- 
nelles re-echo to the halls of Constantine the shouts 
and cries of victory and defiance, and the long- 
suppressed exultation of gigantic deception. 

* Valentini. Guerre contre les Turcs. 



36 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



CHAPTER III. 

Integrity of the Turkish Government. — Influence of Russia 
waning. — Appeal to England. — Revolt of Mehemet AIL — 
Russian Expedition to Constantinople. — Convention of Ad' 
miral Roussin. — Russia gets the Merit. — England arrests 
Ibrahim. — Treaty of 4<th July. — Means by which extorted. 
■ — Consequences. — Turkish Embassy to St. Peter sburgh. — 
Convention signed there. — Its Stipulations. 

But the Treaty of Adrianople was only le 
commencement de la fin. While the mode, the 
epoch, and the consequences of each of the 
four instalments of 1,500,000 ducats of the com- 
mercial indemnity are specified with the utmost 
detail, the Treaty, and the separate Act, scarcely 
condescend to allude to the eight millions of 
ducats ; we only learn that " Silistria and the 
" Provinces are excepted in the evacuation, but 
" are to be exactly restored two months after the 
" discharge of the whole debt, the payment of 
" which will be determined by his Majesty the 
" Emperor of all the Russias, on the Sublime 
" Porte's having recourse to his generosity and 
" his magnanimity." 

Of course other negociations must follow, other 
conventions are to be formed. It is no longer 
Russia that has to exact, to demand, to threaten — 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



37 



it is Turkey that has to beg, to entreat, to sup- 
plicate — the generosity, the magnanimity of the 
Emperor! Still, and it ought to be loudly pro- 
claimed in honour of the feelings and intentions of 
the men composing the Turkish government — 
however unequal to their position they were by 
capacity or information — that at this moment 
neither gold, nor flattery, nor the advantages of 
political connection, had betrayed one individual 
in their councils into intelligence with Russia. 
Under such humiliating, threatening circumstan- 
ces, having all to fear, and also all that was in 
the nature of things to be hoped (delay in pay- 
ment, mitigation of injury and outrage) to hope 
from Russia — surrounded by Russian agents, by 
Russian suggestions, by Russian ideas, whether in 
the persons of their own retainers or in the persons 
of the representatives, dragomans, and agents of 
almost all the European powers — still neither 
then nor at this hour is there a party or individual 
in the Divan to whom the very suspicion attaches 
of being Russian by mere purchase. There is not 
a Turk throughout the Empire that would not 
consider himself insulted by the supposition of 
connection with Russia. She gets men to act in 
her sense — but only through their fears, their 
ignorance, their vices, and their state of insulation 
and abandonment*. What a difference from 

* It must not be forgotten that the Porte was perfectly 
well aware that the intrigues, for it cannot be called the policy, 



38 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Poland! This it is, that necessitates, this it is 
that baffles all the demoralising means brought to 
bear by Russia ; and which would probably by 
this time have been unable to prevent the Govern- 
ment from recovering its equilibrium, had not the 
position of Mehemet Ali come to give Russia 
vigorous support, and to annihilate every remaining 
chance that might have saved the Empire without 
foreign interference. 

This integrity of the Divan alone can explain 
its appeal to England, on the march of Ibrahim 
Pacha. Its appeal to a nation that had chiefly 
contributed to the independence of Greece — the 
motives of which it was not to be expected the 
Porte could appreciate — to a nation that had so 
constantly evinced a disheartening apathy and 
facility of delusion in its relations with Turkey, 
was an act of heroism which merited a very dif- 
ferent reception. Russia all the while using her 
power, her influence, her intelligence, to obtain 
the admission of succour which was certain and at 
hand. 

Even after the demoralising effect of the refusal 
of England, the demand of succour was only 
obtained through the private means made use of 
in the Seraglio, and the Porte was made acquainted 

of one of the parties to the Treaty of the 6th of July, had 
placed Mehemet Ali in the position that matured so consider- 
ably the designs of Russia. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



39 



with it only by the note of the Russian ambassador 
announcing the departure from Sevastopol of the 
auxiliary squadron. 

At this conjuncture Admiral Roussin arrived. 
The Porte, alarmed at the position in which it was 
thus placed by the act of the Sultan, and desirous 
to throw itself on the protection of any power that 
could rescue it from Russian protection, suggested 
underhand to the newly-arrived French ambas- 
sador the convention which was afterwards signed. 
Thus a fortuitous combination rendered France 
arbiter of the East, and of a question on which 
hinged the peace, the interests, and the balance of 
Europe. The ambassador felt that position — 
seized it — and, like General Guilleminot, was 
sacrificed. 

From that moment — a moment that does not 
often recur in a nation's history — France may be 
considered as wholly effaced from the Eastern 
question. 

If it is not known, it ought to be known, 
and it is not the less a fact because it is not 
known, that the presence of between 8000 and 
9000 Russians in the vicinity of Constantinople 
did not arrest Ibrahim Pacha, did not save the 
Sultan. Their presence, had Ibrahim pushed on, 
would only have served further to legitimate his 
enterprise. Ibrahim every where declared that 
he was marching, encouraged by England and 
France, to deliver the Sultan from his Russian 
alliance. This notion was spread from the Elbrooz 



40 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



in the Caucasus, to Montenegro on the Adriatic, 
From one extremity of Turkey to the other, every 
villager, every pacha, inquired if this was not the 
case. One word from either, said by a fit person, 
sufficed to stop Mehemet Ali, whose efforts at 
naval power exposed his whole fabric to the caprice 
of any French or English naval officer. England 
and France, successively, not knowing their power, 
shrunk from the functions of arbiter, when all the 
advantages of that position were assured to them ; 
and only when Russia had occupied that post 
stepped in, and by a representation at Alexandria 
stopped the progress of Ibrahim Pacha. Russia 
must have lost her European preponderance, had 
either nation become protector of Turkey. In 
what a splendid position with regard to Turkey 
was she not placed by their formal renunciation 
of the merit and title of the office which they 
practically fulfilled. They have now permitted 
her to say to Europe, " I might have seized on 
" Turkey, had I been so inclined :" to the Sultan, 
" I have saved you :" and to Mehemet Ali, " You 
" owe to me your new acquisitions." They gave 
her to boast of the glory of at length entering the 
Bosphorus, and as Nicholas said, that it might be 
repeated, " the greater glory of quitting it." 

But such a transaction was to bear practical 
results for Russia. These appeared in the Treaty 
signed 8th July, at Unkiar Skelessi, previous to the 
1 departure of the Russian squadron. 

Nicholas and Count Nesselrode treated, at St. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



41 



Petersburg}], this deed as one of no importance 
whatever to England and France — so much so 
indeed that it was concluded without their in- 
structions, without their knowledge, and even that 
a copy of it reached the Emperor as a piece of 
news. Count OrlofF, with his soldier-like frank- 
ness, expatiated, on his return, on the supplications 
and entreaties of the Porte, which had extorted it 
from him as a pledge of the continued favour and 
protection of the Emperor. 

The authority, the personal honour of the Em- 
peror and his Ministers can alone be called in, to 
excuse the Envoys of France and England at St. 
Petersburgh, for the confidence they did not with- 
hold from such testimony, and for the conviction into 
which they were led, of the absence, on the part of 
Russia, of any design against the independence of 
Turkey ! It may appear impossible to doubt that the 
solemn asseverations of such men were not founded 
on some appearances, at least, that warranted or 
excused them. Yet not a shadow of a pretext 
existed for the declarations to which we have 
alluded. The Treaty represented as extorted by 
the importunity of the Porte, came upon it like a 
clap of thunder. It was drawn up in the Russian 
embassy ; perhaps even in the office at St. Peters- 
burgh ; the draught of it may even have lain by 
for years, awaiting the fitting opportunity*. But 

* The sole object of the mission of Count OrlofF, and of 
the unprecedented authority with which he was clothed, was 
to extort the signature of this Treaty from Turkey : he 



42 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



at all events it is certain that, like the convention 
of Akermann, it was presented not for the Porte 
to discuss, but for it to <f approve and accept." 

Every form of international courtesy was vio- 
lated ; individuals who were suspected of encou- 
raging the opposition, were privately menaced in 
the name of the Emperor, who " knew nothing of 
the transaction, and received a copy of the 
" deed as a piece of news ;" so that the Ottoman 
Ministers desisted from an opposition which they 
saw, without benefit to their country, might bring 
ruin on the individual opposers. 
| But this Treaty, which interested in no ways 
England or France, was thought of so much 
importance to Russia, that Count Orloif gave the 
Turkish Government clearly to understand that 
its signature was the condition of the departure of 
the Russian troops. 

arrived, after every thing had been terminated, to supersede 
then Mr. Boutenieff as Ambassador, General MouraviefF, 
as commander of the corps of occupation, while he was 
invested with the supreme military authority of the southern 
provinces of Russia. 

These immense powers, considering the moment of his 
arrival, it was needless to parade; especially as in his camp 
style he repeated, in all the saloons of Therapia and Bouyouk- 
dere, that he had arrived " comme la moutarde apres diner." 
Yet so impatient did he show himself of a moment's delay, 
even after learning at Odessa the termination of the circum- 
stances that were the pretext of his journey, that, a few hours 
having been lost on the passage by some miscalculation, he 
inflicted, with his own hand, severe corporal punishment on 
the captain of the frigate ! 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



43 



A powerful inducement was also added ; that 
of the six millions of ducats remaining due, one 
half should be remitted; and perhaps the Em- 
peror, gratified by their reliance on him, might 
remit the whole sum. We will not weaken the 
effect of such a transaction, of such assertions, and 
such deeds, by a single syllable of comment. 

Seeing, by what has been said in various places 
respecting this Treaty, that its nature is not 
understood, we will state the principal points 
which Russia has gained, and which made it so 
important an object. 

She is now legitimate protector of the Sultan ; J 
and the contingency again arising, a contingency 
which at any hour she can bring about, an appeal 
to any other power becomes an infraction of stipu- 
lations. Turkey has learnt, to her cost, the 
penalty of every real or pretended cause of recla- 
mation. She has been taught the necessity of 
" the absence of eveiy motive of discussion." The 
fact of protection, which degrades the Sultan in 
the eyes of his people, is rendered notorious by 
the solemnity of a Treaty. , 

The Emperor assumes, in the eyes of Europe, * 
the character of Protector. Having reckoned on 
remonstrance and demonstration, which, as he 
prejudged, would remain without real effect, he 
got over a very great obstacle by the apparent 
hazard of the position he assumed, and has main- 
tained. The gauntlet thrown down by France 
and England, and then withdrawn without any 



44 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



concession or any reparation being obtained, gave 
him a diplomatic victory worth more than many 
bought by fields of blood, and brought conviction 
to the Turkish Government, that there was no 
succour available for it, and that its actual state 
could only be prolonged by fostering the forbear- 
ance which the character of Protector imposed on 
" the Emperor." 

If, contrary to the expectations which Russia, 
judging by the past, was fully justified in forming, 
this treaty should cause England and France to 
awake from their indifference, and arrest her pro- 
gress, then, indeed, she will have committed a 
dreadful fault — the first fault she has been guilty 
of. This, events will alone decide. If not, then 
is this the last treaty that can be made between 
Russia and Turkey ; it is the last indication of 
their separate existence*. 

Since that Treaty, the discussion and decision 
of all questions arising between the two courts, is 
carried to St. Petersburg!]. 

But this subserviency of the Porte is only use- 
ful to Russia, as it enables her to overcome prac- 

* This Treaty was the prize of the daring descent of 9,000 
Russians on the shores of the Bosphorus — the noblest stride 
ever made by ambition, if commanding talents and wonderful 
success can ennoble the blighting trophies, and the brutalising 
sway of Russia ! Lord Ponsonby forewarned the Porte of the 
imposition of such a treaty before the departure of the 
squadron, showing that the projects of Russia are very intel- 
ligible, when her position is understood. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



45 



tical difficulties — as it enables her to disgust the 
population of Turkey, by misgovernment — as it 
puts at her disposal places, the natural strength of 
which had baffled or repulsed her in war; but 
above all, as its stipulations, and the intercourse 
and intimacy consequent on it, confer rights on 
her in the eyes of Europe. To maintain the 
semblance of this intimacy, the ultimate settle- 
ment of the loan was deferred at the period of 
the signature of the Treaty of the 8th July. 
An ambassador was to repair to St. Peters- 
burgh, to have recourse to the generosity of the 
Emperor in the definitive arrangements of that 
obligation, which has entrenched, besides all its 
other consequences, several thousand Russian 
bayonets, permanently, in the midst of the Otto- 
man dominions. 

The ambassador selected had been the principal 
agent in obtaining the Sultan's application for 
succour. His intimate councillor was the Greek 
intermediary in that transaction between the Rus- 
sian legation and the seraglio. Two secretaries, 
one a Turk, one a Greek, were selected with equal 
care. The mission was, in fact, nominated by 
Russia. 

The ambassador, though he owed his nomination 
to Russia, was still a Turk : neither was he de- 
voted to Russia, nor had he sold his country. 
He attempted to speak of her rights ; he was 
silenced with " it is the Emperor's will." He 
had no alternative between submission or de- 



46 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



manding his passports*. The conviction on the 
minds of the Envoys of France and England at 
St. Petersburgh, which we have above alluded to, 
deprived him of even the slightest degree of coun- 
tenance ; he therefore did submit, and the arrange- 
ments were adopted as it pleased the Emperor to 
command. 

The Provinces were nominally restored to the 
Porte ; while Russia, of course, so disposed of 
them, that she controlled them as effectually 
as if formally governed by her ; she possessed a 
fortress beyond them, and had military roads open 
through them from every point of her territory, cen- 
tering in this fortress ; and the Emperor united to 
this military occupation, to the preparation of large 
depots of provisions, the right of proclaiming his 

* The embassy of Achmet Pacha coincided with the first 
naval demonstration of England in the Levant. We have 
grounds for stating, that such was the alarm of Russia, that 
England might by a word have obtained the evacuation of 
Silistria, and almost any conditions she chose to exact in favour 
of Turkey. As England had neither convictions nor plan, 
the individual minister is not to be censured for the neglect of 
so splendid an occasion as this ; but it was peculiarly unfor- 
tunate that that precise moment should have been taken for 
informing Russia that England's demonstration meant nothing 
at all ; and that also, precisely at the same moment, a marshal 
should arrive as ambassador from France, to express the satis- 
faction of his government at the moderation of the Emperor ! 
These things may appear incredible and incomprehensible — so 
they appeared to the Turkish government, which, having felt 
the difference of its own position before and after these ami- 
cable explanations, could only suppose us leagued with Russia. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



47 



moderation and disinterestedness, as of old, to his 
indulgent European allies. 

But the occupation of Silistria being contingent 
on the non-payment of the debt, a loan or pecu- 
niary succour from other powers, or a revolution 
in Turkey, by opening the treasures of the Sultan, 
could emancipate the Ottoman soil. The pro- 
vinces had been, by the above-stated arrangement, 
withdrawn from the chances of such a contin- 
gency ; Silistria was, therefore, ceded for eight 
years, without possibility of redemption*. This 
term, of course, being deemed sufficient, in every 
case, for the full realisation of Russia's designs*)-. 
But this arrangement was again put forward as 
an act of moderation and disinterestedness on the 
part of the Emperor. His ever-indulgent allies 
consoled themselves with the Emperor's consi- 
derate extension of the term of payment for the 
space of eight years ! 

The yearly instalment is to be paid, not in 
ducats, but in the Turkish coin ; not at its ex- 

* This may be denied, we know, by the astonishing vague- 
ness left in the wording of the Treaty. If Russia objects to 
our conclusion, it will be for those to believe whom she can 
persuade. 

•f Even then, should the whole sum be paid, restoration is 
not to be made, unless all the stipulations in the Treaty of 
Adrianople, that impose charges on Turkey, have been scru- 
pulously fulfilled. We have spoken of quasi monopolies 
introduced in reality by her agency : are these not violations 
of the Treaty of Adrianople ? may they not some day be made 
useful and apt pretexts t 



48 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



changeable rate for ducats at the period of effect- 
ing the payment, but at thirty-two piastres the 
ducat : the depreciation since the first payments 
subsequent to the Treaty of Adrianople, has raised 
the exchange to forty-five piastres to the ducat, it 
may rise to one hundred to the ducat, yet the Em- 
peror formally binds himself to accept always 
thirty-two piastres for the ducat of the day, as 
the full value of the ducat. Thus is a powerful 
motive held out for the depreciation of the coinage, 
while the allies of the Emperor will exclaim, What 
generosity ! 

A strong and mountainous district in Lazistan 
and Adjarra, on the Asiatic frontier, had baffled 
the attempts of Russia during the last war. 
A tract of this country is annexed to Russia, 
as far as the signature of Achmet Pacha to 
the convention could annex it; that is, Russia 
arrogates to herself the right of attacking and 
subduing, in peace, a district that had resisted 
her arms in war; a district to which internal 
events had given new and immense importance. 
She has thus a footing in the mountains of Lazis- 
tan and Armenistan, and the means of extending, 
far and near, her demoralising influence. 

This cession required the sanction of some pre- 
text ; it was found in the " compensations en na- 
" ture," which the treaty of Adrianople admitted 
in reduction of the debt. The Treaty of the 8th of 
July had been signed on condition implied most 
certainly of the remission of three millions of the 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



49 



debt. The cession of this Asiatic district is pur- 
chased by the remission of two of those three 
millions already remitted ; the remission of the 
third million being cancelled. This is the only 
way that the expression to the Emperor can be 
understood, " all, or nothing :" unless all I demand 
is granted, the cession of the two millions is can- 
celled. But here again Russia's most indulgent 
allies find proofs of the moderation of the Emperor. 

To crown the marvellousness of this strange and 
eventful history, these instances of the Emperor's 
moderation are published in time to calm the 
alarms and silence the protestations of England 
and France, excited by the treaty of protection. 
The formal announcement of their satisfaction 
follows unequivocal marks of distrust, and the 
fleets, after a demonstration so useful to Russia*, 
are recalled to Toulon and Malta. The diplo- 
matic triumph of Russia is thus proclaimed by 
themselves — she is relieved from all dread of retri- 
bution for the past — her acquisitions all legalised 
— her claims to moderation allowed— the indul- 
gence of her allies secured. What must not the 
vitality of Turkey be, still to exist ! 

If these things are so (and who is there can 
gainsay them?) it becomes imperative on the 

* One consequence of this demonstration was the opening 
of the ears of Mehemet Ali to her suggestions, and the exten- 
sion of her influence beyond the Mediterranean, and to the 
shores of the Indian ocean. 

E 



50 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



cabinets of St. James and Paris, to take measures 
to restore the independence to this Empire, which, 
unwillingly, they have combined with its enemy to 
undermine. This obligation is imposed upon them 
as members of the European community by the 
approaching annihilation of another of their com- 
peers. It is imposed upon them by the necessity 
of maintaining the consideration due to themselves 
— the first element of political power and influence. 
These are motives, which, if originating in similar 
relations with the most insignificant state of Eu- 
rope would be imperative, and which are totally 
independent of the immense and general interests 
implicated in the disposal of Turkey, and in the 
possession of the Dardanelles. 

But it may be said, there is no necessity of 
proving that the independence of Turkey is lost, 
since the fact is admitted. Why then are not 
measures taken to restore its independence? 
merely because it is not known how that inde- 
pendence has been lost. It is not known how 
the plans of Russia might have been disconcerted. 
It is not known how easily Turkey may at this 
moment be restored. It is not known what will 
be the consequences of her subjugation. 

It was not by the circumstances declared by 
the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, that Turkey lost 
her independence. The first Minister of the Crown 
of England declared that, subsequently to the 
Treaty of Adrianople, it was vain to speak of the 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



51 



independence of Turkey ; was it not equally so 
on the Convention of Akermann ? Was it not 
so since the Greek revolution gave Russia the 
means of isolating Turkey from Europe, and the 
liberty to speak and to act as the advocate and 
avenger of a cause she was allowed to declare, 
without being contradicted by word or deed, com- 
mon to all Christendom and to all Europe? 

But formerly the complications of the Greek 
question — the obstinacy of the Porte — its ani- 
mosity of old date exasperated by the ability of 
Russia — its resistance to all counsel, all support, 
and the intimate connection between France and 
Russia, rendered Russia's game comparatively easy. 
These difficulties have entirely disappeared. The 
Greek question is terminated. The Turkish nation 
claims our protection : France must necessarily fol- 
low the impulse we may be inclined to give ; Russia 
has unmasked herself — she has united the univer- 
sal feelings of Turkey against her. The indepen- 
dence of Turkey is, therefore, an object far easier 
to realise than it was before the Treaty of Adria- 
nople, before the Convention of Akermann, or 
the Treaty of Bucharest. 

To these facilities must be added a most import- 
ant consideration, without which these changes 
would be productive of no amelioration of our 
position, — the prudence, the ability that has cha- 
racterised of late our immediate diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Porte. The growing confidence of 



52 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



the Turkish Government a single fault might have 
destroyed. We possess, at this moment, the go- 
vernment and the people. Another advantage 
scarcely less important, is the perfect harmony and 
unity of conviction and intention between the 
French and English embassies at Constantinople*. 

These are favourable chances, nay, certainties, 
which we had no right to expect ; and if we do not 
seize the forelock presented to us by fortune, we 
shall have no reason to complain, if she flies to 
where more vigour is to be found, to force her 
favours. 

* This last advantage has passed away. The French repre- 
sentative must of necessity receive the inspiration of his master, 
and our position becoming worse and worse every day. Had 
any circumstances at home caused the recall of the present 
representative of England, we should conceive that Russia 
had effected all that it was possible to effect, and that her 
game from that moment was certain. Yet Lord Ponsonby's 
removal was in the ordinary course of events, and would have 
been considered in this country a matter of little importance. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



53 



CHAPTER IV. 

Elements of Turkish Power unchanged. — Facility of Govern- 
ment. — Internal Reform. — Progress of Opinion. — Character 
of Janissaries. — Subversion of Dhe Beys. 

But although the life of the supreme authority 
is in Turkey fast ebbing away, there is yet vitality, 
sensibility, and energy, latent in the mass. The 
weakness of the government at this very moment, 
proceeds first from ignorance, which includes at 
once all causes of decay, and all chances of res- 
toration ; and secondly, from the anti-national 
position it has assumed. It loses the affections and 
support of the nation, it loses its strength, by its 
fancied necessity of reliance on Russian pro- 
tection. 

No change whatever has taken place in the 
principles and habits of government in Turkey, 
since its days of conquest ; its people are } r et brave 
and docile, political factions are unknown, and do- 
mestic morality is not less now than ever their uni- 
versal characteristic. The actual prostration of 
Turkey is not the ultimate period of a progression 
of gradual decay ; she has already sunk as low, or 



54 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



lower than at present, and has risen rapidly, instan- 
taneously, again, when she was, as now, apparently 
at her last gasp. Under Solyman II., Greece and 
Dalmatia were occupied by the Venetians ; Hun- 
gary, Servia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, by the Austrians ; 
Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia, by the 
Poles ; a rebel chief overran Anatoly, and even 
ventured to the walls of Scutari ; and another rebel 
in Europe contested with the Sultan its remaining 
provinces ; add to this the refusal of the Mussul- 
mans to enlist, the insubordination of the Janis- 
saries, and a treasury so exhausted, as not to furnish 
means to hire horses for the removal of the 
Sultan's household from his capital*. Yet Kiu- 
pruly-Mustapha had not been a year Visir, when 
the star and crescent brightened again over Bel- 
grade, and the horse-tails were re-planted on the 
banks of the Theisse. Nor was this wonderful 
revolution in strength and feeling of the empire 
brought about by the reform of a single law, the 
imposition or change of a single tax, but merely by 

* The discovery of an extensive conspiracy, forced the 
Sultan to fly to Adrianople. The Imperial stables did not 
contain a sufficient number of beasts of burthen. He ordered 
them to be hired, but money for the purpose was not found in 
the treasury. He sent a portion of his jewels to be disposed 
of at the public auction. This confession of penury, which 
would have instantly paralysed or overthrown the most 
powerful government of Europe, saved that of Turkey, and 
instantaneously calmed the sedition. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



55 



an exact observance of the simple and fundamen- 
tal institutions of the empire. 

There was wanting in the superior administra- 
tion a permanent check, to prevent the executive 
from overstepping the narrow limits to which its 
authority was confined, an authority rather judi- 
ciary than administrative, never interfering with 
an immutable and sacred code, which defined the 
leading features of the administration, the detail 
being filled up by not less revered local customs. 
Its power was despotic, but it lay unexerted until 
appealed to ; and its force, though really insigni- 
ficant, appeared overwhelming, because there was 
required no permanent expenditure of energy to 
repress systematic resistance, to enforce sequences 
of oppressive regulations, to maintain complica- 
tions of innumerable laws*. The executive did, 
therefore, overstep these limits. The very faci- 
lities of governing, gave free scope to injustice. 
The government lost its strength in the violent 
exercise of its power, and the anarchy of the 
capital reproduced itself in the provinces. But the 
evil was anarchy — it was abuse — it was crime — 

* " We must admit, as the particular character of this 
" government, a confidence based on the force of principle, 
" not on the principle of force ; and besides this, the 
" design and will of yielding the greatest possible facilities 
" to all individual relations, without fatiguing or embarrassing 
*' them by the incessant action of the authority of the go- 
** vernment." — Monitew Ottoman, Sept. 2, 1834. Which 
see for an admirable article on the Police of Constantinople. 



56 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



no where system. The Janissaries, a check on the 
individual who was Sultan, were the organ of 
these abuses. A revolution came ; it was one of 
regeneration, but for the time it convulsed every 
portion, unnerved every arm in the Ottoman 
empire. At the same moment, an important 
province was in a state of revolt ; and, as a conse- 
quence of that revolt, and of the use made of it 
by Russia, Turkey was in a state of hostility 
with the whole world. In the midst of these 
events, Russia declares war, and invades the Otto- 
man dominions at both extremities. The time 
was chosen with double perfidy ; when the cabi- 
nets, who must have opposed her progress, were 
forcedly her allies ; when the Mussulman nation 
was disheartened and disarmed. The unfortunate 
issue of that war does not therefore prove that 
Turkey is unable to resist such means as Russia 
has been able to employ against her ; it proves 
merely that Russia did succeed, at a moment when 
Turkey was in a state of internal dissolution 
and of political excommunication. The diffi- 
culty which attended that success, and the fortui- 
tous nature of the chances that caused the Turks 
to submit to the Treaty of Adrianople, instead of 
Russia's submitting to the Treaty brought by 
Muffling, sufficiently proves, that the decay of the 
strength of Turkey is not in her people, or her 
means, but in her government ; and that it re- 
quires but the apparition of a second Mustapha- 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



57 



Kiupriily to restore this empire to its indepen- 
dence and vigour ; and now that the barriers of 
prejudice and fanaticism have been thrown down, 
to prospects of greater well-being than ever blessed 
her days of splendour. 

Notwithstanding the weakness that has resulted, 
partly from the incapacity with which circum- 
stances have been handled, but much more from 
the threatening attitude of foreign policy, and the 
all but fatal wounds which Russia has been per- 
mitted and assisted to inflict, the nation itself has 
made within ten years a progress in opinion and 
public education, such as no other people of Europe 
has made in a century ; and it has thrown off, 
within that space of time, more prejudice and 
fanaticism than have been got rid of in Europe, 
by the most advanced countries, in as many cen- 
turies. This is accounted for by the principle we 
have already pointed out, that the abuses lay in 
the executive, not in the institutions. There were 
no classes of men existing by privileges for them 
which were exclusions to the rest ; there were 
neither manufacturing, nor commercial, nor agri- 
cultural combinations ; there were neither bodies 
of custom-house officers, nor tax-gatherers to put 
in daily familiar opposition people and govern- 
ment ; there was no aristocratic privilege deeply 
rooted in the body, no democratic antipathies con- 
vulsing its mass ; no opposition of interests, creating 
still more perplexing discord of opinion ; while the 



58 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



utmost freedom was allowed to local dispositions, 
to internal circulation, the revenue was drawn from 
that surplus portion of the agricultural profits which 
with us becomes rent, so that, compared with us, 
the country might be called untaxed : consequently 
markets and prices, left entirely to their self- 
adjustment, conciliated to the government, in its 
worst days, notwithstanding superficial violence 
and abuse, an under-current, deep and noiseless, of 
contentment, which has kept afloat, and borne 
along the vessel of the State through agitation 
which, to our eyes, offered no chance of salvation. 
' It is the policy of Europe which has suffered the 
arms, the treaties, the protection, the gold, the 
counsel of Russia, to reduce Turkey to the state 
in which it is. It is the policy of England which 
alone can save her. It is, therefore, no trivial or 
idle investigation that we have undertaken, since 
it is her political elements that we have to embody 
into a new political instrument; since it is by- 
organising Turkey, that we prevent war or ensure 
success. 

The destruction of the Janissaries has effected 
a change in the constitution of power, which, 
notwithstanding the discussion to which it has 
given rise, has not been analysed with the care 
that the deepness of our stake in the welfare of 
Turkey requires. 

This body, was, as Voltaire remarks, the States 
General of Turkey. They brought to the surface, 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



59 



and spread over the whole, the worst feelings and 
prejudices of their race; but they maintained a 
state of unchangeableness, the memory of which is 
becoming respectable by the errors that have fol- 
lowed the faculty of change. In saying this, we 
do not, for an instant, admit the doctrines of those 
who, in this country, attribute to the destruction 
of the Janissaries the ruin of the empire. They 
have been judged in Turkey; foreign invasion, 
domestic revolt, have, since their destruction, con- 
vulsed that empire. Yet what invader, what 
rebel, has dreamt of rallying the remnants of that 
corps, or of raising as a symbol, the polluted sleeve 
of Hadjee Becktash? But the Sultan, sup- 
ported by opinion, in the abolishment of that 
which really was Janissary, has been emboldened 
to attack that which really was Turkish. 

The Janissaries were an oligarchy — military, 
not administrative ; they squandered the military 
resources of the empire, — but interfered not with 
its political administration. They drained the 
treasure — but, as farmers of revenue, they did not 
multiply modes for replenishing it. They were 
an aristocracy — not of producers, to create and 
maintain privileges for certain interests — but of 
consumers, whose interests were inseparably bound 
with freedom of markets and exchange, and low- 
ness of price. They were representatives of a 
dominant class, which, confident in its supremacy, 
stickled for no prerogatives that interfered with 



60 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



the internal customs and institutions of the others. 
In fine, they were a body of Mussulmans, — not a 
conclave of churchmen. Though they might indi- 
vidually despise or maltreat a Ghiaour, they 
meddled not with the creeds or church govern- 
ments of other persuasions, nor suffered them to 
be meddled with. 

Here, then, we must separate the Janissary from 
the Turkish principles, in this controlling body. 
The first are, violence, corruption, and prostration 
of all military resources and strength ; exhaustion 
of the treasury, resistance to all, and therefore to 
beneficial changes; haughty contempt for their 
fellow subjects possessing a different creed, and 
the propagation and perpetuation of fanaticism 
among their own. 

These things have disappeared ; but in conse- 
quence of the change, the Turkish principles, 
which lost in them an organ and support, have 
been left at the mercy of one man's caprice ; and 
these are — non-intervention in the collection of 
the revenue — unrestricted, unburthened freedom of 
markets and exchange — impossibility of illegal 
taxation on the part of the Sultan — inviolability of 
local customs — appropriation of charitable and 
other funds — succession of property — decision of 
voluntarily-elected judges — of church-adminis- 
tration in spiritual matters, and in several important 
civil functions immediately vested in the elected 
dignitaries of the various persuasions. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



61 



These principles have been the Good Gods of 
Turkey, revered even by the most fanatic of her 
sons, preserved in the midst of the most convulsed 
and troubled times. 

Selim, an European essayist, falsely termed a 
Turkish reformer, failed through his apostacy. 
Before he attacked the obnoxious body, he arbi- 
trarily imposed new taxes — a violation of pre- 
scriptive right — a violation of a mixed religious 
and administrative creed. 

These taxes, too, were of the most obnoxious 
kind, for they rendered exchange difficult, and 
raised prices; they rallied public interest and 
public opinions on the side of the Janissaries, and 
he fell a victim to the well-intended attempt of 
imitating Europe. 

Not more a Turk, but less an European than 
his cousin, Mahmoud, by the progress of opinion 
and by a happier combination, overthrew this body; 
nor did he commence imitating Selim until he had 
deprived public interests of their representation, 
and public opinion of its voice. 

The total destruction of the Janissaries and 
Dere Beys, who might be compared to what the 
Indian Zemindars would be with a weak central 
government, are memorable efforts of self-rege- 
neration, which, if Turkey he preserved, will 
immortalise the reign of Mahmoud, and render 
it one of the most important in the history of 
mankind. But our immediate object, at present, 



62 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



is to point out the subsequent errors and misfor- 
tunes which actually o'ercloud the political horizon 
of Turkey — compromise its existence, alarm its 
friends, and deter them from giving it that support 
which would instantaneously combine and utilise 
its latent energies. We had, at first, intended 
confining ourselves exclusively to the political 
question, but, on closer investigation, the convic- 
tion grows upon us of the importance of deter- 
mining, in a more definite manner than has yet 
been attempted, the means by which the internal 
strength and confidence of this prostrate, but not 
feeble, empire can be restored, the causes of its 
depression, and the dangers to which it is 
exposed. 

Accustomed for centuries to misconduct and 
misdeeds on the part of the local authorities, 
against which resistance was always in the end 
approved of by the central government, great 
abuses may exist, great discontent may be engen- 
dered, without these abuses being attributed to, 
or that discontent directed against, the supreme 
authority. The chief of the state has, in like 
manner, remained the object of universal respect 
and awe, from the great facility of removal that has 
hitherto characterised the action of this govern- 
ment*. The revolution that has lately been 

* Suleyman established the gratification to the Janissaries 
on the accession of each new Sultan, with the express and 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



63 



effected, has annihilated the power of the local 
Zemindars, of petty aristocracies, of delegated 
governors; so that if any abuse exists, if any 
crime remains unpunished, the fault has to be laid 
solely at the door of the government, which is now 
omnipotent for good ; and the Sultan, instead of 
being the insignificant individual that discharges 
high but circumscribed functions, becomes an indi- 
vidual possessing the sole authority in the state. 
Under such altered circumstances, the attachment 
for, and confidence in, the principles of the admi- 
nistration — the awe for the office of the Sultan — 
the real, the only bonds of this empire — bonds, 
loose indeed, but tough, elastic, and hitherto 
unsevered, lose — not as yet their strength, but 
their principle of adhesion. 

We say principle of adhesion, because of the 
obliged simplicity of the administration, and the 
obliged submissiveness of the chief of the empire, 
to a code so simple and so appropriate, that sub- 
mission to its dictates was the religion of the 
state. The Sultan is actually the most powerful 
sovereign in the world, the prescriptive habits of 
submission remain ; the checks which by control- 
ing the Sultan's passions and caprice, created those 
habits of submission, are swept away. — If therefore, 
the Sultan could be brought justly to appreciate his 
own position, the merits of his nation, and the 

recorded intention of facilitating the deposition of any Sultan 
who should forfeit public esteem. 



64 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



faults of his government, he could, by a mere 
declaration of his enlightened will, effect such a 
revolution in the fortunes of Turkey as no empire 
has ever undergone. In fact, the destruction of 
the Janissaries leaves Turkey, politically, in the 
state in which she was, with precisely the same ex- 
tent of territory, as under Suleyman the Magnifi- 
cent, excepting foreign influence over her councils. 

All arts — all means — that gold or ingenuity 
can compass, have been employed for this, the 
first object of Russia's endeavours, to turn to 
her account the personal dispositions of the Sultan, 
to enlist in her service — his virtues — his weaknesses, 
and above all his ignorance. She has reaped a large 
harvest of errors — she has sown an after-crop of 
disaffection. But the feelings of ages are not to 
be annihilated in one day ; they will be exposed to 
violent fluctuations ; and that habitual respect will 
long cling to its ancient predilections, in spite of 
the abuses which have now entered, more or less, 
into the system itself ; in spite of the substitution 
of the will of the Sultan for the immutable, the 
sacred code of the Mussulman, and the unfortunate 
coincidence of his power over Turkey, and his 
subserviency to Russia. The proofs of its long for- 
bearance are palpable, notwithstanding the series 
of political and diplomatic faults that have filled, 
without intermission, the last years — the Sultan 
is yet Sultan — the empire has no pretender — not 
an idea exists of a change of form of government. — 
In those districts and provinces that have been 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



65 



detached from Turkey, unequivocal signs declare 
the desire of being restored to it ; and emigrants 
and refugees, who have been tempted or terrified 
into seeking refuge in neighbouring states, sacrifice 
their new possessions to escape back to it. The 
fact is, that even under the J anissaries, although 
all great combinations of industry, science, or 
capital, were arrested ; yet, in no country on the 
face of the earth did man enjoy such domestic, 
village, religious, and commercial liberty. 

Now the Turkish government, unlike that of 
Egypt, has not the physical means of depriving its 
subjects of these advantages. A degree of politi- 
cal independence has been generated, even in the 
midst of these unfortunate convulsions ; and new 
hopes and feelings are spread abroad, which every 
day render this people more difficult to govern ill. 

Travellers declare, that there is a strong party 
against the Sultan ; that is, they draw European 
conclusions, from facts observed in a state of society 
that has no parallel in Europe. The Sultan, as a 
sovereign of Europe, is not supported by one 
class of partisans against a class, or classes, of 
adversaries. The struggle is not between the 
opinions of different men, but between the opposing 
feelings and opinions in each man's breast. None 
curiously and complacently look for faults and 
errors which may support their party, or supply 
food to demagogue ambition ; all regret the faults 
the penalty of which is borne equally by all. In 



66 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



the distant provinces, they still even seek to lay 
those faults, as formerly, on subordinates, or on 
circumstances ; and cling to their allegiance and 
loyalty with astonishing perseverance. The dis- 
satisfaction is not that of a party, not even that of 
a nation ; it is, or rather has been, that of a family, 
mingled with affection, and therefore rendered 
more violent in its expression, but long enduring, 
and with returns of charity, repudiating the 
means that present themselves as a last resort; 
and if patience is pushed beyond endurance now, 
under new and alarming circumstances, the effect 
will be, not only the destruction of political exist- 
ence, but the destruction of many of the moral feel- 
ings that render them estimable as men. 

This state of things has placed this nation 
in complete dependence on foreign policy ; their 
centre of action, of direction, of opinion, has 
been cast without the sphere of their own interests 
and habits. The connection of the Sultan with 
Russia has forced on all the disheartening convic- 
tion — that they are in opposition with him; and 
as they have no means of controlling him, every 
cause of complaint is exaggerated — it is laid on his 
shoulders. Hatred to Russia has become a com- 
mon centre, a common bond ; it may be made by 
us a bond of conservation, of regeneration ; but in 
the anti-national position which the government 
has assumed, it is a union big with the spirit of 
destruction. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 6? 

This crisis is now matured at Constantinople, at 
least by the consequences of the revolt in Syria, 
against Mehemet Ali. Universal attention has 
been directed to the exhibitions that have been 
made — of the inefficiency of the army and the 
fleet, notwithstanding the docility of the men, and 
the excellence of the material — of their absolute 
dependence on foreign powers — and their conse- 
quent political prostration. The profound humilia- 
tion, thence resulting, is deepened by the connection 
with Russia, and the leaning of the Ottoman Empe- 
ror, and the Mussulman Caliph, on the Muscovites 
for support. The odium of all these measures is thus 
concentrated in one point — it is directed against 
the Sultan ; because this connection is repu- 
diated even by the administration. This remark- 
able expression, which sums up all we have been 
endeavouring to explain, was lately used to an 
Englishman, by one of the chief of the district 
in Asia, exacted by the Emperor from Achmet 
Pacha. " We would shed the last drop of our 
" blood in defence of our Sultan ; but why is he 
4< such a friend to the Russians ? We see that he 
" never will be worthy of the affection we all bear 
" him, till he is guided by the counsel of Eng- 
" land." 

It is a singular, but natural coincidence, that 
hatred for the Russians should have led to the dis- 
appearance of prejudices against other Christians ; 
as their hopes, from one extremity of the empire 



68 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



to the other, are now turned to us. In the capital^ 
in the meanest village, in the centre of communis 
cations, on the furthest frontiers, a feeling of vague 
but intense expectation, is spread, which claims at 
our hands internal re- organisation, and external 
independence. 

Its disappointment will paralyse every remain- 
ing faculty of resistance. 

Unless anticipated by visible intervention on 
the part of England, which will relieve them from 
the permanent menace of the occupation of the 
capital, and which will impose on the government 
the necessity of a change of measures, a catas- 
trophe is inevitable. 

The habitual forms of combination and resist- 
ance have been swept away. There is no regular 
vent, by which fermentation can relieve itself; 
there is no regular index of its intensity. The 
hour, the day, the month, when the explosion will 
take place, no man may be able to predict ; but 
that it will come, unless anticipated by some 
power or other, is a certainty to which, like death, 
every hour, and every change, and every effort, 
brings us nearer*. 

But it must be the intention of Russia to an- 

* This was written at Constantinople, immediately after the 
insurrection in Syria, and in the midst of the foreign and 
domestic agitation that followed that event. At such a moment 
only can be conceived the convulsions that can suddenly 
spring up in the midst of apparent tranquillity and repose. 



BUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



69 



tidpate an internal convulsion, in the midst of 
which, hatred to her would rise the ruling spirit. 
Anarchy annihilates the possibility of resistance, and 
increases the difficulties of English and French in- 
tervention ; advantages naturally immense for her, 
but what are they, compared to full and quiet in- 
heritance ? She must also put to profit, ere it is 
too late, the actual subserviency of the Austrian 
cabinet*. She must preserve the chains she has 
rivetted with such care — she must anticipate 
the alarms of Europe, up to this hour so wonder- 
fully lulled — she must exclude all European 
powers from the partition — she must preserve 
the Sultan's name, and the existing forms and 
habits of administration. She assumes her po- 
sition on this foundation, she quells resistance 
by the fact of her presence and possession, she 
calms animosities by measures of momentary con- 
ciliation, without sacrificing one iota of the autho- 
rity she acquires in the absolute control of the 
naval and military means, the occupation of 
strong places, the command of the coasts, of 
the police, of the communications, the roads, 
the markets, and the commerce of the whole 
country — while, by balancing against each other 
the various distinct populations, and the hostile 
creeds, she will stand erect on their prostration, 

* If the Austrian cabinet is escaping from her, she has gat 
another more powerful co-operator in the French cabinet, 
now manfully labouring under the banner of Mehemet Ali, 



70 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



and strong in their disunion. Environed with the 
splendor of bloodless conquest, and the semblance 
of unlimited power, — to her people she will appear 
endowed with preternatural fortune ; — to Turkey, 
the supreme arbiter, not of her destinies alone, but 
of the destinies of mankind. She will, in fact, by 
the consequences of her conquest, dispose of the 
resources of 100,000,000 nominally independent 
Europeans, and present to the remainder, to 
France and England, an invulnerable body, and a 
menacing front. 

The preparatives of enormous magnitude, now in 
progress, notwithstanding the misfortunes of the 
seasons — the increasing establishment of her army 
— the doubling or tripling of her fleet in the Black 
Sea — the vast expenditure for fortifications in her 
southern and eastern regions, where certainly no 
attack can be feared — the haste with which these 
operations are conducted — show not the designs of 
Russia, but the shortness of the period that may 
still be allowed us for anticipating an event that 
will mark the climax of the greatness of England. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



71 



CHAPTER V. 

Comparison of Poland and Turkey. — Poland easily subdued. 
— Turkey , once subdued^ easily held in subjection. — No 
other power will share in the dismemberment of Turkey. — 1 
Impossibility of confederation in Turkey. — Its unity is its 
strength. — Toleration of Islamism. 

The history of Poland becomes at this moment 
a lesson most impressive and instructive. Every 
circumstance connected with its subjugation is 
an indication of the procedure, of a system then 
organised and acted upon, and since deeply pon- 
dered upon and improved. For at least sixty years 
the possession of Turkey has been an immediate 
object for Russia; it has occupied the earnest atten- 
tion of each successive sovereign and minister. 
No expense has been spared in collecting and 
digesting the necessary information ; and oppor- 
tunities have offered, not only for putting in prac- 
tice the plans that have been formed on Turkey 
itself, but of trying their efficacy on other states. 

The Mussulmans are a numerous and warlike 
people, with unity of feeling and hatred to Russia; 
they inhabit a strong and mountainous country. 
These are difficulties immensely greater than any 
presented by Poland. 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Poland was a champaign country; the race 
cognate to that of Russia ; the language a dialect 
of the Russian. Religious persecutions, animosities, 
and even war, distracted the state. The anarchical 
aristocracy rendered the executive powerless, while 
it reflected on the mass of the nation the most 
abject serfage, affording but the form of a consti- 
tution, which, without giving any union to the 
body, destroyed the independence of the separate 
parts; affording but the name of justice and of 
law, which was no control to the powerful, no 
protection to the weak. 

This government was merely suffered to exist by 
the jealousy of the surrounding powers, and the 
temptations it offered to them all, not only of in- 
fluence and interference, but also of military occu- 
pation and elective sovereignty ; for its territories 
might be called a great chase, or common, open to 
the troops of Russia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Saxony — its crown an object of com- 
petition among the younger branches of all the 
royal houses of Europe, or, like Courland, for the 
paramours of the Empresses of Russia. Rut so 
far had Russia succeeded in overreaching her com- 
petitors in the acquisition of internal influence, 
that a partition was no ways to her liking ; as she 
had acquired an authority which was equal to pos- 
session, and that authority was maintained by a 
physical force of only 10,000 men. Austria and 
Prussia only obtained a partition, and a share, by 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



the menace of a league with Turkey; yet the 
Poles were one of the most warlike nations of Eu- 
rope, and most enthusiastically attached to their 
independence. There was, therefore, no difficulty 
in taking possession of Poland ; but there was 
some difficulty in keeping it. There was the diet, 
which, forced to unite by the foreign pressure, 
might arouse itself, as it did, to some transient pa- 
triotic effort — there were the nobles, who retained 
the right and facility of assembling bodies of armed 
retainers — there were the serfs, reckless, because 
deprived of property and protection. The very 
sources of weakness, while the government re- 
tained the show of independence, became sources 
of resistance, under a foreign administration ; re- 
sistance which, after forty years of foreign do- 
minion, the sword alone has been capable of 
extirpating. 

But in Turkey, the weakness of the government 
does not arise from discord and faction, which 
may subsequently furnish means of resistance. 
Under all oriental administrations, are markable, 
and to us unaccountable, facility of governing, has 
been established, by numerous facts in our own 
times, and by the entire history of the past. 
The reason of this is, that man, under those 
systems, is attached to his soil by the indis- 
soluble chain of property ; to his village, by 
the not less powerful bonds of moral and financial 
obligation. There is no political organisation 



74 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



of any kind to excite and direct resistance; 
when the capital is lost, all idea of resistance 
vanishes. War is looked upon by all as the 
greatest of calamities, because it brings all its 
penalties in its immediate train. There are no loans, 
to conciliate the support of capitalists, to encou- 
rage warlike feelings, and throw the burthen of 
war on future generations. There are no con- 
tracts to be made, no shipping to be taken up, no 
impulse given to production, activity to com- 
merce, increase to wages ; no career of honours 
and distinctions opened to the directing portions of 
society ; none of all these separate and unperceived 
causes which form in Europe public opinion to 
war, and disguise its effects. There, war is accom- 
panied by levies of men, by the exaction of con- 
tributions, by the spoliation of harvests and 
property, and by forced labour. Hence an innate 
aversion to war — hence a submission to the 
appearance of strength, in no ways analogous to 
the personal courage, or the numbers, of the popu- 
lation. When a people, under such a system, lose 
confidence in their own government, and have not 
the means, do not see the way, of correcting it, 
they can only await the chances its own weakness 
may bring. 

But the geographical position of Constantinople, 
independently of the political position of the govern- 
ment, gives to Russia the means of occupying the 
capital at once, and therefore of turning the barrier 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



75 



of public hatred, which now would render a hostile 
invasion impossible, with perhaps twice the mili- 
tary means at her disposal, In the last war, not- 
withstanding all the difficulties she encountered, 
and the losses she incurred, she was invited by 
almost every class of the population — Greeks, 
Bulgarians, Armenians, and Turks. In Asia she 
was called in, and assisted by the Dere Beys. 
These facilities exist no longer ; and to that very 
war, and its consequences, are to be attributed the 
necessity of amelioration, and the hatred of all 
classes to Russia. The first giving them an addi- 
tional motive to defend their soil ; the second, union 
among themselves, and confidence in us. 

Here, then, are remarkable contrasts between 
the facilities of occupying Turkey and Poland. 

In Turkey, there are no religious wars, to call 
in a moderator ; but there are separations of sects, 
which preclude combination against a possessor. 

There are no struggles of political principles, to 
call in an arbiter ; but there is absence of all poli- 
tical principle and organisation, to resist a pos- 
sessor. There is no turbulent diet, to paralyse the 
best measures of defence ; but there is a govern- 
ment, so weak as not to be able to defend its 
empire, and therefore weak enough to become the 
subservient instrument of its military occupier. 

There are no reckless serfs, to be restrained by 
physical force ; but there is a nation of small pro- 
prietors, whose social habits and domestic virtues 



76 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



make it their first interest to preserve order and 
tranquillity. 

In Poland, there was a class powerfully rich, 
and a mass wretchedly poor — extremes which 
touch revolution on both sides. In Turkey, there 
is neither great wealth, nor pauperism ; but a middle 
state, too weak to unite from ambition, too well 
off to coalesce from desperation. 

In Poland, these general principles produced 
individual revolutionary dispositions, ever ready to 
discover, or even suppose, causes of discontent. 
In Turkey, the contrary principle produces a 
docility in the dispositions of each individual, that 
inclines them not only to submit to wrongs, but to 
overlook them. 

In Poland, every man was a Pole — was actu- 
ated by the feelings of a Pole, rallied by the cry of 
country — belonged to Poland. In Turkey, there 
is no watchword, no country— every man belongs 
to his village. 

The abuses of Turkey interest no class in their 
defence; they proceed merely from the faulty 
administration, and offer the occupying or pro- 
tecting power means of conciliating universal con- 
fidence, by correcting them. 

Turkey is not an inland country, but a maritime 
country — not only accessible by water, but bisected 
by the sea ; its capital cleft into three parts by the 
sea, its communications intercepted by the sea ; 
and this sea not only commanded by the occupy- 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY, 



77 



ing power, but as exclusively her's as if it were an 
inland lake. 

The destruction of the Janissaries and Dere 
Beys swept away all internal combination against 
the power of the Sultan. How immensely has it 
not then facilitated the quiet possession of the 
empire by the protector of the Sultan. Had they 
not been destroyed, Turkey would not have the 
union of material means, which to-day render a 
hostile attack on the part of Russia impossible*, 
but she would have had the will, the thought of 
resistance, which has now vanished. Her pro- 
vinces would have been open to the Russians, her 
Rayas their partisans ; but 8000 Russians would 
never have encamped on the Bosphorus ; and even 
had she fallen, the Janissaries would have remained 
a national body, and a centre of resistance ; and 
the Dere Beys, like the Polish nobles, would have 
rallied the bolder spirits under their banners, or 
even maintained a wild and mountain independ- 

* Even in the last war, although Turkey brought into the 
field only raw boys, formed into battalions as they were sent 
into the field, two battalions only having been enrolled a year, 
and in all 30,000 of so called regulars, without a staff, 
without officers, yet the result of the campaign of 1828 was 
exceedingly favourable to the Turks. The campaign of 
1829 was only not so because the general did not obey his 
orders, and because Diebitch pushed across the Balkans. 
European diplomacy alone crowned his temerity with success. 
Turkey, with all her faults, had she not been deprived of her 
fleet, must have been successful. 



78 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



ence. Their destruction offers to Russia far greater 
hopes, but renders those hopes precarious ; for 
formerly Turkey was insulated from Europe by 
the fanaticism entertained by these bodies. While 
their disappearance exposes to her attacks, to her 
protection, the government and the capital, — it 
allows, it forces the whole nation to receive, to 
invoke from England moral courage, and political 
support and direction. 

Strange and wonderful combination, without 
precedent in former events, without parallel in its 
immense consequences ! This hitherto haughty 
and intractable people of Mussulmans has been 
brought to implore the tutelage of a Christian 
power. An empire which, in extent, in resources, 
in population, in position, and in individual quali- 
ties and courage — in all, in fact, save instruction— 

Valentini makes a confession, of no little importance, that 
the veteran generals were reminded, by the young Turkish 
troops, of the French at the commencement of the war of the 
revolution : — " Tels que les Francais d'alors combatterent 
" leurs adversaires sans connaissance, et sans exercise, tels 
" nous avons vu aujourd'hui les Osmanlis faire leur pre- 
" miers essais, sous les memes auspices. Des coups decisifs 
" etoufTeront toujours des forces naissantes, qui par une 
" guerre lente et methodique se seraient elevees d une puis- 
" sance formidable." — Guerre centre les Turcs, page 229. 

His impartiality may be judged of by the following avowal, 
which proves, moreover, the truth of the above statement;-— 
" Si nous trouvons ici toujours 300 hommes engages contre 
" 3000, et avoir le dessous, on n'y verra rien que de tres 
" naturel et rien de deshonorant." — Page 248. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



79 



is one of the greatest on the face of the globe, is 
brought to look with ardent expectation for the 
arrival of a foreign squadron, and a body of 
auxiliaries in its capital; and to expect, from 
their presence, the contrary of what they have 
experienced from Russia — reformation of internal 
abuses, and restoration of their independence ! 

Under these circumstances, it is evi- 
dent THAT THE DEFENCE OF TURKEY MUST 
PRECEDE OCCUrATION. 

Should a stronger feeling of nationality than we 
anticipate, burst forth among the Turks, on the 
occupation of Constantinople, the most ardent 
spirits would retire inwards, to the mountains, or 
they would be received under the protection of 
Mehemet Ali, or his successor, so as to leave to 
Russia the only portion of the country, the pos- 
session of which is desirable to her. But the 
Egyptian power would furnish new pretexts and 
means to Russia for excluding all European 
intervention — for excluding all other powers from 
the eastern partition — which only ignorance or 
madness can lead any other cabinet to dream of 
sharing in. 

If, after the event of occupation, England and 
France found it impossible to endure the conse- 
quences, and resolved on making an effort to 
expel Russia, they would find arrayed against 
them the very spirit of resistance which is 
now at their disposal. The Turks will fight, to 



80 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



prevent their country from becoming a field of 
contest* 

Russia once in Constantinople, is vulnerable 
only in Constantinople. The possessor of the 
capital possesses the empire ; the possessor of the 
Dardanelles possesses the East. The importance 
of neither has been felt, because the possessor 
knew not his own advantages ; but let Russia be 
there, she will feel them, and make them be felt. 

* Although the work of General Valentini is the fable of 
the Man who could paint, and the Lion that could not ; it 
abounds with admissions of the individual superiority of the 
Turks, amidst the often merited abuse of the government, and 
its measures. 

" The Ottoman," he says, " defends his arms, as every 
" thing he possesses, with greater pertinacity than any other 
" nation, and fights with the devotion of despair, rather than 
" surrender himself prisoner. 

" It is, therefore, very conceivable that 5,000 armed Turks 
" should, by a spontaneous movement, have assembled behind 
" the breach of Brailow, to defend it. This is the conse- 
" quence of a natural warrior instinct, and of deeply-felt per- 
" sonal interest, which we will only attain to in our Christian 
" Governments, by a state of perfect civilisation. With us the 
" first bomb shakes institutions," &c. — Page 240. 

Do not these few, but remarkable lines, establish the results 
that naturally flow from the causes we have been endeavour- 
ing to point out ? 

In the very following page we find that Kustenji ignobly 
surrendered ; " but for the honour of the commandant, it is 
" assured that the garrison was almost entirely composed of 
" old Janissaries." 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



81 



If then, the allies, by a great effort, can force 
the Dardanelles, they may be able to crush the 
power of Russia. What consequences may follow 
such a contingency, we confess, appears to us 
involved in darkness ; but the chances are scarcely 
worth weighing, for we believe not in the proba- 
bility of Russia being attacked at all, and scarcely 
do we think she will be attackable, when once 
entrenched in force, behind the ramparts of the 
Dardanelles. 

There are men of no inconsiderable influence, 
who imagine, that in the event of the occupation 
of the Dardanelles by Russia, the other powers 
may scramble for the provinces. The examination 
of the question into which we have entered, suffices, 
we trust, to expose the emptiness of the expecta- 
tion of possessing any useful interest in Turkey or 
in the Levant, on the occurrence of that contin- 
gency. It will then be for England and France 
not to look for further acquisitions, but to the 
defence of Malta and Algiers, and of so many 
other interests far and near. This idea is of 
course industriously spread by the agents of Russia, 
which, like all her suggestions, has hitherto been 
implicitly admitted by our ignorance. 

Now it is to be borne in mind that the Dar- 
danelles is the only point that Russia has to 
defend; that by its sole occupation she holds in 
subjection the whole Ottoman empire, defends 
her possession from all aggression, and places 



S2 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



beyond all reach and intercourse the various points 
of her own territory where an attack or a diver- 
sion could be made. Its occupation instantly 
covers her whole line, from Riga to Astrakan, and 
renders disposable not less than 100,000 men. 
Will any efforts be spared to render it impassable, 
impregnable ? It is only at three days' sail, with 
the regularly prevailing winds and currents, from 
the arsenal, crowded with ships, men, stores, 
materiel, and artillery, that, in long expectation, 
has been constructed on the nearest point of her 
territory, and which seems to stretch out as far as 
possible into the Euxine, to shorten the space 
across which this southern eye of Russia looks on 
the inheritance of Constantine. 

We should regret that one moment of the atten- 
tion we can command should be diverted to futile 
discussion, or even to refutations of erroneous 
opinions. The best refutation is facts, which may 
have been neglected, but which cannot be denied ; 
still there is a necessity for referring to a pecu- 
liarly prejudicial opinion, which has of late been 
propagated by the press — the possibility of raising 
up, out of the ruins of Turkey % independent states 
as a barrier to Russia. Could any suggestion be 
imagined more capable of giving to our policy an 
uncertain and suspicious gait ? of perplexing it 
with remote deliberation and reference, at a mo- 
ment when vigorous action is imperative ; of ren- 
dering it mistrustful of all, suspicious to all, and 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



useful to none, save our adversary ? This notion 
has been put forward, with a certain pomp, in 
essays which have found, in this middle term, 
a show of conciliation between two necessarily- 
opposed principles, the one of European prejudice, 
that Turkey must be lost ; the other of English 
interest, that she must be preserved. The eleva- 
tion of these states is, moreover, held out as a 
threat to Russia. A threat to Russia ! It would 
seem the ingenious suggestion of a Russian agent, 
had not past experience sufficed to prove, that the 
ablest generals, diplomatists, and agents, of Russia, 
have never served her as she has been served by 
her antagonists. 

The unity of the Ottoman power has not only 
been the cause of its permanency, but is the un- 
equivocal object of the desires of the whole of 
these populations, whose interests and affections 
are thus arbitrarily disposed of. If they wish to 
correct and control that unity, it is clear they 
have no idea of destroying it*. The details into 

* The most remarkable revolts of the last few years bear 
unequivocal testimony to the intensity and universality of this 
feeling. 

When Mustapha Bairaktar led his victorious Albanians to 
the capital, it was to relieve the Sultan from the control of the 
Janissaries. When the Servians revolted, under Czerni 
George, it was to expel the Dais or Janissaries of Servia ; 
and, to prove that their revolt was not against the Sultan, they 
left unoccupied the fortresses they had taken. Mustapha, 



84 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



which we have already entered, may probably con- 
tain internal evidence of our opinion not being 
formed in a closet, remote from the subject we are 
treating. We might perhaps rest satisfied with 
denying the conclusion ; but we will not place the 
supremacy of the Sultan and the unity of the 
empire as a final object, as a political axiom, 
without offering some considerations, which we 
deem conclusive, in its support. 

The repairing of an edifice is not generally 

Pacha of Scodra, called West Roumelia to arms, and marched, 
at the head of 20,000 men, on Monastir. His proclamations 
breathed respect and loyalty for the Sultan, and called on the 
faithful to unite, to release him from the thraldom of evil coun- 
sellors, Ibrahim Pacha put forward, as his best claims to the 
support of Anatoly, that he marched under the sanction of a 
secret intelligence with the Sultan to emancipate him from 
Russian protection. Mehemet Ali, supposed in Europe to aim 
at occupying the throne, was as much overawed by this preju- 
dice or opinion as his meanest fellow subjects. The utmost 
limit of his secret aspirations was, succession of the Seraskier, 
or the presidency of a Council of Regency. Even the Rus- 
sians, in passing through the territories " annexees a per- 
petuite a l'Empire," prevented opposition, by proclaiming 
that they marched not against the Sultan, but, by his orders, 
against some rebel Pachas. This notion they propagated, 
even after their invasion. By means of it, they occupied the 
important position of Anapa. Is such a principle to be treated 
with levity ? Is such an element of power to be sacrificed 
to the lucubrations of some periodical publications, who 
have occupied the vacant field of European publicity and 
discussion r 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



85 



commenced by knocking down the scaffolding ; 
but here, not the scaffolding but the edifice itself is 
to be destroyed, by the measures proposed for its 
restoration. But what is the new form, to make 
room for which so much is to be sacrificed ? Have 
we not had sufficient proofs what means of self- 
defence small federated states possess against 
neighbouring monarchies? Appeal to every in- 
stance, from the Achean league to the German 
confederation : they will show but internal dis- 
union and external weakness. Look at the large 
peninsula of Italy, containing above twenty mil- 
lions of a civilised and refined population, where 
one religion, one supreme church, one language, a 
common origin, a common history, common ruins, 
common interests, the same songs, the same music, 
the same school-books — all is to be found that can 
give to a great people unity of feeling, and, conse- 
quently, power. This people is, moreover, great 
in art and science, rich in literature — it possesses 
admirable roads, an exuberant soil, an immense 
commerce, and a position fit to command the 
world. Here you have the independent states 
that are to bring independence to Turkey — and 
what is the result? What is the independence 
of Italy ? what is its weight in the political scale ? 
Nothing — less than nothing — a minus quantity — 
and only not absorbed by one neighbouring mo- 
narchy because another has contested the pos- 
session ; but not contested it, as the partition of 



86 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Turkey, in distant diplomatic council chambers, 
but in bloody struggles on the banks of the Adige, 
the Po, and the Tiber. 

But what a contrast in the homogeneity of 
Italy, and the multitude of distinct races and 
hostile religions which now exist, separate and at 
peace, under the shadow of the Turkish domi- 
nion ! The separate existence of each race is 
impossible ; for, if even not attacked from with- 
out, they are too far advanced in civilization 
not to be vulnerable ; they are not far enough, 
(as what people ever has been ?) to be moderate 
among themselves. What race, then, is to be pre- 
dominant ? Will the Greeks submit to the Ser- 
vians, the Servians to the Albanians, the Bosniacs 
to the Bulgarians, the Turks to the Armenians ? 
The very supposition, should it be generally 
spread, would suffice at this moment to convulse 
the Empire. Nor are these antipathies created 
by race, language, and habits, alone. There is a 
far more important source of disunion— religion. 
Independent of Islamism, there are four great 
religious systems spread over the empire, with 
central church governments, complicating the sub- 
divisions of races by other lines of demarcation, by 
other and more dangerous oppositions. 

While the abuses of the Turkish government 
have been so industriously dwelt upon, who has 
ever dreamt of investigating the inherent difficul- 
ties, of conciliating the interests, of restraining the 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



87 



passions, of maintaining the equality, of so incon- 
gruous an assemblage? What traveller has not 
observed the fanaticism, the antipathy, of all these 
sects — their hostility to each other ? Who has 
traced their actual repose to the toleration of 
Islamism ? Islamism, calm, absorbed, without 
spirit of dogma, or views of proselytism, imposes at 
present on the other creeds the reserve and silence 
which characterise itself. But let this moderator 
be removed, and the humble professions now con- 
fined to the sanctuary would be proclaimed in the 
court and the camp ; political power and political 
enmity would combine with religious domination 
and religious animosity ; the empire would be de- 
luged in blood, until a nervous arm — the arm of 
Russia — appears to restore harmony, by despotism. 
Did not the animosities of the eastern and western 
churches lay the Greek empire at the feet of the 
Turkish conqueror ? Open abruptly the political 
arena to similar contentions, the same scene would 
be reproduced ; and even if the Christian sects 
alone remained, the theologian and sectarian acri- 
mony of Mount Athos, of Etchmiazin, and the 
Vatican, would reappear, unaccompanied by the 
remnants of the science and philosophy of Athens 
and of Rome. 

If these considerations are not sufficient to prove 
the utter impossibility of raising the Turkish em- 
pire by destroying the Turkish supremacy, whether 
religious or civil, look at Greece. Is her revolu- 



ss 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



tion not the real cause of the late progress of 
Russia ? Look at Egypt. Has not the Mussul- 
man schism brought on the actual crisis ? Would 
you still increase such chances ? Can Mehemet 
Ali restore the unity of power, by occupying the 
Sultan's throne? If he could, a struggle must 
first take place ; that struggle brings Russia to 
Constantinople. Can Greece replace Turkey, 
unless Turkey is destroyed ? But then, does not 
Russia step in? A contest constitutes her in- 
stantaneously arbiter ; and that contest, in the 
actual posture of affairs, she can at any hour bring 
about*. 

Numerous are the considerations that press upon 
us, in support of these conclusions ; but they appear 

* Russia will not bring about that contest until she is pre- 
pared with a sufficient disposable force, and with sufficient 
means of transport, — until the pitch of hopelessness and 
resignation has been reached, which she may see necessary in 
the Turkish government and people ; and until the state of the 
west diminishes to the slightest possible chance the slight 
probabilities of an after coalition against her ; but these con- 
siderations are all subordinate to the seism of Turkey. 
This it is that perplexes her victim in resources and in mind — 
this it is that gives her her rights of protector — that distracts 
European opinion and policy. If, therefore, she sees Mehemet 
Ali in danger of falling by himself, she must hasten the 
crisis ; at this moment his position seems more precarious 
than ever — and this is strangely the moment taken to get up 
Mehemet Ali's credit in Paris and London ! This is most 
ominous ! 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



89 



to us truths so self-evident, when fairly stated, 
that the prolongation of the discussion might em- 
barrass the judgment without strengthening the 
conviction. 

The settlement of Greece, such as it is, has cost 
ten times the trouble that would have sufficed to 
organize Turkey. The settlement of the Egyp- 
tian question in Egypt, or in the Mediterranean, 
involves ten times the danger and difficulties that 
would be incurred in humbling Russia at Constan- 
tinople. The cabinets of France and England 
have themselves created the dilemma in which 
they are placed ; the responsibility under which 
they stand is self incurred ; they cannot now, by 
any possibility, retreat, even if they had no inte- 
rests of their own at stake. 



90 ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



CHAPTER VI. 

Examination in detail of material condition of Government. — 
Causes and effects of various alleged insurrections of the 
Curds, Lazes, and Albanians. — Quasi independence of the 
Servians. — State of Finance. — Agriculture and Commerce. 

The degradation of the government so naturally 
leads to the supposition of an equal degradation 
and depression of the national interests, that it is 
necessary to the just appreciation of the state of 
this country to examine in detail its material 
condition. 

The weakness of the government, which brings 
discredit on the country, has been, in many 
respects, advantageous to its well-being, seeing 
that the action of the government, slight as it is, 
is almost always wrong. The grounds of this 
belief we shall state as concisely as possible. 
We will first point out the causes and effects of 
various alleged insurrections, of the Curds, Lazes, 
and Albanians, of the quasi independence of 
the Servians, and then examine the state of 
the finances of agriculture and of commerce. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



91 



The revolt of the Curds, which has been so often 
cited as a proof of the disorder of the country, is 
only an attempt on their part to resist a project 
of the government for settling them permanently 
in villages — an attempt never dreamt of formerly, 
and for which, if it is properly conducted, and if it 
succeeds, the government will be entitled to the 
highest commendation — it will add to the resources 
of the state more than has been lost by the inde- 
pendence of Greece. 

The Albanians are in a state of nominal submis- 
sion, but of passive hostility, to the Porte. Imme- 
diately after the conclusion of the Russian war, 
that country assembled in arms ; it was entirely 
subdued. It offered to the Porte a nursery of 
excellent troops, and might furnish several hun- 
dred thousand men. They were opposed to the 
nizzam, but more so the change of dress, which 
was an incident ; however, their armed opposition 
was subdued. Having hitherto existed by mili- 
tary service — ignorant of the arts of peace, and 
despising them — beaten in the field, controlled in 
their markets and castles, they had no alternative 
but unconditional submission and acceptance of 
military service necessary to their existence. The 
Porte, however, removed the only man who had 
combined sufficient firmness and judgment to subdue 
and control them, so that advantage has not been 
taken as yet of the immense resources they offer 
to the empire, nor of the consequences of their 
subjugation — deprived at present of the means of 



92 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



existence — not controlled either by superior force 
or by a ruler capable of forming a party among 
them, or of overawing them, they exist in a state 
of useless and nominal submission, committing of 
necessity partial depredations, until the Porte 
thinks fit to send there a fit governor, and to 
relieve the plethora of the country by enlisting a 
considerable body of them. 

Servia is said to be independent, and therefore 
that from a useful province it is become a hostile 
state. Servia, as a province of Turkey, paid no 
tribute, in consequence of the disturbed condition 
it has been in for forty years ; it supported, how- 
ever, 2,000 spahis, soldiers possessing fiefs, who 
certainly rendered the Porte but slender service, 
and were the chief causes of its convulsion. The 
Servians, oppressed in turns by the Sultan's pachas 
and by their provincial janissaries, were almost 
constantly in a state of revolt. Three armies have 
been lost in that country — the neighbouring pro- 
vinces distressed and exhausted, and auxiliaries 
offered to every invader, in the warlike inhabitants 
of this advanced position. 

Since the settlement that took place at the end 
of the last year, Servia is to pay a regular tribute 
of 3,500,000 piastres yearly. It has become at- 
tached, by its dearest interests now coinciding 
with long prejudices and feelings, to the supreme 
dominion of the Porte, which assures it the most 
unlimited freedom of internal administration and 
commerce, advantages which it can appreciate 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



93 



better than any other province, by the contrast 
which its position enables it daily to make with 
the Servian tribes under the administration of 
Austria. Its prosperity, important in itself, ex- 
tends its influence to the surrounding country : its 
tranquillity and loyalty restrains the Bosniacs and 
the Albanians, while the independence and the 
elevation of the social position of the Servians ele- 
vate the character of the Rayas elsewhere, and 
render impossible former oppression by the refuge 
it affords, and the respect it commands. Instead 
of the Porte's having in future to expend its 
resources, and the blood of its subjects, in quelling 
revolts produced in Servia by its maladministra- 
tion, Servia becomes the means of restraining 
commotions elsewhere ; and instead of its offering 
auxiliaries to foreign foes, it has 30,000 brave and 
warlike troops; and, in case of invasion, 100,000 
to defend the empire; if, indeed, and that is 
always to be understood, the Turkish Government 
can be brought to be a friend to its people and 
itself. Although the various Treaties between 
Russia and the Porte have stipulated this internal 
freedom and independence for Servia, Russia 
used every effort to prevent the fulfilment of the 
stipulations she extorted, so as to lose entirely, for 
the moment, the affections of this people, and to 
confirm their attachment to the existence of the 
Porte, by completely unmasking her own designs. 
This is the only independent state of the east, 




94 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



that has not imitated Europe, an imitation uni- 
versally fatal. The Crimea — Turkey itself — in as 
far as that imitation has extended ; Egypt ; 
Greece— are all instances of the impossibility 
of engrafting European fiscality on the simplicity 
of eastern institutions, and of forcing it on the 
adverse prejudices, opinions, and interests of the 
people. The cause of this happy difference is, 
that the above-mentioned states have seen but 
the results of European civilisation at a distance ; 
Servia has seen the means on her own borders. 

A revolt, as it has been termed, has recently 
been quelled in Lazistan, on the eastern frontier 
of Anatoly. The facts are these : — In this strong 
and remote district, the Dere Beys had main- 
tained their ground. There were from twenty to 
thirty of them, possessing from fifty to five hun- 
dred villages each, recognising no authority save 
their own, paying no tribute to the Porte, and 
constantly at war among themselves. In the last 
Russian war, they naturally were unable to make 
any head against her — they joined (when they did 
join) the different pachas with hostile objects, and 
were by them considered more dangerous than the 
avowed enemy ; besides, many of them were in 
correspondence with Russia. This conduct, and 
the humiliation of defeat, exasperated the whole 
country against them. At this period a great 
amelioration took place in the general admini- 
stration of the Pachalic of Trebizond, in which 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



95 



Lazistan was included ; the pacha was dis- 
graced, and ordered to Constantinople ; he was 
then reappointed, and, on his return, a total change 
was observed in his conduct and administration. As 
the strength of the Dere Beys had always been in 
the weakness of the provincial governors, and in 
their mal-administration, this change instantly 
blew into a flame the disaffection of the Lazes to 
their hereditary chiefs. These had, however, nu- 
merous partisans — they assembled troops — Tousji 
Oglou, the most powerful of them, had constructed 
at once a fortress and a palace at Rizch, and had 
collected 15,000 men. Achmet Pacha, the kiaya 
of the Pacha of Trebizond, was sent against him, 
with, as he says, 7,000 — as the Lazes themselves 
say, 1,500 men. One shot alone was fired. Tousji 
Oglou's men dispersed instantly, or joined the Sul- 
tan's troops. Lie himself was taken ; his castle, so 
extensive, that it required the daily efforts of 500 
men during a month to overturn it, taken, and 
the other chiefs dispersed, to maintain themselves 
as long as possible in their holds ; but they were 
every where pursued by the indignation of the 
people, and, notwithstanding there was not at the 
disposal of the Pacha a force sufficient, unassisted, 
to have reduced one of them in his strong hold, if 
properly defended, yet in four months not one 
remained. Two of the principals were executed, 
the remainder were suffered to go and remain un- 
molested, but without authority in the country; 



96 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



but several, who had had connection with Russia, 
took refuge in her territories*. 

Here then a revolt, which is supposed directed 
against authority, and quelled by an exercise of 
power, is in fact a revolution in a province hitherto 
in a state of anarchical independence, which has 
ended by connecting it with the remainder of the 
empire, and prepares it to be converted into a 
formidable barrier against Russia, from which it is 
now detached. Russia is there at present the ob- 
ject of a hatred, unequalled even in the remainder 
of Turkey ; that feeling will gradually wear off, if 
the Porte acquires sufficient strength to force upon 
them Salian Ichtsab, &c. Those violations of her 
principles and her creed, which have cost her so 
many insurrections, have occasioned her so much 
weakness, given so much strength to Russia, and 
to which she is so wedded, and the nation so 
opposed, that the weakness of the government 
becomes a condition of its existence. 

These are some of the very recent imitations of 
European fiscality affecting exchange, and levied 
by government tax-gatherers. The immutable code 
and creed of Islamism establishes a tenth of profits, 
of all descriptions, as the only legitimate tax col- 
lected by the people themselves. The Arab political 
economists hold, that a tenth of profits furnishes 
the maximum of revenue. At an early period, even 

* Russia has made much boast of delivering up to the Porte 
Cadi Kirran ; but he was not a Dere Bey. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



97 



under Omar, scales of assessment were introduced. 
On the occupation of Constantinople, several imi- 
tations of the Greek system corrupted the sim- 
plicity and beauty of the Turkish ; still it has 
remained the best, the steadiest system of finance 
in Europe, notwithstanding the political misfor- 
tunes of the country, the errors into which it has 
fallen, the violence that has been exerted against it, 
the necessities under which the state has laboured, 
have never led to bankruptcy*, or to the incurring 
of foreign debt ; and no abuse at present exists that 
is not branded with the word abuse, and which 
cannot be removed without impairing the system. 
This statement may little agree with the epithets 
of travellers' note books. We trust, in future, it 
will be found necessary to know something of the 
institutions of Turkey, before either condemning 
or admiring them. 

There is, perhaps, no district in any country, 
Servia excepted, where greater contentment reigns 
at this moment, or greater devotion to their sove- 
reign ; and the motives are self-evident, — the old 
abuses have been swept away, the new ones have 
not been introduced. Lazistan is a sample of the 
feelings that would at this moment animate and 
connect the whole empire, if the Sultan had felt 
what he could make of his empire when he had 

* The depreciation of the currency, instead of being a mode 
of meeting difficulties, in fact increased them — the currency 
is not paper. 



98 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



destroyed the Janissaries. Lazistan to-day ex- 
hibits a living proof of the astonishing impulse 
which this empire has at times received from an 
able monarch or vizier, and renders credible and 
intelligible, relations and events, which otherwise 
would appear fabulous or incomprehensible. 

The Lazes are of Georgian origin, and have, 
since the possession of Georgia by Russia, gradu- 
ally been converted to Islamism. The proximity 
of Russia had from the first introduced elements 
of disorganization into this province ; the authority 
of the Porte was weakened, and finally subverted, 
by the opportunities thus afforded to the Dere 
Beys to usurp its authority. But the very means 
employed by Russia, to open to her this barrier of 
the empire, prepared a new and extraordinary 
element of resistance. 

Without entering into the causes, it is sufficient 
to state that numerous examples prove the fact, 
that wherever D§re Beys have superseded the 
municipal bodies, the people have lost their indi- 
vidual character, their tenacity for their ancient 
habits, traditions, and religion. Russia introduced 
disorders into this province, and fomented them ; 
the Dere Bey system sprang up, and this, with the 
discredit attached to Christianity by the neigh- 
bouring administration of Russia, has led to the 
apostacy of the Lazes. Russia, in separating 
them administratively from the Porte, has brought 
about their religious union to the Sultan — she has, 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



99 



moreover, raised their character; for it must be 
observed, that the difference here is not between 
the Bible and the Koran, between Christianity 
and Islamism, but between the superstition and 
idolatry of the Greek church and the simplicity of 
the Mussulman practice, between two systems of 
which the apparent differences are religious, but of 
which the material differences are political and 
social. 

The Georgians are proverbial for drunkenness 
and debauchery ; they are not brave, they are 
superstitious. Those who have become Mussul- 
men seem to have entirely abjured the charac- 
teristics of their race ; they have become sober*, 

* " The epitaph of Darius, which records his remarkable 
" power of drinking much wine, and bearing it well, presents 

a singular trait of national manners, and it is curious to mark 
" the change, in this respect, of modern times." — Fraser's 
History of Persia, p. 110. 

This, in a note, is an admission made by the conscientious- 
ness of Mr. Fraser. 

Klaproth, speaking of the ancient wild rights of the Circas- 
sian princes, adds, " Cependant ils y ont renonces en em- 
" brassant le mahometanism. Depuis cette epoque le peuple 
" a aussi change les habitudes sous beaucoup de rapports. 
" Ils buvaient de l'eau-de-vie h l'exces, &c, a present ils 
" s'abstiennent de toutes ces choses." — Klaproth's Tableau 
du Caucase, p. 74. 

We have never dreamt of answering objections or refuting 
false opinions, or false testimony, regarding Turkey. But 
while this page is under correction, a number of a periodical, 
devoted to popular instruction, benevolently intended to dispel 



1G0 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



chaste, and hospitable ; these are habits of their 
new faith. Their character has acquired dignity 
by belonging to the honoured class. In confirma- 
tion of this change of spirit, the establishment of 
their schools in each village dates from the epoch 
of its conversion. 

We have dwelt thus particularly on this district, 
for three reasons :— first because it illustrates 
forcibly the character of the people, and the prin- 

ignorance, refute errors, and destroy prejudices, is opened by 
the writer ; it treats the hundreds of thousands that benefit 
by its useful knowledge, to an article on intoxication and 
opium eating in Turkey, and refers to a former article on the 
same subject. This is really intolerable. The falsehoods 
and nonsense put forth (of course proceeding from some one 
who has written a book on Turkey), are below observation, 
and we notice it only in the hope that the benevolent and 
enlightened directors of that publication may examine and 
test the truths of the assertions they are the means of pro- 
pagating. 

The writer of these pages, after five years spent in Turkey, 
knows but one old man who eats opium. He knows three 
in England, two being ladies. His individual experience 
would lead him to report in Turkey the English as opium 
eaters. The opium eating story is one of those instances of 
European ignorance and credulity with which a European 
traveller may amuse his Turkish entertainers. 

This note has been submitted to a gentleman who has 
travelled long in the East, as many have, and who has had 
the rather extraordinary advantages of acquaintance and 
friendships beyond the pale of Frank society. His observa- 
tion was, " add my six years rambles in Turkey without know- 
" ing or seeing one opium eater." 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



101 



ciples of the Turkish systems, old and new : se- 
condly, because it is a portion of this province that 
Russia has extorted by the convention of St. Pe- 
tersburgh : thirdly, because it shows the state of a 
population, the name of which is scarcely known*, 
which has never been visited by a traveller, and 
which, even at Trebi%ond, is represented as so 
wild and savage, that it is impossible to land on 
the coast. 

In all these instances it is evident that appear- 
ances are fallacious, that the very causes of despair 
to the friends of Turkey, are really proofs of the 
great facility of governing that exist, if properly 
used. This is still further established, by general 
submissiveness to a corrupt administration ; and 
the absence of crime, which there are no visible 
means of punishing or repressing. 

Prosperity is arrested by want of confidence — by 
restrictions on production and commerce — by the 
eminentlyhostile attitude of Russia — theprecarious- 
ness of internal tranquillity — by the misintelligence 
between Mehemet Ali and the Porte, and by the 
effects, still unrepaired, of the late events in Ana- 
toly : under such unfavourable circumstances, it 
would be irrational to look for any very remark- 
able improvement ; and the slightest indication of 

* " La quatrieme branche des Georgiens comprend les 
" Lazi — c'est un peuple farouche." — Klaproth's Tableau 
du Caucase, p. 87. 



102 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



improvement must afford alike matter of surprise 
and congratulation. 

The absence of all statistical returns, and the 
extreme difficulty of obtaining general information, 
and of knowing, with any degree of certainty, in 
what state Turkey is, throw difficulties in the 
way of obtaining correct estimates, that hitherto 
have proved insurmountable. The revenue, drawn 
almost exclusively from production, is the best, 
and, indeed, the only official test of the condition 
of the country ; and we have fortunately had the 
means of ascertaining pretty accurately the state 
in which it is. The revenue, compared with 
former periods, is reduced, by the defalcation of 
the tribute of Greece — of Moldavia and Wallachia 
— of Albania, for many years— of Servia and Bos- 
nia, Egypt, Syria, and Candia — of Bagdad, and of 
the Pachalics of Erzeroum, Kars, and Akhalsich, 
which have scarcely paid any thing to the Porte 
since the Russian war. The regular expenditure, 
on the other hand, for the army, navy, and admi- 
nistration, has been gradually increasing, and has 
doubled within the last eight years*. This year 

* Notwithstanding 300,000/. have been expended on the 
festivities on the Sultana's marriage, a new palace, a large, new, 
and several minor schools, barracks, and other edifices, debts 
and progressive redemption of a species of long annuity, at 
12 per cent., have absorbed 200,000/. more. These sums 
ought not to figure as regular expenditure, and amount to 
60,000,000 piastres. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



103 



there has been a very considerable extra expendi- 
ture, yet we have grounds for asserting that there 
is a larger surplus of revenue over expenditure 
than has been obtained for a century. Yet there 
has been no confiscation — no very crying abuse or 
extortion — none that have profited the treasury ; 
so that the increase proves a very positive and 
very astonishing increase of production. 

A larger body of troops are on foot than ever 
were maintained before, a standing army of 60,000 
men*, with all the necessary administration, and 
without sufficient control in the expenditure, occa- 
sions a heavier outlay than formerly 2 or 300,000 
irregulars. 

The fleet has occasioned considerable expendi- 
ture ; and the construction of new vessels, within 
the year, repairs or building alone, if paid in 
money, would amount to 30,000,000 piastres — it 
really cost the government a much larger sum in 
the diminution of revenue appropriated to this 
object. 

The pay of civil servants now begins to figure 
in the budget, having before been allowed to pay 
themselves — their number has been considerably 
reduced. The Pachas have been reduced to a 

* The regular troops are an additional expense of thirty 
millions beyond the sum paid for the Janissaries, and the re- 
venue of the fiefs of 12,000 cavalry, which government has 
taken into its own hands, having enrolled the holders in 
regiments. 



104 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



fourth of their former number, which greatly faci- 
litates the administration, while it is a relief from 
heavy charges and great abuses. The salaries 
have not yet been settled — but the ministers, and 
several of the higher functionaries, have already 
commenced drawing their salaries from the trea- 
sury ; although additional resources are still left 
them, they receive £.4800 per annum. 

It is not alone war and revolt that have weighed 
down the nation, but the expenses of these wars, 
and the subsidies to Russia. Thus, independently 
of the expenses of the war, nearly £.8,500,000 
have been paid to Russia. The Egyptian campaign 
is calculated at £.1,500,000 — the Albanian at 
£.1,000,000. These charges have, of course, 
directly or indirectly, to be borne by the cultivators, 
their means of production crippled, and the 
treasury impoverished. 

Considerable capital has been expended in the 
erection of schools and churches by the tributaries, 
in consequence of the permission granted after 
having been withheld for two centuries ; this is so 
much withdrawn from the sources of production. 

Rut the greatest misfortune of all, has been the 
drought of this season, which has every where 
seriously injured the grain crops. Some provinces 
are in great distress, and if the whole country is 
not afflicted with the horrors of famine, it is solely 
owing to the astonishing increase of cultivation 
during the last sowing time ; still, prices, compared, 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



105 



with last year, have advanced 20 per cent, and 
the average of last year was above former ones, 
in consequence of the demand from the country 
that formerly supplied grain. 

This internal prosperity, that has overcome so 
many and such great obstacles to its development, 
has made itself be felt on external commerce. 
During the last three months, traffic is in a state 
of stagnation, in consequence of the Plague. The 
Persian trade has been interrupted by an act of 
legitimate retaliation. Still our exports to this 
country must, during the last year, have greatly 
exceeded the former one. The prospects for the 
next year are still more encouraging, grain 
has in a great measure failed, but the crops of 
Indian Corn, and especially of Rice, exceed every 
expectation. Silk has been produced in quantities 
exceeding any former period, and the price has 
likewise advanced, in consequence of the supposed 
diminution in Italy and Spain*. 

Cotton and Woolf have also increased, though 
not in the same proportion. The fruit crop has 
been very abundant ; oil most abundant, and in 
great demand^:; so that while the exportations of 

* Silk lias advanced 20 per cent, 
■f Wool 15 percent. 

J The exportation of oil was formerly prohibited, so that 
the permission was to be purchased at a rate and with diffi- 
culties too great to render the exportation important. The 
production was therefore neglected. This prohibition and 



106 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Turkey, on which she depends for the means of 
purchasing, are greatly augmented, prices have 
not fallen, but, on the contrary, have greatly ad- 
vanced in almost every article*. 

But the source of the prosperity is the increasing 
independence of the peasantry ; and the lightening 
of the local burthens. Great and beneficial altera- 
tions must have taken place in these points, to per- 
mit of any amelioration under actual circumstances ; 
it is on the progress of these alterations, that hopes 
of increased consumption of our manufactures 
must be founded. This increase will of course be 
immediately affected by the large credit which this 
year's production will open to Turkey in Europe. 

It is to be remarked, that this commercial pros- 
perity is not owing to measures adopted by the 

the monopoly of it have been removed, although the trade 
in it is not entirely free. This, with the reduction of duty on 
olive oil in England, and the demand at Marseilles, has already 
caused an increase of 20 per cent., although the crop is more 
abundant than in any year since 1828. 

* Opium has for three years been a monopoly (it is the 
only monopoly in Turkey), during which time the official 
exports have dwindled to one-half, but the diminution is by 
no means so great, as large quantities are smuggled. The 
increase of this article does not, therefore, keep pace with 
the rest ; it is represented this year as stationary, the price has 
advanced 30 per cent. It perhaps is superfluous to observe, 
that opium is produced for exportation for the China market, 
the home consumption being so small as not to enter in any 
degree into the merchants' calculations. If opium were largely 
consumed in Turkey it could not be a monopoly. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



107 



care of the government for the protection of 
commerce. It is the result of the improved poli- 
tical condition of the producer, and has to contend 
against the will, intention, and, as far as it can 
go, the injurious regulations of the government*. 
Not one measure has been adopted to favour 
commerce since the opening of the oil-trade, a 
measure forced by the menaces of Mitylene, 
when arguments were found of no avail. Since 
then a monopoly of muslins was attempted, in 
favour of the Armenian esnaf; it was defeated 
by the representations of Lord Ponsonby. It was 
attempted to impose on the fairs the duty exacted 
in cities, on the sale of goods ; two fairs, rather than 
submit, dispersed ; one was held in a new place, 
to avoid the new imposition, which also has been 
abandoned. An attempt has been recently made 

* The most remarkable of these are the Teskeres, or Per- 
mits, for exportation. These have been styled by the mer- 
chants, " monopolies ;" the term is, however, inapplicable — 
they do not affect internal commerce — they do not affect those 
objects which interest any large class of producers — they are 
principally for wool, the price of which has, however, advanced 
50 per cent., within five years ; valonia and galls, which are 
no one's property, and are collected in the mountains ; but they 
do not affect grain of any kind — salt, tobacco, fruits, cotton, 
silk, &c. These permits amount to a tax, the injury of which 
would never have been observed, had it not touched the inte- 
rests of the Frank merchants. They are principally owing to 
Russian interference, but they are also an indication of pro- 
gress. Formerly, a governor would have taken by violence 
— he now seeks to take financially. 



108 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



to prevent at fairs all money from circulating, save 
that of the Sultan. A moubayagi was sent to the 
fair of Cashan— he established a booth of 'change, 
and published an order, that all foreign coin 
should be exchanged for money of the Sultan, 
according to the tariff. The tariff fixes, rela- 
tively to the other coin, the Turkish money 
2^ per cent, above its exchangeable value : the 
result was, that the camels and mules were imme- 
diately reloaded, and in a few hours the booth 
of the agent of the mint was left standing alone. 

The safeguard of Turkey is that habitual 
attachment to the chief of the state, which has 
held it together for so many centuries : one single 
fiscal regulation of this sort, without one paras 
profit to the treasury, endangers more that feeling 
than the loss of some thousand lives, or than the 
sack of a province. 

This is a consideration of the very greatest im- 
portance ; it shows that the causes and conse- 
quences of disorders, under a centralised and a 
localised administration, are wholly distinct : that 
is, insurrection in England or France would be 
against the government, and prove hatred to the 
government ; but insurrection in Turkey is against, 
or hitherto has been against, the local governor, and 
in favour of the general government — supposed by 
us to wink at rebellion through weakness, but, in 
reality, considering a justifiable act, what we con- 
ceive treasonable. Now the local governors have 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



109 



lost their power, now the government interferes 
with those interests which were inviolable before — 
markets and prices, and that through an agency 
equally obnoxious ; therefore do we now see re- 
sistance to the government itself, or a tendency 
that way. This explains how Russia may prepare 
for herself a teeming country, and a dissatisfied 
people, and, consequently, a powerless and despised 
government ; for the want of cohesion, uniformity, 
and centralisation in the government, takes from 
it all power, authority, and respect, when it acts 
against the character of the people, and their tra- 
ditional habits of self-administration. 

Other circumstances combine with these indica- 
tions of internal prosperity, to favour the suppo- 
sition of a rapidly-increasing traffic with Eng- 
land, which are — greater facilities and security 
of navigation and communication, than have 
hitherto existed — principally the establishment 
of insurance-companies for short voyages, which 
have been in operation for the last four or 
five years, but the full advantages of which are 
only beginning to be felt now — a weekly post to 
Vienna, established six months ago — the opening 
of the Danube, and regular steam communication 
with Vienna by the provinces — the prospective 
establishment of steam communication with Mar- 
seilles — steam packets to ply regularly between 
Constantinople and Smyrna — a sailing packet be- 
tween Constantinople and Trebizond, which has 



110 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



been plying for nearly a year — and steam-tugs to 
tow vessels through the Dardanelles and Bos- 
phorus, where the long continuous prevalence 
of northerly or southerly winds is the greatest 
drawback on the immense advantages of this 
unrivalled position. As to inland communication, 
a universal conviction now exists of the necessity of 
establishing roads and posts — a commencement has 
even been made ; and on a point like this, where the 
advantages cannot be at all conceived until the 
results are seen, the commencement is the chief dif- 
ficulty*. A road has been commenced, and already 
carried 30 miles from Scutari, in the direction of 
Broussa — post carriages have been brought and 
tried, and this experiment is to decide on the 
feasibility of connecting by post roads the principal 
cities of the empire. 

This progress — these facilities, together with 
other considerations, if undisturbed by political 
events, bid fair to render Turkey, in a few years, the 
largest mart in the world for English manufactures. 

But were England to acquire over the councils 
of Turkey the influence necessary even for its 
political existence, and use that counsel prudently, 
Turkey would be under the necessity of unloosing 
those administrative chains, those commercial pro- 
hibitions, that lock its resources from the light 
— then, and then only, can its worth be known. 

* Since this was written, great progress has been made. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



Ill 



A manufacturing people, our first element of 
prosperity, is abundant, and cheap materials. What 
unlimited supplies would this country not afford ? 
What natural facilities of transport by sea, and on 
her now unfrequented rivers ? What bounds to 
the production of cotton, of the finest qualities — 
of silk, of tobacco, of wool, of dyes and drugs, of 
corn, oil, hemp, tallow, flax* ? The facilities of 
exchange render production comparatively cheaper 
than in any other of the countries from which 
these articles are at present exported in quantities. 
Her forests, and inexhaustible mines, offer richer 
natural sources than are elsewhere to be found, 
Timber, of the finest qualities, may be procured 
for little more than the expense of transport and 
cutting ; and forests, almost wholly useless, from 
which navies might be built, are within three 
hours' sail of her capital. Copper is at present 
extracted, in thousands of tons, at a third of 
the market price of Europef, even by their 
ignorant processes ; and it might be extracted 

* No article which forms a considerable item of export 
from Russia is permitted to be exported from Turkey, not- 
withstanding the free importation of all goods. Why this is so, 
it is useless to inquire. How completely has Russia fooled the 
whole world, and on every question — war, politics, literature, 
hemp, tallow, flax, and linseed ! After all, these are the 
material points, and she alone knows how to handle them. 
She has no commercial treaties. 

f The copper of the mines, administered by the Pacha of 
Trebizond, cost him, when transported to the shore, and twice 
refined after smelting, 3\d, per lb. 



112 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



by tens of thousands of tons, at a diminished 
cost. 

The restrictions and prohibitions which act so 
injuriously on Turkey, are, after all, trifling in 
themselves. We have not to struggle against 
a tariff; but to point out administrative errors, 
and direct administrative reforms, which will 
increase with their wealth, their custom — and 
in advocating these measures for our own 
benefit, we shall not be looked on with jealousy 
by the various national interests, but on the 
contrary as benefactors. This is a consideration 
of some importance, although it might require 
more development than the question, even yet, 
may command attention for. 

Were the commerce of Turkey thus emancipa- 
ted, so immense would be the production, that the 
price of raw materials would fall throughout the 
world, and a revolution in commerce would take 
place similar (since there is nothing greater to 
which to compare it) to that produced by the dis- 
covery of America. We took the plants and seeds 
of Turkey, and discovered a new world fit for 
their expansion to set them in ; we transported 
thither an European population to cultivate them. 
But that world is at a distance, the labour of a 
rapidly-increasing population is dear, restrictions 
are placed on the returning the remunerating value 
of our produce. Here two continents lie known 
on the map, unknown, unexplored in their re- 
sources — men are at our disposal in millions — 



liUSSTA, AND TURKEY. 



115 



labour is cheap, communication easy, a political 
system and a commercial system, which we make 
such as suits us best ; and which in so doing, ren- 
ders us supreme in the affections of the people — 
no restrictions arrest or incommode our direct 
traffic ; and thence, north, south, east, and even 
west, new markets extend. A combination of 
commercial freedom may be here established, to 
balance first, and then destroy the systems of com- 
mercial restriction extending in Europe. Every 
object we purchase will be paid for in British 
goods, and every ton, exported or imported, will 
be embarked in British bottoms. 

These results, whether as to the strengthening of 
Turkey, the obtaining a control over her councils, the 
production of a greater supply of cheapened raw 
materials, or greater demand for our wares, it is 
in the power of England to realise or frustrate, to 
hasten or retard. It is not by her policy alone 
that they are to be brought about, but also by her 
commercial system, as affecting Turkey both di- 
rectly and indirectly. Some of our commercial re- 
gulations have been more injurious to Turkey, even 
than our political errors. The preponderance of 
Russia over Turkey, can be accounted for by the 
Tariff of England alone, and we trust this subject, 
hitherto enveloped in mystery, will soon be ren- 
dered intelligible. Above all things, some com- 

i 



114 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



mercial concession at this moment is necessary*, 
as the means of preserving to ourselves the chief 
benefits of her future prosperity — of anticipating 
a connection, the advantages of which, no other 
nation foresees at present, but which will hereafter 
become the object of rivalry and competition. 

* Several important reductions have been made on arti- 
cles which are largely imported from Turkey ; but if the dis- 
tinction were expressly made for Turkey, its moral effect 
would be very great, and this might be the commencement 
of a reciprocity system, which other circumstances and expe- 
rience might modify, and to which other states might subse- 
quently be added. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



115 



CHAPTER VII. 

Turkey, a portion of the European system. — Union of France 
and Turkey, as opposed formerly to Austria, and now to 
Russia. — Effect on France of extension of Russia to the 
Mediterranean. — Effect on England. — Only to be prevented 
by strengthening Turkey. — Union of France and England 
must cease, unless directed to this end. — Actual state of 
things necessarily leads to the proximate realisation of 
Russia's designs. 

We have hitherto treated Turkey as a principal 
question, referring to the powers of Europe merely 
in as far as their policy has influenced her state or 
existence ; we shall now examine the interests of 
those powers with respect to each other, referring 
to Turkey merely as the field of their contests, 
and in as far as its wealth, arms, commerce, posi- 
tions, and marine, may give influence and power 
to each of the rival or allied cabinets. 

A distinguished diplomatist, in the late appre- 
hensions occasioned by the complication of the 
Belgian affairs, and the representative of one of 
the great powers, observed, " Why all these alarms ? 
" No gun will ever be fired in Europe for Belgian 
" independence. It is in the East, that the arena 
" will be opened for the European struggle." 

Yes, it is rendered every day more evident, by 



116 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



thronging events, the conviction is daily growing 
in the minds of those who direct the councils of 
Europe, that the solution of European embarrass- 
ments lies in the East, and that the Turkish ques- 
tion is not only a European question, but that 
it is the chief among them. 

In France there is a general, a vague idea, that 
the interests of England are principally involved 
in the preservation of Turkey ; while in England, 
it is supposed that it is France that is chiefly 
interested. We trust to be able to prove, not only 
that both are equally interested, but that there 
alone can the action of both Governments be com- 
bined for the purpose of maintaining, of preserving, 
those interests which are common to both. 

The political interests of France have ever been, 
and ever must be, opposed to the aggrandisement 
of Russia. They must be so, even if to-morrow 
Charles X. were restored by means of Russia. 
The interests of France are, and ever have been, 
connected with those of Turkey. What are her 
interests then in the aggrandisement of Russia at 
the expense of Turkey ? 

When Austria and Poland pressed hard on 
Turkey, Louis XIV. poured 200,000 men into 
Germany, to restore the balance*. When menaced 
by Russia, French engineers and officers instructed 
the Turks, formed schools, raised batteries, and 
perseveringly rendered what service the then 

* See Appendix, No. 2. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



117 



intractable Ottoman would accept. When Poland 
was partitioned, France was not interested, only 
because governed by the mistress of Louis XV. 
But then France was a despotic monarchy, 
united to Russia by political principles, if op- 
posed to her by political interests. In 1793, 
France assumed a new position ; she adopted poli- 
tical principles which extirpated in France itself 
the interests, and ranks, and opinions on which 
were founded the authority of its former Govern- 
ment, on which are founded the Governments of 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Here are motives 
of hostility inherent in the very existence of these 
Governments ; an hostility that can never cease 
while France affords a vulnerable point, while any 
of these possess the means of aggression. 

Russia became the centre of a combination 
which twice struck Napoleon to the ground ; and 
however little her own means contributed, or 
could contribute to that end, she directed the 
movement, because she was the chief advocate of 
the principles that arrayed themselves against the 
power of France ; principles liable to violent 
assaults in the states of her allies, but which have 
remained invulnerable and supreme only in Russia. 

This hostility of Russia is not a consideration 
appreciable only by statesmen in their cabinets. 
The Cossacks have twice bivouacked on the Seine. 

France, overwhelmed by the whole of Europe, 
and exhausted by the inordinate ambition of her 



118 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



ruler, had, for a time, ceased to give cause of alarm 
to the northern powers. In 1830 she assumed 
her dangerous, her menacing attitude of 1793. 
The northern powers did not fly instantly to 
arms, because they had learnt, by experience, a 
surer mode of attack (perhaps they committed a 
great error in not doing so), and the insurrection 
of Poland, and the movements and discontent in 
Germany, showed them their real weakness, if 
attacked, and the necessity of subduing every 
resistance at home, and of combining all their 
means before displaying the signal of a war of 
political extermination, that, once lit, must have 
blazed with a fury, and spread with a velocity, 
unparalleled at any former period of the most con- 
vulsed times. Russia, as formerly, is the centre 
and soul of this combination, grounded on the com- 
mon necessity of crushing the principle of France. 

Austria and Prussia cling to Russia, because 
exposed to dismemberment by every movement of 
France, because exposed to internal commotion at 
every hour. Russia is their refuge against both 
dangers, while she, secure in her distance, her 
climate, and her poverty, prepares a crisis in which 
the various states of Europe will mutually exhaust 
and destroy each other. In the endeavour of both 
to swallow up the states of Germany, they are 
supported by Russia, they are opposed by France ; 
hence a double source of dependence on her, by 
the objects she can favour, by the hostile influence 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



119 



she can counteract. What would Russia be to- 
day, but for the rivalry of France and England ? 
What would she be without the war of liberalism 
and despotism ? It is in these contests that she 
has been aggrandised ; these contests are neces- 
sary to her future aggrandisement. France is the 
object of attack. France must therefore look on 
each accession to the strength of either of the 
allies — not as on a question of foreign or commer- 
cial influence, but as ammunition introduced into 
a hostile fort — as reinforcements entering an 
enemy's camp on the eve of battle. 

In this state of real hostility, what must the 
consequence be of the accession of all the resources 
of the Turkish empire to the northern alliance ? 
From that hour Russia is invulnerable — a few 
thousand men suffice to guard her southern and 
eastern frontiers — her attention is all concen- 
trated on the west. A very few years will double 
or triple her revenue. The commerce of Europe 
will be in her hands — in her control will be 
placed all the materials at present used in the 
arsenals of France. A formidable fleet will be 
launched in the Mediterranean ; she will imme- 
diately possess a navy superior to that of 
France. The influence and commerce of France 
is immediately arrested in the sea hitherto her 
own ; and at any hour Russia may transport her 
Cossacks to the shores of Italy or of Spain, to sup- 
port the factions, and the principles which, at 



120 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



present, cause France so much inquietude. These 
circumstances will re-act on Belgium, on Germany, 
on internal faction. The very hour that Russia 
is entrenched at the Dardanelles, these conse- 
quences will be evident. Then will the time 
be at hand for carrying into execution the plans 
so carefully matured in the three cabinets, and 
for extinguishing, by a third occupation, the 
spirit that inspires such terrors to the two 
northern courts, and which gives its supremacy 
to the third. 

England, to-day the ally of France, will she be 
so then ? Can she send fleets or armies to her 
support ? Clearly impossible. Whatever may be 
her sympathy, England cannot again engage in a 
continental war — and this struggle will be confined 
to the dry land. 

If such consequences flow from the occupation 
of Turkey, is not that question one of existence 
for France ? Supposing it possible for these con- 
sequences to be delayed, is it less so ? A nation's 
life does not run out with the few sand-glasses 
that mark the period of individual existence. The 
life of a nation is its system ; — that life in France 
is already seriously compromised — and a few 
steps further gained by Russia, its fate becomes 
irrevocable. 

But reanimate the Ottoman empire, the whole 
picture is instantaneously reversed ; Russia will be 
arrested where she is, and prevented from becoming 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



121 



any thing save that which she is, poor, exposed, 
and vulnerable in her centre. While the Dar- 
danelles are Turkish, Russia can never dare to 
irritate the maritime powers. Even were a war 
necessary to reanimate Turkey, France now 
chooses her time, instead of Russia choosing her's ; 
she has the whole Ottoman empire, with its im- 
mense power of resistance, to oppose against her ; 
she avoids the armies of Germany, if they are 
hostile, and she calls in the maritime, and, still 
more important, the moral force of England. Suc- 
cess is certain, and the means insignificant. She 
requires 500,000 men, besides the national guard, 
to be prepared against the contingencies of Eu- 
ropean affairs. The fleet actually at sea, would, 
in three months, solve the Turkish question 
entirely in her favour, carrying as a consequence, 
every European obstacle — setting at rest the irri- 
tation in the Peninsula and Belgium, excited by 
Russia and her compeers, to divert her attention 
from the field, where she has only to appear, to be 
victorious — and to comprehend to appear. 

Not less imperative are the interests of Eng- 
land. The northern combination, political against 
France, is commezdal against England. This sub- 
ject demands a separate and more detailed expo- 
sition. Suffice it for the present, to say, that the 
countries buying from us and selling to us, to the 
yearly value of thirty millions, would be placed 
under the immediate control of the coalition, and 



122 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



of course under the regulations of the Russian 
tariff ; not as it is to-day, but such as it would be 
when the mask is wholly dropped. What would 
the effect on the internal state of England be, if 
a considerable diminution of exportation occurred ? 
But it is not only the direct effects of the tariffs 
of the coalition that is to be apprehended — would 
it not command the tariffs of northern and south- 
ern America ? Are the opening prospects of com- 
merce, not to speak of that actually existing in 
Turkey alone, of no importance ? Is it nothing, 
to see projects maturing for direct com- 
munication with India through the Turkish 
Territory, while the Danube is rendered navi- 
gable, while canals are about to connect that 
stream with the other rivers of Austria, and with 
those of Russia, Prussia, and Bavaria, so as to 
establish a direct communication between the 
manufacturing districts of Germany with the 
marts of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, and even 
India itself? Is it for England to allow freedom 
of commerce to be extinguished in the only portion 
of Europe where it exists ? Is it for England to 
allow an empire, a principle of whose existence is 
freedom of commerce, to be swallowed up by the 
most restrictive power on the face of the earth ? 
Is it for England to allow the first commercial 
position in the world to be occupied by such a 
power ? These motives could not have been ap- 
preciated by Lord Chatham ; they did not then 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



123 



exist, because the fiscality of Russia had not been 
developed, when he said, with all the concentration 
of deep conviction, " with the man who cannot 
" appreciate the interests of England in the pre- 
" servation of the Ottoman empire, / will not 
" argue" 

While Russia, as the St. Petersburgh Gazette* 
has even already ventured to threaten, expects to 
march " by Constantinople to Paris," she looks 
with not less interest to the exclusion of the 
commerce of Great Britain from the continent as 
a means of rendering England powerless, and her 
own allies subservient for the advantage she may 
have it in her power to grant, independently of 
any commercial advantage she may reap for herself. 

On the occupation of the Dardanelles, disap- 
pears the importance of our possessions in the 
Levant. They were only valuable because the 
Turks held these straits. When Russia is there, 
they are valueless, and will soon be untenable ; 
although the expenses of harassing observation 
may greatly increase our internal embarrassments. 

But Russia here, also, has views distinct from 
her allies. Our Indian possessions — shall we fight 
for them on the Dnieper, as directing the whole 

* This memorable article in the St. Petersburgh Gazette, 
was, on the reclamation of France and England, disavowed — 
but afterwards published in the Yassy Official Gazette, and 
produced a strong sensation on the Russian troops, then 
occupying the provinces. 



124 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



Mussulman nation, or shall we fight for them on 
the Indus, at Bagdad, or in Persia, single-handed 
— close to the insurrections she will raise in our 
rear, and when she is possessor of Turkey and 
Persia ? In the Black Sea, we have France to 
support us. Russia, by her principles, her inte- 
rests, and her designs, must wage war to the 
knife, with England*. England and France, by 

* The identity of the position of England, or rather Europe 
and Russia with that of Athens and Philip, is truly remark- 
able. On the one hand, the same concentration of political 
power — the same spirit of conquest — the same command and 
combination of arms and diplomacy, of cunning and falsehood, 
of successful delusion, facility of sowing dissensions, success 
consequently of every scheme, an equal dexterity in the use 
of the sword in war and of the pen in peace, generals, spies, 
diplomatists — all the machinery so ably put in motion by 
Philip, is to be found, but how magnified, how improved ! 
at the disposal of the Sclavonic association for conquest. On 
the other hand, as in Athens, we find the same craving after 
news and indifference to facts — the same bravery of speech 
and cowardice of action — the same forensic bickerings, inter- 
nal animosities — the same combination of dread at the progress 
of their enemy and contempt for his power — the same con- 
fidence in commercial prosperity, in maritime supremacy, in 
civilised reason over barbarian strength. The same conside- 
rations also of material causes — the Hellespont and Byzan- 
tium, the winds of the channel, the commerce of the Black 
Sea, &c. The oration on the Chersonese and the Fourth 
Philippic, with a few verbal alterations, might be supposed 
addressed to England at this day — God send that the re- 
sults be not similar ! In the last-mentioned oration there 
is the following apposite passage : — " But it is against 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY, 



125 



taking up a position of defence now, oppose to her 
the mass of the Ottomans, and the body of the Otto- 
man Empire, render useless for aggressive purposes 
the unwilling subjects she has acquired since 1774, 
and detach from her, and neutralise her now subser- 
vient allies. England obtains the co-operation of 
France, which would be impossible on the Indus. 
France obtains the co-operation of England, which 
she will not obtain on the Rhine. Russia's spirit of 
conquest, which torments and menaces every corner 
of Europe, will be extinguished ; her banners ar- 
rested along the 3000 miles of their progressive 
movement, from the Vistula to the Araxes — her 
power lost in Europe — her face for ever turned 
from the east and south. 

We have more than once repeated, that the 
allies of Russia, united to her in western policy, 
united to her in the abandonment of the Ottoman 
empire, are necessarily detached from her by the 
decision of England and France to restore the 
Turkish Empire. To develope this idea, which 

" our constitution that his arms are principally directed, and 

" there is a necessity for this. He knows that all his con- 

" quests, however great, can never be secure while you are 

" free ; he therefore sees in your freedom a spy on the inci- 

" dents of his fortune. In the first place, therefore, we are 

" to consider him the enemy of our state — the implacable 

" enemy of our free constitution. In the next place, be 

" assured that every thing he is concerting, he is concerting 

" against our city, and that wherever any man opposes him, 

" he is opposing an attempt against these walls." 



126 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



alone contains the solution of the whole question, 
we must examine the interests and motives which, 
under different circumstances, may determine the 
policy of Austria. 

Austria, the old enemy of Turkey, has already 
been enriched by recovered Hungary, — by Tran- 
sylvania, Sirmia, and the Austrian Croatia, wrested 
from that empire. A hundred years ago she 
was inspired with the hopes of the possession of 
European Turkey and Constantinople, but another 
enemy of Turkey has arisen — another competitor 
of Austria ; Russia has succeeded to these expec- 
tations. 

It then became Austria's policy to unite with 
Turkey to repress this northern intruder ; but the 
bond of the Polish partition reduced her to insig- 
ficance, subserviency, and silence. Still, as the 
power of Russia has increased, her indecision has 
diminished ; and, during the last war, she was pre- 
pared to pour her armies into Wallachia, and did 
not do so only because England was engaged on 
the side of Russia. But leave Turkey to her 
Russian enemy, and Austria will seek to profit by 
the catastrophe she has not been able to prevent. 

But her interest in the Turkish question is but 
a portion of many cares. Her first object is that 
of self-preservation. The first shot fired on the 
Rhine, or in the west of Europe, will be levelled 
at her existence. Her government is under the 
control of a high aristocracy — an aristocracy in 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



127 



the great Sclavonic and Hungarian divisions of 
the empire, essentially feudal, without a middle 
class between it and the serfs, whose position is 
not far superior to those of Russia. But this 
system, precarious as it is, has not the advantage 
of uniformity ; the supremacy of the government, 
and of the local aristocracies, depends on employing 
the military means of one province to enforce sub- 
mission in another ; and on this precarious submis- 
sion depends, not only the unity of the empire, but 
the existence of the aristocracy, who direct its 
policy. The preservation of peace is, therefore, 
the first of Austrian interests, which she must 
maintain by the sacrifice of all external interests, 
if necessary. But if her political state loudly de- 
precates every external collision, her financial state 
not less imperatively demands repose, and her 
fiscal regulations can suffer no violent disturbance. 

France, by her principles alone, endangers 
Austria, and the system of government on which 
the existence of Austria depends. The interests 
of France, moreover, are opposed to the consolida- 
tion of Austria's supremacy in Germany and Italy, 
The power of France, if she is powerful, will de- 
prive it of that supremacy, and expose it to an at- 
tack in case of war. The principles of France, no 
less hostile than her interests — no less dangerous 
than her power, combine with both to render that 
supremacy precarious in profoundest peace, pre- 



128 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



carious even under the most favourable dispositions 
of the government of France. But the govern- 
ment of France being popular, it is evident that 
neither the interests, nor the popular principles of 
the nation, can, in any case, be long excluded from 
action on her foreign policy ; if they were, a change 
of administration would follow, and bring with it 
violent reaction. Therefore, no compact, no treaty, 
no alliance, no concession, that it is in the power 
of France to make, can in any degree calm the 
alarms, or soothe the hostility, of Austria. But 
France, at this moment, does exert an opposing 
influence in Germany ; she does hold Ancona. 
For three centuries the views of Austria have been 
fixed on Italy. Her principal influence in Europe 
depends on her possession of Lombardy, and on 
her control over the remainder of the Peninsula. 
Her Italian possessions furnish a large contingent 
to her army, and a large portion of her revenue. 
Her possessions on the Adriatic give an outlet to 
her whole empire for its industry, and nourish that 
industry by foreign produce. But they are so de- 
pendent on the presence of a strong body of 
Austrian troops, that Prince Metternich has de- 
clared, that the principle of intervention is a vital 
question for Austria. So that while French inter- 
vention puts these possessions in the greatest ha- 
zard, the recognition, by France and England, of 
the principle of non-intervention, is fatal to her 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



129 



possessions, if she is obliged to conform to it ; 
while its mere proclamation multiplies her diffi- 
culties and her dangers. 

While France maintains so large a military 
force on foot, Austria must maintain her actual 
establishment, disproportioned to her means, be- 
yond the resources of her treasury. Yet no com- 
bination can diminish this necessity ; because, were 
France even to reduce her standing army, she 
could not dismiss her national guard, become now 
a portion of her institutions, a vital part of those 
principles, already in their moral character so dan- 
gerous to Austria. These considerations may so 
deeply affect the mind of Prince Metternich, that 
he may consider all remoter interests or apprehen- 
sions of little importance, when compared with 
the necessity of diminishing the power of France, 
since he cannot expect to modify her principles by 
any thing short of a third occupation. This, at 
least, is the only grounds on which we can account 
for the late subserviency of Austria, which may 
prove, which must prove fatal to her in common 
with the rest of Europe. 

The means of laying France in the dust present 
themselves in permitting Russia to occupy Con- 
stantinople. Prince Metternich may hope to 
counterbalance the acquisition by additions to the 
territory of Austria in Roumelia — additions which 
may furnish uncontaminated nurseries of sol- 
diers, to subdue revolutionary principles in other 

K 



130 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



provinces. He may be more impressed with 
dangers of an internal than an external kind ; and 
he may suppose that Russia, having a new field 
opened to her ambition, her views will be directed 
to the east, her energies and resources absorbed in 
that pursuit, and all dangers for Austria postponed 
to a period remote, and until the attainment of re- 
sults subject to many contingencies. That in the 
mean time the animosity of Russia must be di- 
rected against France, and Russia must be not 
only little inclined to quarrel with Austria, but 
desirous to augment her strength, for the further- 
ance of their common objects. Prince Metternich 
will consider that Russia, at Constantinople, would 
come into immediate contact with France ; that 
the animosity which had animated, for so many 
years, both governments, while the whole of 
Germany was interposed between them, would 
necessarily be exasperated ; so many interests, on 
which Russia can now exercise only a remote and 
uncertain influence, would then be subject to daily 
interference, control, and menace. Russia's influ- 
ence and commerce would become predominant 
in the Mediterranean, in Egypt, in Greece, her 
navies threatening, and her Cossacks within reach 
of Italy, Spain, Corsica, and Algiers. Russia 
would then, at any moment, be ready to attack 
France ; her military establishment would be ren- 
dered necessary to her own defence, instead of 
being a source of alarm to Austria ; and, under 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



131 



such circumstances, France would never venture 
to send a large force into Germany or Italy. 

The hostility of Austria to France, occasioned, 
for centuries, by their common views on Italy and 
Germany, and latterly, by the opposition of their 
political principles, has rendered Austria neces- 
sarily dependent on the maritime superiority of 
England, to protect herself in her commercial and 
other interests exposed to the operation of the 
marine of France ; but the union of these two 
powers renders their common principles more 
dangerous, and takes from her all confidence, all 
possibility of support in the maritime power of 
England against that of France. But, in the 
creation of the naval power, which Russia neces- 
sarily and immediately becomes possessed of, Aus- 
tria finds relief from her dependence on England. 

It is in Prince Metternich's power, at this 
moment, to grant to, or withhold from Russia the 
possession on which these results hinge. He has, 
therefore, immediately pressing upon him the 
conviction of great danger from principles he has 
in personal horror ; and he has the feeling of 
holding in his hands the destinies of Europe. 
These sources of alarm on one hand, and confidence 
on the other, are, no doubt, ably worked upon by 
Russia* ; and Metternich may think, by one able 

* The means taken by Russia to win her way into the 
favour of individuals, as well as to bring about events, are 
really curiosities in politics. Her progress is a real political 



132 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



stroke, to bridle France, to annihilate the Euro- 
pean commerce of England, to dissolve a union 
which evidently, unchecked, will in a few years 
arbitrate supremely in every European interest, 
and so strengthen the northern combination as to 
render it capable of exterminating, with the sword, 
the political institutions to which he is opposed ; 
and of restoring, and effectually securing, the 
supremacy of the absolute principle by the destruc- 
tion of the press. 

However, while the questions at issue are placed 
in the west, whatever be the views of the cabinet, 
Austria must exert every energy, arm her last 
man, expend her last florin, in the cause of the 
northern alliance ; for there the first reverse is 
fatal to her power, and without a contest the pros- 
drama — incidents, situations, decorations, changes of scene 
and scenery, and always ending in the desired result. It is 
since the revolution of 1830, that Russia has acquired such 
ascendancy over Austria ; but this ascendancy is not wholly 
owing to the alarms of Austria : After the revolution of 
July, the first messenger from St. Petersburgh brought Prince 
Metternich the announcement, that the Russian minister at 
Paris had been ordered to follow the mareh of the Austrian 
minister, and to quit Paris if he thought proper to do so. 
Metternich instantly appeared to himself the director of a 
great system — the controller of the destinies of Europe. 
From that hour, Austria has not reckoned sacrifice what 
Russia demanded, nor spared concessions. Could Metter- 
nich do less than enjoin to his minister at Constantinople, and 
his agent at Alexandria, "loyal co-operation" with the 
representatives of Russia ? 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY". t&8 

perity of her adversary menaces her system. 
There she has all to hope and nothing to fear from 
Russia — all to fear and nothing to hope from 
France ; but transport the field of discussion, and 
the chances of collision to the east, and the scene 
is wholly reversed. Here, on every point, she is 
in competition with Russia, and on each she 
is connected with England and France; Austria 
interposed between the adverse principles of the 
north and the west, contains within herself that 
opposition. She has two sets of interests at variance 
and at war, and one or other must predominate, 
as the corresponding principle predominates 
without. 

Austria, the rival of France in Germany, is the 
rival of Russia in Turkey ; the antagonist of 
France in Italy, she has equally strong motives 
for being the antagonist of Russia in the pro- 
vinces ; the competitor of France in the Levant, 
she has to dread the supremacy of Russia in the 
no less important outlet of the Black Sea. 
Russia already tampers with the Illyrian military 
colonists that guard her Hungarian frontiers, and 
is actively engaged in the three Turkish provinces 
nearest to Austria, in preparing a state of things 
that will render them valueless property to Austria. 
France affrights Austria with a chart — Russia 
affrights her with a creed. 



134 



ENGLAND, FllANCE, 



No Austrian statesman can be blind to the 
consequences, if Russia take possession of Con- 
stantinople ? No pretence of equivalent can Aus- 
tria find in the half Russian provinces of Servia, 
Bosnia, and Montenegrin*? It will be more 
profitable even for Russia, that they be apparently 
possessed by Austria. She looks to maritime ac- 
quisitions, and will gladly purchase, by so insig- 
nificant a cession, the prolonged subserviency of the 
Austrian government. But what will be the 
independence of the Austrian empire itself ? All 
its commercial relations in the Black Sea are at 
her disposal ; two-thirds of its territory are encir- 
cled by her frontiers; its commercial marine in 
the Mediterranean, which numbers so many thou- 
sand fine vessels, may be at any hour proscribed 
by an Ukase. What becomes even of its possession 
of the Adriatic ? 

Russia, occupying the Dardanelles, the key of 
all traffic of the Levant, enforcing what regula- 

* We have already stated, that Russia bad become an 
object of hatred to the principal men ; but Austrian domina?- 
tion would very soon awaken Russian predilections : Austrian 
intolerance and fiscality would soon prepare food for Russian 
propagandism ; even now, however unwillingly, they are 
obliged to lean on Russia, as her influence pervades and 
predominates everywhere. She gives bribes — sends agents 
and spies — she can promise and threaten. Her eye and her 
finger are every where, or what is, perhaps, even worse, 
suspected of being every where. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 135 

tions she may think fit, throughout Turkey*, and 
in its necessary dependencies, Egypt, Greece, and 
the islands, will she suffer the Austrian, or any 
other flag, to form seamen and a marine in the 
commerce of the Levant ? Of course the Russian 
mercantile marine will both occupy the caravan 
trade and the trade between the Levant and Eu- 
rope. But she will, moreover, from the coast of 
Dalmatia, from the Seven Islands, which must 
ultimately fall to her, command the Adriatic in a 
military point of view ; and thus, in every case, 
deprive it of its value for Austria. Is it not then 
Austria's interest to maintain an intermediary 
power at Constantinople, the destruction of which 
must immediately lead to an immense development 

* Even already in the provinces has she ventured to com- 
mand the withdrawal from Europeans of the privileges granted 
by the Turkish government to all foreigners throughout its 
states. It is needless to quote the entire interruption of the 
European transit trade through Georgia ; for it must be evi- 
dent, as the sun at noon-day, that one of the principal motives 
of Russia in her acquisition of the Dardanelles is the erection 
of a great naval power ; and, as a means to that end, she will 
exclude all European traffic and shipping ; and she has only 
to make Turkey retaliate on France and England their own 
regulations, effectually to exclude both. She will supply the 
East with what manufactures she can raise, thus protected 
against English and French competition, and with those of 
Germany, whose commercial relations will thus be in her 
power. 



136 ENGLAND, FRANCE, 

of France on the one hand, or of Russia on the 
other, equally fatal to her* ? 

And if France and England unite to compel 
Russia to desist from her designs against Turkey, 
will not Austria rejoice to see the war so long 
menacing between the opposed principles and the 
rival strength of the two alliances, to which she 
holds merely for self defence against its conse- 
quences, carried far from Italy and the Rhine? 
Must she not rejoice to see that the consequences 
of that war will bring accession of strength to 
neither of the powers, which alike cause her 
anxiety and alarm ? The object of that war 
being the protection and consolidation of a 

* Since the first edition was published, the circumstances 
have entirely altered. Austria has had time to weigh more 
maturely, and to perceive more clearly, the dangers that me- 
nace her from the north. These dangers have been doubled 
by the union of France and Russia, which destroys entirely 
the balance that existed even a few months ago. It is no 
longer time to choose between French or Russian connection. 
The only chance of salvation is now a cordial co-operation 
with England. All dangers are now concentrated in one 
point — one position alone remains for a stand to be made 
against Russia — shall that point be sacrificed, or not ? Prince 
Metternich must say " it shall not" ! 

The union between France and Russia is, however, between 
Louis Philip and Nicholas ; this union cannot exist in the face 
of publicity — it is a mystery, and its disclosure and publica- 
tion in this country neutralises half its effect — a decisive step 
taken by England practically dissolves it. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



137 



power which must prevent both from becoming 
preponderant in Europe. 

But that above all which is most dreaded by 
Austria is, that the war that threatens, once en- 
gaged, will become one of political principles — that 
France and England will not be arrayed against 
Austria and Russia, but that Liberal will be J 
arranged against Absolutist, and popular against 
divine rights. If, therefore, the storm bursts in 
the east, the field of contest is removed from her 
soil, and the principles of the belligerents are left 
in repose. There no watchwords will be pro- 
claimed, that may thrill through the clubs of 
Vienna, that they may arm the slave against the 
master, the subject against the sovereign, the bro- 
ther against the brother. England and France, 
in assuming the defence of Turkey, stand forth in 
the majesty of their united power, and of obliged 
moderation, as the advocates of the public interests 
of the European community ; they seek no sup- 
port from political theories or political antipathies. 
In the government they undertake to defend, the 
favourers of liberalism may find individual inde- 
pendence such as the freest state of Europe does 
not possess — while the Absolutists may console 
themselves by seeing the constitutional govern- 
ments supporting the purest expression of their 
favourite system — a monarchy absolute in its form, 
combining religious and civil supremacy, and 
doubly sanctioned and sanctified by right divine. 



138 ENGLAND, FRANCE, 

Let the squadron of England and France appear 
in the Black Sea, and the decision of Austria can- 
not be doubtful. The union of England with 
France is a guarantee of the disinterestedness of 
the intentions of both. Their power, when com- 
bined on this arena, is irresistible. Their object, 
not a war of propagandism, of revolution, but one 
of conservation, of protection ; assuring not only 
the independence of Austria against the north, but 
elevating a power in the south to balance the in- 
fluence she dreads in the Mediterranean and in 
Italy. The speedy termination of the contest, the 
instantaneous success of the allies, must be the 
first of Austrian objects, because she is the first 
exposed to the danger ; nay, the certainty of 
dismemberment by any struggle in Europe. 

It is on the strength of these considerations, 
that we conclude, that if Russia is attacked in the 
Black Sea, the alliance of France and England is 
established, by the combination of their action on 
a common field — that the northern coalition is in- 
stantaneously dissolved, its positions and defences 
turned — the government, strong by its diplomacy 
and important by its position, brought over to our 
side, and the whole chances and dangers of war 
concentrated on the head of that single power 
which, always aggressive, because nowhere else 
assailable, has comnlicated and embroiled the affairs 
of Europe, to open to herself, in the midst of the 
confusion, a road to Constantinople. 



KUSSIA, AND TU11KEY. 



139 



This is a mere contest of dates. If Russia is 
first at Constantinople, she combines, necessarily, 
all the resources of the northern governments ; she 
developes a naval power, to which there can be no 
possible balance in the Mediterranean ; Greece and 
Egypt become dependencies ; no state can partake 
of the spoils of Turkey, or subsequently share in 
the commerce of the Levant, the Euxine, or 
Central Asia and Persia, Arabia, Syria, and Egypt. 
The possibility of all useful union against her on 
the part of England and Erance vanishes ; and 
civilisation itself is threatened with a more dan- 
gerous eclipse than it suffered from the overflow 
of the barbarians in 604. 

If England anticipates Russia, she has with her 
France ; Austria enters to hasten the termination 
of the struggle, if necessary ; the whole Ottoman 
empire is called to arms, the troops and fleet of 
Mehemet Ali united to them, and the only result 
that will then be worth accepting, will be the 
retreat of Russia behind the Dnieper, which mode- 
rate prudence and consequence in the policy of the 
cabinets of France and England would never have 
permitted her to traverse. 

But we must not neglect, in this inquiry, the 
position and resources of Mehemet Ali. A state 
of hostility has sprung up between him and his 
sovereign, which has grown with the growth of 
Mehemet Ali's power ; and this hostility is a neces- 
sary consequence of the position occupied by Russia. 



110 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



The consolidation of the Sultan's power is fatal 
to Mehemet Ali; he must be, therefore, even 
without any intelligence or concert with that power, 
ready to play into the hands of Russia, to keep the 
Sultan weak, though perhaps not with the idea of 
bringing Russia to Constantinople. But England, 
in the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, did not 
anticipate the Treaty of Adrianople ; nor France, 
in raising up Mehemet Ali against his sovereign, 
the Treaty of the 8th of July. So Mehemet Ali, 
with more reason — for he secures, at least, his life 
interest in Egypt — -may become the chief instru- 
ment in the final consummation which he has 
already brought so near. 

Mehemet Ali's power now solely rests on the 
sword. In proportion as he feels his insecurity, 
he must look to the support of Russia — look to 
the disorganising influence of Russia on the Porte 
as his only safeguard ; he may even prefer a con- 
test with his Sovereign to the prospect of insurrec- 
tion or gradual decay, for the chances it may offer 
to Russia to step in with the means of holding 
Constantinople. He is therefore brought to that 
point where, not only he can be rendered subser- 
vient to Russia, but where he desires what Russia 
desires. 

MouraviefF* gave him clearly to under- 

* It may appear surprising that we date, as so recent a 
period } the direct connection between Mehemet Ali and 
Russia. Could Russia neglect a power which now throws 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



141 



stand that, while Russia interfered to protect the 
Sultan, she left him at liberty to secure as much 
of the Sultan's dominions as he could ; and in fact, 
Ire has not forgotten that England and France, 
and not Russia, had arrested the progress of 
Ibrahim. Russia has now taken care to have 
at Alexandria an agent equal to the post, and 
capable of entering into these questions with the 
Pacha without a dragoman. 

The agent of Russia may easily alarm the fears, 
and aw r ake the interest of the Pacha to Russian 
counsel, by showing him his danger on the one 
hand from the animosity of the Sultan, calmed, 
for the moment, by the energetic representations 
of Russia ; he may show him that Russia has 
even deviated from the terms of her engagement 

into her scale such immense weight ? She did not neglect it, 
and ably has she continued to bring about its growth and 
position. During the Restoration, France was the tool of 
Russia. Her armies were sent into Spain to quell the prin- 
ciples she now sends her armies to support ; her influence 
was used in Egypt to raise an enemy to the Ottoman empire, 
and to produce consequences which she must now, if not 
wholly blinded by adverse destiny, run the chances of a 
war to avert. But France entered into the scheme, not 
as she entered Spain, on compulsion, but with the view 
of sharing with her Russian patron the spoils of Turkey 
— with the view of balancing the influence of England 
in the Mediterranean ! Thus Russia exercised an additional 
authority over France, and proved her disinterestedness, in 
making that vacillating cabinet contribute to the furtherance of 
her own views, and to the destruction of the Ottoman empire. 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



to the Sultan, for the sake of his preservation ; he 
may show him, on the other, that his hostile 
position to a sovereign that it is the intention of 
the maritime powers to defend, puts him in hos- 
tility with them ; that, moreover, France and 
England are both opposed to his aggrandisement ; 
the one resisting him in the west, the other in the 
east, both patronising Greece, and guarding the 
integrity of the Ottoman empire ; he may succeed 
in persuading a man who, however great his 
ability, has never had his mind formed to political 
judgment, and who has been led, by the duplicity 
and intrigues of the portion of the French admi- 
nistration that most actively served Russia under 
the restoration, to form a low estimate of one, at 
least, of the allies, that his interests were not 
opposed to those of Russia — that their interests 
were common — that the weakening of the Sultan 
was necessary to both, and that the occupation of 
Constantinople itself by Russia, would be the 
means by which he would become the pastor and 
preserver of the Mussulmans scattered by the 
storm — so that he should unite the succession of 
the Califat to the patrimony of Mahomet. What 
must not the effect be of such suggestions, and 
proceeding from such a source, to a man of 
Mehemet Ali's ambition, and in his perilous 
position ! He may even have had his regards 
turned to rich and renowned plains, where 
millions of his co-religion aries groan under a 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



143 



christian yoke. He may have been told how easily 
that dominion may be upset. A combination 
between himself and Persia, ma}' have been 
detailed under the direction of Russia. It may 
have been shown him that an Egyptian camp 
at Bussorah — a Persian camp at Herat, with 
no more than the secret agency that Russia 
at this moment employs, would suffice to ren- 
der government impracticable in India, to dry 
up the sources of revenue — to excite to revolt 
in all the remotest points of these wide-spread 
dominions, leading to the necessity of precautions 
and observation, and armed force to watch dis- 
affection and quell insurrection. What a field is 
not here opened — what motives, what temptations, 
has not Russia at her disposal for all men and all 
circumstances ? Bank notes, crosses, and porte- 
feuilles for London and Paris. Crowns, and 
sceptres, and empires, for Alexandria, and Te- 
heran. This may be treated as a vision : it 
is one of those visions by which Russia arrives at 
realities ! 

It is quite idle to talk of danger to Turkey 
from Russia, if England is on the side of Turkey ; 
that is to say, if England sends even a couple of 
line of battle ships into the Euxine. That declares 
that Turkey has the support of England : the 
Turks would feel that England was committed, 
and England (which is not less important) would 
have a complete ascendancy over the Turkish 
government, and direct its measures. Our con- 



144 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



viction is, that a burst of enthusiasm would arise 
in the capital, and be re-echoed from the farthest 
frontiers ; — nay, that an electric chord, extending 
from the western limits of Poland, to the fishermen 
on the east of the Caspian, would receive a shock 
from the avowedly hostile contact of our vessels 
with the waters of the Euxine, which would shake 
at once those regions free from the grasp and the 
pollution of Russia. If this is true, or if it is any 
thing like the truth, it is clear that there is no 
attack to be feared from Russia against Turkey ; 
but, supposing that none of these internal causes 
of insurrection or even inaction existed, and that 
Russia was prepared to defy the union of Turkey 
and England— what could she do — make a 
descent on Constantinople? clearly impossible 
with an English squadron there — supported by 
50 or 60 Turkish men of war. Clearly impossible 
again, because she has not, at the utmost, the 
means of transporting at once more than 10,000 
men ; and 10,000 Russian as enemies, certainly 
could not at present come within reach of the 
capital. Should she send an army into Roumelia, 
she would require not less than 200,000, for 
she lost nearly that number last time, when Eng- 
land was committed against Turkey — when 
Turks and Christians were at war on all points, and 
both were in opposition to their own Government, 
which they accused of putting them in a state of 
hostility with the whole world— when Turkey had 
no troops whatever — when no counsel or advice 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. * 



145 



far less direction could be tolerated by the Turkish 
Government from us, whom it justly considered 
leagued with her enemy — when, above all things, 
her fleet had been destroyed by us. Now Russia 
could not venture to attack Turkey with less than 
double the force put in motion during the last 
war — and how is she to find means of transport*. 
The confined region of the provinces is incapable 
of supplying them — an insuperable obstacle is 
thus placed to the passage of such a body of troops 
as passed in 1829, for then the transport was 
effected by sea ; not only was the sea her's, but the 
Turks were obliged to reserve 15,000 of their 
best troops (and they only had 30,000 at all 
disciplined) to guard against a descent on Thrace, 
and the destruction of the reservoirs of water 
for the metropolis. Then also was Constantinople 
blockaded by Russian vessels f non-belligerents ) on 
the south. It must be superfluous to proceed with 
the contrast of that period and the present. The 

* The post between Tiflis and Odessa is partly served by 
oxen, horses are so scarce. Even during the campaign of 
1829, when provisions were particularly abundant, and when 
the Black Sea was covered with her transports, it is mentioned 
as a fore-thought highly creditable to Diebitsch, that he had 
transported, from the Crimea and the banks of the Volga, 
camels and other beasts of burthen, without the assistance 
of which he could not have effected the passage of the Balkan. 
But such a movement on the part of Russia is an utter impos- 
sibility. 

L 



146 



• ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



result of Russia's success, has been the moral pros- 
tration of the Turkish Government, which ceases 
the moment that England steps in. 

But putting aside again the dangers of insurrec- 
tion to Russia, putting aside the incapacity of 
Russia to attack Turkey, she having England as 
her ally, would it be possible for Russia to defend 
herself, if Turkey even now released from that 
state of prostration by the support of England, and 
freed from her own errors by the counsel of Eng- 
land, chose to assume the offensive against Russia ? 
The whole question depends on the possession of 
the Black Sea. The power occupying the Black 
Sea, in any collision between the two, must be the ; 
aggressor, or no collision can take place. The 
union of England with Turkey gives Turkey the 
command of the Black Sea. 

The idea of aggressive warfare would rouse all 
the energies — silence all the dissensions — combine 
all the efforts of the Mussulman population. Every 
point of Russia is open and vulnerable— once the 
Russian vessels have retreated to their harbours; for 
each point she would be equally alarmed, and her 
communications would be cut off. Turkey has 
60,000 tolerably disciplined troops, all disposable ; 
2 or 300,000 irregulars could be assembled at a call; 
fifty sail of vessels, with small craft, could break 
down the Russian defences, where most consider- 
able. The Georgian provinces would instantly 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



147 



throw off the yoke ; even the W allachians, Mol- 
davians, and Bessarabians*, would join in the 
general impulse ; the millions of brave and inde- 
pendent Circassians would pour across the Couban, 
and spread over the Crimea — and where would 
Russia be? — sending troops to Warsaw, not to 
Silistria ! 

But such extremities never can be proceeded to 
— we have no hostile intentions, no aggressive 
designs against Russia. She knows too well the 
consequences to provoke them ; but she is quite 
right to threaten, while threats obtain victories. 
Our object is not to push England into war, but to 
save her from the fearful consequences of giving 
Russia greater strength in our fears than she pos- 
sesses in her own arms. 

Russia must, necessarily, be overwhelmed if 
attacked ; for if circumstances favoured her, she 
would not wait to be attacked. She would at- 
tack — surprise — occupy. The chances are all 
actually against her for war : famine, poverty, 
weakness of defences at Sevastopol, and elsewhere, 
contests and serious reverses in the Caucasus, the 

* This province, formerly a part of Moldavia, has to 
regret its detachment from the worst governed province of 
Turkey. Still it is less oppressed than any other part of 
Russia ; for important exceptions have been made in its 
favour to conciliate the cognate tribes. It is emancipated 
from serfage and conscription, and is yet so barbarous as to 
deplore Russian civilisation. 



148 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



union of France and England, irritation against 
her in these nations, general discredit in Europe, 
power of resistance in Turkey, unfitness in her 
navy, bad state of her army, necessary loss of 
her allies, and peace in Europe. All chances 
equally work for her in the maintenance of peace ; 
gradual disorganisation of Turkey, prolonged and 
exhausting misintelligence between Mehemet Ali 
and the Sultan, calming of the irritation in 
Turkey, of the irritation in Europe, slumbering of 
the Turkish question, and restored confidence on 
that subject, probabilities of confusion and conflict 
in various places, of internal troubles in France 
and in England, of disunion between them, even 
of general war in Europe ; cessation of famine at 
home, increased resources in Moldavia and Wal- 
lachia, improvement of finances, progress in prepa- 
ratives, great and rapid improvement of her navy, 
levies on a scale beyond a war establishment, 
active progress in defensive works, subjugation of 
the coasts of the Caucasus. These are the chances 
or the progress offered her by every hour of no- 
minal peace, while she is permitted to keep a curb 
in the mouth of Turkey, and place a load on its 
back — a spur in its flank. If on Turkey the 
salvation of the whole European question depends, 
can this be endured ? If not promptly succoured, 
it must sink. The last few months have hastened 
its exhaustion ; months, not years, if abandoned, 
will number its remaining career. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 149 

And what will this succour cost the two first 
nations of the globe, whose colossal rivalry have 
for thirty years shaken and overthrown every 
institution, every throne in Europe ? United now 
happily in their objects, their interests, their prin- 
ciples, and their might, it will cost them even yet 
but to say — " Let Turkey live." While the Bos- 
phorus is still open, will they not say the word ? 
Their squadrons anchored in the Bosphorus, they 
dictate their own terms to Turkey ; to Russia 
they proclaim, that from that day they intend 
to arbitrate supremely between the nations of 
the earth. Their power is only limited by their 
indecision. 

While the government of England takes " peace" 
for its motto, it is idle to think of supporting Tur- 
key. Peace, that is, useful peace, flows from the 
mutual respect of two, not from the inclination 
of one. 

But in England it may be said, even though 
our government feels its position, that of France 
may not. We answer, it is wholly impossible for 
the French Government not to follow the impulse 
of that of England. The administration in France, 
that suffered England alone to bridle Russia, would 
not exist an hour. Besides, the Government of 
France holds by many ties to that of England ; 
France, if we act, must and will support us. 



151 



POSTSCRIPT. 

It is now six months since this essay first ap- 
peared ; during this interval, there has occurred 
no fact to recal interest to the east — all seems 
tranquil as the flow of a deep and undisturbed 
stream, the course of which is probably never 
again to be interrupted — but how is the scene 
changed ! If the reader will turn back a couple 
of pages, and reconsider the chances there placed 
against Russia for war, the chances pointed out 
as working for her in peace, he will find that, 
during this short period of six months, most of the 
chances unfavourable to her have disappeared, and 
those favourable have become fact. 

Famine, — which paralised all her energies, and 
during which the maintaining of her semblance of 
strength may be called a miracle, because brought 
about by means incomprehensible to us — that 
famine has disappeared. 

Poverty, — with Famine, her financial difficulties 
have disappeared ; she is in no want of money*. 

* " It is of course impossible to pierce the veil of mystery 
with which Russia covers all such transactions ; yet, many 
things may be known, although not capable of proof. Elec- 
tions in England — certain expenses at Paris and Vienna — in 
Vendee lately — in Spainand Portugal, must have amounted 
to a very large sum. The Chancellery at Constantinople is 
like a money-change. It has been seen ancle-deep with coin. 



152 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



She has refused the offer of the Turkish Govern- 
ment to pay off several instalments at once (!) 
She has recently, and without a word being heard 
about it, raised a loan at Warsaw of 3,700,000/. 
(the second since the revolution), which is already 
8 per cent, above par ; she can have, therefore, no 
difficulty in borrowing. She has 2,500,000/., war 
indemnity, coming in from Poland, and the subju- 
gation of Poland gives her a considerable pecuniary 
profit by the diminished establishments, military, 
civil, and judicial, a saving of between one and two 
millions sterling. 

Weakness of Defences at Sevastopol. They 
are strengthening. 

Contests in the Caucasus. She is withdrawing 
her troops thence. She has no aggressive move- 
ments to fear from the Circassians, and now that 
the changes in Turkey have diminished the diffi- 
culties and danger of occupying Constantinople, 
she will leave the Caucasus to itself; it was 
important, as the barrier that has hitherto arrested 

Boutinieff, within three weeks of his arrival, drew bills on 
Vienna, &c, for 40,000/. ; yet he could not have come empty- 
handed. The post regularly brought back pack-loads of gold, 
— none of the indemnity had been remitted to St. Petersburgh 
— 8,000,000 of roubles were said to be appropriated to the 
new fortifications of Sevastopol ; the new naval armaments 
contracted for cannot be stated at less than 2,000,000/. The 
half of the revenue of Russia must suffice for all internal and 
peaceable ends ; the other half may fairly be considered as 
devoted to the preparations for war." — British and Foreign 
Review, No. I., p. 119. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



153 



her. She has now in view a shorter cut ; she 
therefore concentrates her troops towards Sevas- 
topol and Odessa, to bring for the present these 
military demonstrations to support the action of 
her diplomacy at Constantinople, to demoralise 
the Turks, to act more powerfully both on the 
Porte and on Mehemet Ali. Who can tell if the 
period she has set is not really very near, and a 
rupture produced between Mehemet Ali and the 
Sultan will be the occasion taken for securing the 
co-operation of the Sultan's authority, to cause 
her troops to be admitted as friends ? 

Union of France and England. If such a 
union still lingers, it certainly is ineffective for 
the eastern interests of either ; probably this 
weight, then, against Russia, is now in her scale. 

Unfitness of her Navy. In a rapid state of pro- 
gress, every month producing an augmentation of 
guns, vessels, and efficiency. 

Bad state of her Army. Army left more dis- 
poseable — new levies since then — provisions, fo- 
rage, improved means of transport. 

Peace in Europe. We now have war in the 
Peninsula to distract us*. 

* The following extract from the Berlin Gazette, of the 
18th Sept., will show the longings before hand of Russian 
policy, for some troubles to occupy England in the west. 
" The number troops entertained by Russia in the south, 
" is double that in the north, in consequence of the fears 
" inspired by the state of the east, although the troubles of 
" Syria are appeased — the pretensions of the English cabinet 
" are still to be dreaded. It is astonishing, that in London, 



154 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



And finally, the power of resistance in Turhey. 
We have sufficiently shown that Turkey wants 

" more is said and written about the east than the west, 
" where assuredly a fermentation reigns, that the disappear- 
" ance of two generations will not extinguish. They ended- 
" vour to guess at the real state of the east, and in the 
" meantime neglect to observe the menacing symptoms that 
" appear at home — and no attention is given to Spain. 
" The system of Canning ought to have guided the present 
" ministry, who will expiate one day their fatal negligence, 
" &c." A following passage is too curious to be omitted. 

" But the ill-disguised entetement of the English cabinet 
" is extraordinary, when the Oriental question is agitated. 
" For him who knows the prejudices of Lord Palmerston in 
" favor of Turkey — and the task that England has imposed 
M on herself, of arresting the effects of the destructive prin- 
" ciple ; it ceases to be matter of surprise to see the noble 
" lord alarmed at every moment, and calling out fire when 
" nothing inflammable exists around him. All the world 
" knows the convention of Russia with the Porte, and 
" the manner in which Russia understands it. All the 
" world knows the commentaries addressed to the Porte by 
" the Ambassador of Russia. Lord Palmerston persists 
" alone in seeing nothing, or rather he believes that each 
" article contains a double sense. This explains the pre- 
" sence of the English squadron in the Mediterranean, 
" where it goes and comes, passes and repasses, as if to 
" excite complaints, as if to bring about some adventure 
«' to justify this useless activity ; we believe it will be lost trou- 
" ble, and that the English admirals will be no more successful 
" in causing the Porte to deviate from its ordinary tranquillity, 
" than the diplomatic notes of Lord Palmerston have succeeded 
" in neutralising the negotiations, and ruining the system 
" followed at Constantinople, and St. Petersburgh.*' 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



155 



neither limbs nor hearts ; it is a head she wants. 
The Sultan is all powerful ; he can do just what he 
pleases ; that is, he can make himself the centre 
of national feeling, confidence, and strength ; or 
if he can make himself the centre of national anti- 
pathy, and the cause of national convulsion and 
prostration. The degree of influence which Russia 
can acquire over his mind, is therefore in a great 
measure the indication of the progress she has made 
towards the subjugation of Turkey. All external 
collision has now ceased, all resistance of a public 
or political nature to the power — that garrisons 
Silistria — that assembles armies almost within 
sight of the capital — that has bewitched all Europe 
— that possesses alone means of access to the sove- 
reign and the government, is of course not to be 
dreamt of; no news will therefore come hence- 
forward from Turkey. But an incident or two, 
may be worthy of the attention of those who do 
not conceive the occupation of Constantinople 
" iin fait accompli." 

At the commencement of the Ramazan, the 
Russian ambassador announced to the Turkish 
government, that he had received from the Em- 
peror Russian decorations, to be distributed to 
the Turkish regiments which had formed part of 
the camp of Unkiar Skelessi ; and that his majesty 
wished, by this distribution, to impress still more 
deeply in the memory of the troops, and the Otto- 
man people, the recollection of that period of fra- 



156 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



ternity. This distribution of Russian medals to 
the Russian troops had been several times before 
resolved on, but as often abandoned, the period 
not having arrived when it could be enforced. 

Mark the moment now made choice of for 
insisting on this distribution. — The Ramazan ! the 
period of fasting — of Mussulman sanctification — 
of relaxation of discipline among the troops, and 
of supervision over the people — when long vigils, 
and meetings in the streets and coffee-houses, faci- 
litate combinations. This is always the epoch 
in which dissatisfaction foments ; and what fitter 
mode of leading to insurrection than the forcing, 
at such a period, by the government itself, this 
brand of degradation on the Turkish army. The 
answer to the application for the distribution of 
the decorations, which was officially made by Bou- 
tinieff, was for several days evaded, and in the 
interim the troops were sounded. It was found that 
they were animated by the most decided spirit of 
resistance, and that there prevailed among them a 
general determination not to permit the decorations 
to be affixed to their breasts. BoutiniefF pressed 
his demand, in terms still more urgent. A short 
delay was solicited, on the ground of the Ramazan, 
its religious observances, and pious preoccupations. 
These arguments being without effect, the dangers 
of the moment, and the dispositions of the troops, 
were represented to him, and the apprehensions of 
the government unfolded, in friendly confidence. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 157 

The implacable minister replied, that it was neces- 
sary to overcome resistance, and to contend with 
danger ; that the Emperor would learn with in- 
dignation that there was a disinclination on the 
part of the Turkish ministers to make that use of 
his present for which he had destined it, and that 
any delay would be considered by his majesty as a 
serious offence. He saw that it was necessary to 
convince, or to intimidate, each of the ministers 
separately. One evening he invited himself to 
sup with Achmet Pacha, another evening with 
the Vizier, another with the Seraskier, another 
with the Kyhaia Bey. He also visited the Reis 
Effendi, but did not sup with him, because this 
minister was suffering from indisposition. During 
eight consecutive nights, he visited one or other of 
the principal personages, using to each the language 
appropriate to his position ; flattering, caressing, 
and threatening, by turns. The road being thus 
smoothed, he once more peremptorily repeated his 
demand for the distribution. The government 
had then only one course to adopt ; this was, to 
inspire terror for the purpose of escaping destruc- 
tion, and to fulfil, with as little danger as possible, 
the will of the Czar. Those who had most posi- 
tively and energetically refused to accept the deco- 
rations, were seized and beheaded ; and twenty 
young men forfeited their lives as an offering to 
the genius of Russian moderation ! 

Do the annals of politics record a more odious 



158 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



act than this ? What language possesses terms 
capable of characterising it ? The Ottoman go- 
vernment resisted as long as it was able, without 
declaring itself in open insurrection against the 
Russians. Placed between the dread of incurring 
the displeasure of the Emperor, and the danger of 
an insurrection at home ; terror alone could deliver 
them ; it was therefore deemed necessary, on the 
order of the Russian minister, to call in the aid of 
the executioner. Such measures are carried into 
effect by a brilliant, elegant, amiable, and prepos- 
sessing diplomatist ; how steeled, then, must be the 
resolution of that merciless system ! what may it 
do — what may it dare, one day, to annihilate in 
Europe the institutions which are obnoxious to it ! 

It was then that conspiracies were spoken of, 
and that the English fleet was recalled from Malta. 
There was no conspiracy save that of the Russian 
minister ; no executions but those which were 
ordered in consequence of his insisting on a distri- 
bution, which he was assured could not take place 
without that horrible preliminary. There was no 
executioner but one — the Russian ambassador. 

What must be the feelings with which these 
events have inspired the troops, — what the dissa- 
tisfaction and hatred which the Sultan has drawn 
down upon himself by these acts ? If, to-morrow, 
the Russians should attempt to dethrone him, 
what soldier would expose his breast, or draw his 
sword in his defence? This unhappy sovereign 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



159 



will be abandoned to his fate, for the crimes of the 
Emperor, who will one day date a ukase from 
Constantinople, by the consequences of this and 
such like crimes. 

BoutiniefF has in this gained a victory of the 
first importance — he has succeeded in putting 
blood between the Sultan and his army, and that 
at a time, when the head of a Mussulman is almost 
as inviolable in public opinion, as the life of a 
citizen among us is inviolable in the eye of the law. 
This tragedy has occurred at a moment when such 
atrocities are not screened from general attention 
by the rapid movement of public and absorbing 
events, or by prosperity, which wipes away the 
stains from absolute power. These unfortunate 
victims fell in the midst of their countrymen, 
already excited by alarms, and attentive to the 
least signal denoting new catastrophes, irritated 
by suffering, and requiring, as some compensation 
for the miseries that press upon them, that life at 
least should be protected against the vicisitudes to 
which it was formerly exposed. Davoud, Pacha 
of Bagdad, Mustapha, Pacha of Scodra, were both 
taken in arms— the one is honored with a govern- 
ment, the other gratified with a pension. Times 
are changed, and the sabre which now no longer 
sheds the blood of culprits, of rebels, or of enemies, 
should at least respect that of servants, unim- 
peached, save for their honest zeal and honorable 
devotion. 



160 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



This fact sufficiently proves that the Russian 
system is ripening, and gaining strength. Whilst 
Russian diplomacy in the different courts of 
Europe professes ignorance whenever allusion is 
made to designs on Constantinople ; whilst they 
are lavish of assurances — of falsehoods — and decla- 
rations; here the mine is completed, the inflam- 
mable matter is collected, and the moment for 
lighting the match is the only combination as yet 
incomplete. 

At the close of last year, the Turkish government 
had come to the determination of definitively regu- 
lating the army and the fleet. With this view, 
they decided on applying to England for a certain 
number of superior naval officers, and to France 
for a certain number of military officers in every 
branch of the service, a portion of whom were to 
be placed at the head of a military school. A 
large building (Galata Serail) was to be put into a 
fit condition to receive 500 pupils and the requisite 
number of professors. A naval school was to be 
established in the Arsenal, or at Prince's Island. 
All was arranged, and letters were about to be 
dispatched. Russia, on learning this, made remon- 
strances, and inquired whether the Porte wished 
to consign the instruction of her army and navy to 
turbulent men, the republicans, the Janissaries 
of England and France, to inculcate ideas of dis- 
obedience and insubordination. These represen- 
tations, certainly not without effect, were still 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



161 



insufficient ; and then it was declared that if 
the project were really adopted, the Emperor 
would view it with the utmost displeasure, and 
would not patiently witness the troubles which 
must speedily convulse Constantinople, by the 
mere fact of the presence of a considerable 
number of foreign officers, seeking to annihilate 
the power of the government, and revolutionize the 
armed force. From that moment the scheme was 
abandoned. One phrase has now become a spell, 
** It is the Emperor's will." By it, Boutinieff 
already reigns in Constantinople. 

What is the result of this state of things ? 
That the Turkish ministers have totally abandoned 
all hope of extricating themselves from their pre- 
sent degrading situation, or of escaping from speedy 
destruction ? They see that they are delivered up 
to Russia, and that henceforth there will be no 
thought of delivering them. They are resigned, 
because resignation is the only course for them. 
So at least they think ; for as we have frequently 
remarked, the government has arrived at such a 
degree of distrust of itself, and fear of others, that 
no energetic resolution can arise, except by external 
influence and support. Depression has sunk to its 
utmost depth, and each day of existence seems to 
the Ottoman government a day of grace, for 
which they ought to thank heaven. In this state 
of things, what is to be expected but the acceptance 
of the Ukase, which will annex Constantinople to 

M 



162 



ENGLAND, FRANCE, 



the Russian Empire ? All will bow down their 
heads, and return quietly to their homes. 

In conclusion, let us connect the most recent 
facts that indicate the triumphant march of Russia. 

Persia, in 1826, nourished such a spirit of 
resistance to Russia, that she declared war against 
her. She was beaten, humbled, her spirit broken, 
a debt imposed on her, her provinces occupied; and 
her soldiers, two months after the triumph of 
Russia, turned against Turkey*. 

In 1828, Turkey nourished such a spirit of 
resistance to Russia, as to declare war against her. 
She was beaten, humbled, debt imposed, provinces 
occupied, bound by treaties, and garrisoned. 

In 1830, Poland arose in arms, and shook off the 
yoke of Russia ; she is conquered, prostrate, and 
in herself hopeless. 

In 1832, Turkey, attacked by Mehemet Ali, 
made an effort to emancipate itself from Russian 
thraldom, and to throw itself on England ; she 
was spurned back into the arms of her enemy. 
Five years have sufficed for her to subdue three 
hostile and aggressive kingdoms, her neighbours — 
five years have sufficed for opening up the portals 
of India, where a hostile nation has hitherto stood 
as watchman — for rendering definitively her own, 
that great, that ancient Poland, so long, so use- 
lessly — called the Bulwark of Europe; and for 



See Appendix. 



RUSSIA, AND TURKEY. 



163 



converting into an unresisting and subservient 
ally, her old, her terrible Ottoman foe. Five 
short years have sufficed for the accomplishment of 
labours, in which a century of prosperous enter- 
prise would have been profitably expended. He 
must be a bold man who can talk — not of war, 
but of peace ! Since, then, four years for new pre- 
paration have been given her, four years chances of 
information and combination have been lost, and 
the occupation of the Dardanelles is now, in anti- 
cipated submission, considered " un fait accompli " 
except in its consequences, although a hundred 
leagues of the blue deep stretches between her 
capital and the Russian arsenals, and the channel 
leading to that sea has yet soundings for a British 
squadron. 



APPENDIX, No. 1. 



ON THE IMMEDIATE AVAILABILITY 

OF THE 

RESOURCES OF PERSIA TO RUSSIA. 

See Introduction. 

It is very natural that those who are unacquainted 
practically with the facilities that exist in the east for hand- 
ling men ; — the ease with which, by a little dexterity, the 
enemy of to-day may be made the parti zan of to-morrow — 
those who have not seen how affections can fluctuate, pas- 
sions arise and subside, and how opinion, that sole bond of 
Eastern Government, responds with instantaneous and 
obedient vibration, to the touch of the skilful hand — it is 
very natural that those who do not understand this moral 
state of the East, should vastly underrate the prospects 
of Russia — that they should not perceive the elements 
of military power which she is now acquiring in the 
political and moral control she is allowed to establish over 
Persia and Turkey. The resistance, the public and per- 
sonal resistance, the implacable hatred of the Circas- 
sians to Russia, the drawback they have proved on her 
strength and resources, the barrier they have presented 
to her extension, have actually propagated the belief 



166 



APPENDIX. 



that Russia weakens herself by extension. The Circassians 
are Mussulmans ; and, therefore, people believe that all 
Mussulmans possess the same power of self-independence, 
the same unsubdued spirit of mountain freedom. This 
is a grave error; and this barrier, not subdued, but 
passed (it is nearly so), the power of Russia will expand 
south, east, and west — not only not arrested by religion 
and its predilections, by mountains and their spirit, but 
it will combine, for its own ends, if allowed the time, 
the very obstacles that have hitherto retarded, but never 
cooled, her ardour, nor arrested her march. 

The whole history of the East establishes as facts, that 
which we have not sufficient knowledge of its habits, and 
of its political institutions, to preconceive or account for. 
Its continual changes, the sudden development of amazing 
power and prosperity, the as sudden prostration of power, 
show the facility of building up as of breaking down, and 
prove how easy it has then been for one individual's 
genius to command victory and dominion. What may not 
the genius of a system effect ! There, conquerors have 
marched from triumph to triumph, with the rapidity of a 
courier. A skirmish has been known to decide the fate 
of a hundred millions of men. A few months have often 
sufficed for the erection of systems that have endured 
for ages, and for raising empires from the lowest pitch of 
degradation to the pinnacle of power. 

At once, in illustration of this truth, and as throwing 
light on events in progress, we will quote a passage from 
an unpublished journal of Mr. C. Burgess, who for 
several years has had a command under the late Prince 
royal of Persia. 

" The account of the part they (two Persians, now pro- 
tegees of Russia ) took in the last wars, I will give in his 
own words. As soon as the prince royal, Abbas Mirza, 



APPENDIX. 



m 



commenced his expedition against Tiflis, Shiack Alee 
Mirza, another of the king's sons, came into Ghilan, to 
raise an army of tufankchees or riflemen, from Mazan- 
deran and that province, with which he was to make an 
incursion against Lenkeran, and to proceed as far up the 
banks of the Caspian as he could. He was joined by 
Mustapha Khan, a famous Mazanderan chief, Bala Khan, 
of the Talish tribe, and Meer Hassan Khan, of Lenkeran, 
before the Russians took possession of it, and whose 
family are the hereditary governors of the town. The 
army might muster about 12,000 men, irregulars, and 
chiefly riflemen, which is the force best suited to the 
woody impracticable nature of the country they were 
to act in. They set out without giving the Russians 
any notice of their approach, and took Lenkeran, Salian, 
and Bakou*, almost without resistance. They were in 
the act of besieging Kouba, thus having completely 
turned the Caucasian chain, and the Daghestanees, and 
other of the mountain tribes, were bringing in heads of 
Russians to their camp in hundreds ; when, all at once, 
there came in the night a courier to the prince command- 
ing, Shiack Alee Mirza, with the news of the prince 
royal having lost the battle of Genga or Elizabethpol-f- ; 
on this, he, without acquainting any one but his imme- 
diate suite, decamped, and at daylight, when the whole 
army arose, to their great astonishment, their com- 
mander was nowhere to be found, Of course, a panic 
was the immediate consequence, and each chief went off 
with his own followers to his home, and thus this suc- 
cessful force melted to nothing. The Russians had been 
so much alarmed at this incursion, that the people at 

* Bakou was not taken ; it was surrounded and blockaded. 
if Abbas Mirza, had he pushed on to Tiflis, must, after all, 
have driven Russia beyond the Caucasus. 



168 



APPENDIX. 



Astrachan were beginning to prepare to move, and the 
whole of the Caucasian tribes, who have never, even to 
this day, submitted to the Russian yoke/ were completely 
set in motion, and fast uniting with the Persian force. 
What the effects of such an expedition would have been, 
had their commander been a man of enterprise, it is 
impossible to say ; but the fact of a Persian force so 
commanded, and so organised, having overrun such a 
tract of country, and taken three fortified towns, may 
fairly lead to the conclusion, that had the Persians been 
assisted, as they ought to have been, in the war by 
England, and English officers had authority in their 
army, the results would have been far different from 
what we have now to contemplate. Meer Abon Talib, 
who was in Astrachan at this time, was placed under 
" surveillance" by the Russian police, for the part his 
brother was taking ; however, at the close of the cam- 
paign, he was released, and the family again taken into 
favour*? 

* The next passage contains too deep a moral to be omitted. 

Tabreez, March 8, 1834. 

" To-day I rode into the caravansera Gulshaw, one of the 
principal ores of the town, and found Mirza Rezza, the chief 
of the customs, and Auvek, who is called the head of the 
Russian merchants in Tabreez, in fierce dispute ; who was 
right it was very difficult to say. The cause of quarrel 
appeared to be, that some Russian subjects had attempted to 
defraud the customs, in which Auvek defended them, and, it 
appeared to me, unjustly ; however, be this as it may, nothing 
could justify Auvek's setting his arms a-kimbo, and crying 
out * I have defiled your fathers' graves ; how dare you eat 
such dirt as to oppose the authority of the Russians ! don't 
you know that this town and the whole province is our's, when- 
ever we please to take it, and yet you dare to interfere with 
our subjects.' " 



APPENDIX. 



169 



What is, then, the military strength of this Russia, 
when twelve thousand irregulars, so collected and so offi- 
cered, can sweep along 200 miles of her most important 
frontier, carry or blockade three fortified places, meet with 
no resistance, and spread terror to a city like Astrakan, 300 
miles within her lines ? But mark what follows: — The 
victorious body, that Russia has no means of resisting, is 
dispersed by the pusillanimity of their leader, and the 
absence of all combination. Russia, by combination, 
triumphs — she takes possession of the very district from 
which these men had been collected — crosses the Araxes 
— forces Persia to sign the Treaty of Turkman Chai, in 
February, and in April moves a body of these very men 
against Turkey — where the success of the Russian arms 
is, by the confession of Paskewitch himself, owing to the 
Mussulman troops. 

This leads us to notice another subject of some import- 
ance. The vast erudition, the profound research of 
M. Klaproth, and the official sources of information open 
to him formerly at St. Petersburgh and Moscow, have de- 
servedly rendered him the first and almost the sole au- 
thority, at least on the continent of Europe, with respect 
to the Caucasus, and to central Asia. He left Russia, 
as it is understood, in disgust, consequently no suspicion 
attaches to his views and statements of a Russian bias ; 
indeed the reverse is generally supposed. Now there 
may be circumstances that might justify the supposition 
of their being more of collusion than disgust in his flight 
or exile. Certain it is, that the effect of his writings have 
been eminently favorable to Russia's projects. He has 
established the opinion that the Mussulman population are 
most difficult of subjugation, and that Russia must weaken 
herself by every conquest she makes. We insert a paper 
of his, published at Paris a few months before the Persian 



no 



APPENDIX. 



war, in the Courier Frangais, which produced a deep 
sensation at the time, and was reproduced in several works. 
The tendency to lull public attention, to calm alarm, is 
marked in every line — the opinions appear unaccountable 
in a man of M. Klaprotfts information — the mis-state- 
ments perhaps render the source of the opinions intel- 
ligible. 

" Since Russia has extended her possessions beyond the 
Caucasus, she finds it necessary to maintain a numerous 
army in the newly conquered provinces. But the coun- 
tries occupied do not afford sufficient provisions for the 
army, and supplies must therefore be forwarded by the 
Black Sea, and across the Caucasus, along a road seldom 
practicable for waggons. All articles necessary for the 
equipment and arming of the troops, being conveyed 
in the same manner to Georgia, it will be readily per- 
ceived that the possession of that country must be bur- 
thensome to Russia. Forty thousand men scarcely 
suffice to keep down the population of Georgia, and the 
warlike tribes of the Caucasus, who are ever on the 
watch for opportunities to plunder the country, and to 
carry off the inhabitants into slavery. 

" Constantly menaced on one side by the unsubdued 
mountaineers, the Russians cannot make a free dispo- 
sition of the forces which they have to the south of the 
Caucasus. A war with Persia must greatly embarrass 
them ; for though it is easy (?) to order 100,000 men to 
pass this chain of inhospitable mountains, it is quite im- 
possible to feed them when they have arrived at their 
destination. No part of the Caucasian Isthmus produces 
corn in sufficient abundance to admit of any considerable 
exportation ; and if a surplus did exist, the difficulty of 
the communications would prevent its conveyance to 



APPENDIX. 



171 



the less fertile provinces* The great obstacle which this 
deficiency of provisions presents, will always prevent 
Russia from augmenting her army in Georgia, and from 
making extensive conquests in Persia. The portion of 
the latter country through which a Russian army must 
pass in marching on Tehran, the present capital of 
Persia, is still less fertile than Georgia. (?) It is solely 
inhabited by wandering tribes, (?) who live upon their 
flocks ; cultivated fields are rarely seen. (?) On the aproach 
of a hostile army, the Nomadic population would pro- 
bably retire with their cattle into the mountains, where 
they would be able to defend their property against the 
Cossacks, who might be sent out to forage for provisions. 
Besides, Tehran is surrounded by deserts ; (?) and in those 
countries there is no means of securing subsistence for 
an invading army. (?) To carry on war in such regions, it 
is not sufficient to have an army well equipped and well 
commanded ; it is, moreover, necessary, that the troops 
should be inured to the climate. The insalubrious air 
of several districts of northern Persia engenders fever 
and other diseases, which are aggravated by unwholesome 
food, and chiefly by the eating of fruit, from which sol- 
diers cannot abstain. 

" In advancing on the Persian territory, the Russian 
troops would leave behind them at least 120,000 Cauca- 
sians, well armed; and all the Georgian population of 
the Isthmus, ready to seize any favourable opportunity 
for revolting ; and, finally, the Mahometan tribes of Kara- 
bagh, Shirwan, and Daghestan, always willing to shake 
off the yoke of the Infidel. Embarrassed in its march 
by the want of articles of the first necessity, the invading 
army would find itself constantly harassed by the Per- 
sian light cavalry, a description of force fully equivalent 
to the Cossacks. Every one knows how much unfore- 



172 



APPENDIX. 



seen attacks by such troops contribute to fatigue and 
damp the spirit of an army on its march. 

" Were the Persians themselves prudent enough, or 
were they sufficiently advised, to avoid a pitched battle 
on the invasion of their territory by the Russians; — 
were they to allow the Russians to advance, and confine 
themselves to cutting off the communications between 
the different corps of the enemy and Georgia, they would 
infallibly succeed in destroying the invading army, or in 
compelling it to return with loss to its own country. 
But the stupidity and false courage of all Mahometan na- 
tions will probably prevent them from adopting a course 
so advantageous to themselves. They are always ready to 
try their strength in the open field with an army of 
infidels; and then the bravery of the Russian soldier, 
directed by European tactics, is capable of withstanding 
an enemy tenfold more numerous. But one, two, or 
three battles lost, do not decide the fate of a semi- 
barbarous state. (?) The difficulty of conquest will be 
infinitely less to Russia than the retaining under her 
sway the provinces of which she may obtain possession. (?) 

" Moreover, the aggrandisement of Russia at the ex- 
pense of Persia cannot fail to prove disadvantageous 
to the former of the two ; she will acquire provinces of no 
value, the inhabitants of which, being zealous followers of 
Islamism, will never be sincerely attached to her govern- 
ment. She will therefore find it constantly necessary 
to maintain a considerable number of troops in the 
conquered country, which must give occasion to ex- 
traordinary disbursements, besides the expense of the 
administration. She will then be in a situation as em- 
barrassing as was the East India Company, after the 
war imprudently undertaken against the Birmans, and 
the glorious peace which terminated it, when the new con- 



APPENDIX. 



173 



quests beyond the Ganges reduced the English to the 
situation of holding themselves long on the defensive 
against their neighbours to the eastward. 1 ' 

The drift of this article no one can mistake, now that 
events have shown the groundlessness of the assumptions. 
Here is the first authority on this question assuring 
France that Russia could not triumph over Persia, and 
if she did, that she would weaken herself. These opi- 
nions he supports by the bold assertion of falsehoods, 
and he concludes with an artful allusion to India, to 
rouse up the old rivalry of French ambition, and to tell 
it, that if really danger existed in the east, it was only to 
the colonial empire of Great Britain. 

M. Klaproth tells us that the northern regions of 
Persia are solely inhabited by wandering tribes, and that 
the country round Teheran is a desert. The northern 
districts of Persia are Agerbijan and Ghilan. With 
respect to the first, Mr. Fraser says, " This province is 
one of the most productive of the kingdom, and provi- 
sions and comforts abound. 11 With respect to the 
second, he tells us that it " Displays scenery which for 
beauty and interest cannot be surpassed in any part of 
the world. Large corn fields, divided by excellent 
fences and hedges, varied with copse-wood, orchards, and 
groves, from among which the neat cottages of a village 
often peep out, and fine swelling lawns with noble park- 
like trees dotting the green surface, or running up the 
hill sides in natural glades. 11 Of course the elaborately 
erudite M. Klaproth could not be ignorant of what 
every child that has gone through his school-book exer- 
cises must know, that the northern regions of Persia are 
the richest, most populous, and fertile portion of that 
country. During this war, Azerbijan fed a Persian army 



174 



APPENDIX. 



of 50,000 men, the Russian army, and the inhabitants, 
without difficulty, and with scarcely a rise of price. 

The loss of two or three battles not deciding the fate 
of a demi-barbarous people is a novel doctrine. Alex- 
ander the Great refuted it — more eloquently did Mah- 
moud of Ghizni refute it, as every conqueror in the 
East has done. 

As to the latter paragraph, it is a series of false pro- 
positions. Opposition to Russia in those regions, while 
England stands aloof, depends solely on the energy of 
the Persian government. Whatever diminishes that energy 
takes from them the power of that resistance — when that 
ceases to exist, these countries cease to cause Russia to 
expend men or treasure, and, on the contrary, contribute 
to her resources. As to the comparison between the 
Persian and Burmese wars, Russia made Persia pay the 
expenses of the war to the uttermost farthing ; we incurred 
a debt of twelve millions beyond the sum recovered from 
the Burmese. 



APPENDIX, No. 2. 



POLITICAL CONNECTION OF FRANCE AND 
TURKEY. 

See page 116. 

In an introduction prefixed to the French translation 
of this Essay, there are the following observations on the 
fact of the historic union of the interests of France and 
Turkey. 

" Turkey — Turkey brought to the edge of an abyss 
is the subject of this work— solemn and terrible question, 
which touches, by every point, the repose and happiness 
of the whole of Europe, and in which are necessarily 
involved the interests, the honour, and the futurity of 
France. Curiosity alone, in the absence of more honour- 
able and powerful motives, might alone lead us to follow 
the development of this political drama, in which events 
— acts — intrigues — prepare a catastrophe which must 
place in our epoch one of those great revolutions which 
change the face of the globe. 

" Since the day in which was created that political 
system which for three centuries has regulated the 
destiny of Europe, no alliance is recorded by history 
more advantageous, more necessary, or even more con* 
stant, than that which has bound France to Turkey. 
When, at the commencement of the sixteenth century, 



176 



APPENDIX. 



the people of Christendom became alarmed at the con- 
quests of Selim and Soleyman — when the Popes endea- 
voured to reanimate the spirit of the crusades, the kings 
of France required, as it were, a diplomatic inspiration, 
to resist the religious sympathies of their people, and to 
avert the dangers with which their country was menaced 
by the ambition of the House of Hapsburg, which sought 
to appear the instrument of an universal religious move- 
ment, and thus to subvert a dangerous rival, the sub- 
version of which must have rendered that house the 
mistress of Europe. It was a phenomenon new in 
Europe ; it was, to use the expression of the times, scan- 
dalous to see the very christian king leagued with the 
chief of Islamism against an apostolic emperor. How- 
ever, from the very principle of that alliance, French 
diplomacy received an impulse and direction so natural, 
so profitable, and so necessary, that during three cen- 
turies France never once deviated from this political 
dogma*. What would have been the resistance of 
France if under Francis I., Henry IV., or Louis XIV., 
the House of Hapsburgh had aspired to the occupation 

* It would be superfluous to talk of the commercial ad- 
vantages which France has reaped from this alliance ; but we 
cannot pass over in silence a historic fact, which had escaped 
the erudition of the Minister of the Interior, in his lucid 
exposition of the rights of neutrals, in affirming that France, 
at the treaty of Utrecht, was the first to recognise this right. 
M. Thiers makes a mistake. " The treaty (concluded a 
century before the treaty of Utrecht), between Henry IV. and 
Mahomet III., contains this remarkable clause, — ' Que les 
marchandises chargees a notis sur vaissaux Francais et 
appartenans aux ennemis de la Porte ne pouvoient etre pris 
sous preteste qu'elles venoient des ennemis de la Porte.' " 



APPENDIX. 



177 



of Constantinople, or even to influence over the councils 
of the Porte ? If at the close of the eighteenth century 
France abandoned this prudent system, it was only 
because she herself had been seduced into projects of 
universal dominion, and the conquest of Egypt and 
Syria naturally led the young hero of the Pyramides to 
the conquest of the Bosphorus. These illusions dispersed 
— Napoleon revived the old Dogma of French diplomacy. 
When at Erfurt the two Emperors appeared, in the midst 
of mutual concessions and deferences, to divide, between 
themselves, Europe into two equal portions, while, in 
reality, each sought the means of arriving at undivided 
domination ; it was the question of the Bosphorus that 
tore the veil asunder. The hero of Austerlitz, at the 
head of France, of the Empire, did not dare to abandon 
Constantinople to the pacific Alexander. Will Louis 
Philippe and the France of July be more courageous, in 
face of the enterprising and happy genius of Nicholas ! " 

After a happy and original exposition of the species of 
dictatorship that Nicholas exercises throughout Europe, 
the writer returns again to the Eastern question. " The 
magnitude of its imminent results has nothing com- 
parable to it in the annals of diplomacy. This Eastern 
question, essentially a French question, offers to France 
the most fortuitous and solemn means of restoration to the 
path of national honour, and also of national security. 
One energetic decision would, as it were, by a miraculous 
metamorphosis, transfigure the most defective and 
despised portion of our system — our diplomacy. And 
this species of external restoration could not be without 
a salutary influence on our internal state." 

This observation is not more profound than true. A 
reasoner seated at Paris could arrive at the idea of the 
diplomacy of France requiring a deep conviction — a 

N 



178 



APPENDIX. 



recognised spring of action, to be effective only as the 
result of long study and reflection. The second con- 
viction, that the diplomacy of France must be spiritless 
without such a principle, is but an inference from the 
first. 

Whoever has wandered over that arena, where the 
interests and destinies of Europe are at stake, must have 
stumbled over these truths. What in the one case is 
intellect, in the other is sense. We who have seen the 
diplomatists, and the admirals of France, acting in all 
senses with the activity of mind that characterises their 
country, but without the unity that once was its motto, 
should have considered the worthlessness of the diplomacy 
of France, too common and notorious a fact to merit 
observation. This we have no hesitation in affirming, 
that, if, during the last ten years, France had never 
heard of Turkey, and Turkey had never heard of France, 
that Russia would now be half a century further off 
from the realisation of her projects than she actually is. 



APPENDIX, No. 3. 



TURKISH OIL AND RUSSIAN TALLOW* 

See Introduction. 

If we were studiously to sit down to arrange our 
Tariff, with the view of favouring Russia and injuring 
Turkey, we should make it just what it is. If our influence 
over Turkey had been subsequently directed to the same 
end, it would have produced just such results as those 
which are before us. By favour of our Tariff, by regu- 
lations of Turkey, introduced contrary to her stipulations 
with us — by the dependence in which we are self-placed 
on the markets of Russia, for every article imported into 
England from Russia, do we deny ourselves commercial 
and manufacturing advantages of the very greatest im- 
portance — do we pay Russia annually several millions, 
which otherwise we should pay to Turkey ; and thus have 
we given to Russia the power of encamping on the Bospho- 
rus, of injuring the prosperity and degrading the power of 
our own empire, and of endangering the peace of Europe. 

We take one instance for the present — oil and tallow. 

In all countries possessing that inestimable fruit, or 
enabled to procure its produce by commerce, the olive 

* This paper was drawn up at the period of the Russian 
expedition to the Bosphorus. It is inserted as an illustration 
of the effects of a score in a tariff on political combinations, 
and on national prosperity and independence. 



180 



APPENDIX. 



and its oil have been considered, next to bread and salt, 
necessaries of life ; yet in England it may be said to be 
unknown. Oil is the best material and principal ingre- 
dient in the manufacture of soap, necessary to the cleans- 
ing of the person and the clothes of each individual of 
our population ; — oil in England is almost unknown as 
an ingredient of soap. It affords, naturally, the best and 
cheapest light for our northern nights ; — in England it is 
used for light only by the rich. Oil is useful and neces- 
sary in a great proportion of the chemical processes on 
which the greatness of the country depends, and is abso- 
lutely necessary to the working of every piece of ma- 
chinery throughout the empire; — the importation of 
oil into England, where not a single olive-tree exists, 
amounts but to one-sixth of the importation into olive- 
growing France ! Cloths, dyes of all kinds on all stuffs, 
and soap, are staples of French exportation — not pro- 
duced by natural advantages ; she owes them to her oil. 

The substitutes which we have forced into use, instead 
of oil, are, chiefly, tallow — inferior in almost every case, 
wholly inapplicable in many, to the deterioration of our 
produce, and the restriction of its exportation ; also of 
higher price, as will presently appear; and, moreover, 
wholly inadequate to supply the demand without an ex- 
cessive increase of price ; other inferior substitutes are 
found in cocoa-nut oil, oil from seeds of all kinds, and 
palm-oil, all admitted at a lower duty. 

The country which principally grows oil, admits, with- 
out any restriction whatever, the produce of England, its 
demand for which is only limited by its ability to furnish 
us with produce in return. It is a country which, 
politically, we wish to strengthen, and with which our 
object is to establish and cement the closest connection. 
The country which furnishes tallow restricts by every 



APPENDIX. 



181 



means the importation of our produce, and applies the 
resources, furnished by our traffic, to endeavours to raise 
up rival manufactures, and to political purposes, and to 
military operations, hostile and dangerous to us. While 
our vessels return light from Turkey, they go light to 
Russia. Our trade with Turkey is carried on exclusively 
in English bottoms ; our traffic with Russia is shared 
with Russian vessels ; and will be the means of improving 
the Russian marine. 

But it might be supposed, in compensation for the 
injury, politically and commercially, inflicted on Eng- 
land by the next to prohibitory duty of 8/. 8s* on oil, 

* Since that period the duty lias been reduced to 4/. 4>s. 
but scarcely any results have followed. Every day's expe- 
rience teaches us the immediate connection between the 
tariff and manufacturing intelligence. A fractional duty 
has often changed the whole course of commerce, and 
prevented great resources not only from being brought 
into action, but from being known. Oil, now that the 
duty is 4/. is. , is almost as much excluded from ma- 
nufactures as when it was 16/. 16s., or 81. 8s : because 
habits have been formed, and because the retail price is nearly 
what it was, that is, about 200 per cent, above its real value. 
Oil, it is also to be observed, does not keep, especially when 
exposed, and w T hen there are not proper vessels ; nor can these 
be afforded, unless the sale is great and the demand constant. 
This accounts for the slowness of the advance in the consump- 
tion of oil, and the appreciation of its qualities. The first 
experiments must be made in detail, and it is to be procured in 
the retail shops at an exorbitant price, and is, moreover, old, 
if not rancid. 

The importance of oil in woollen manufactures is not under- 
stood. The beautiful texture of the Tunis caps has been 
found, by recent experiments at Constantinople, to be chiefly 



182 



APPENDIX. 



that at least we have an abundant or an adequate supply, 
which is to be obtained alone by the favour accorded to 
Russian tallow, — quite the contrary, — the price of tallow 
is at this moment rapidly rising, because the supply is 
inadequate to the demand. It has, within a few months, 
risen 101. per ton, and the reserved stock on hand has 
dwindled, within the last three years, from 15,000 to 
3,000 tons ; and as the reduction of duty on soap and 
candles will naturally lead to increased consumption, it is 
certainly fair to anticipate, that the benefit proposed, by 
the reduction of the duty, will in a great measure be 
frustrated by the increase of price. The price has 

owing to die use of large quantities of oil during the manipu- 
lation of the wool and yarn ; one -third of the weight of wool 
has been there employed, and the fabric nearly equals already 
that of Tunis. Precisely the same process (excepting the 
quantity of oil) is employed at Genoa, also the same wool ; 
but the caps bring a sixth of the price of Tunis caps : one- 
tenth of the weight of wool is there used. Olive -oil is used 
in all the celebrated cloth manufactories of France and Ger« 
many. The attention of the writer was first awakened to this 
question by seeing olive-oil used in some of the cloth districts of 
Prussia, from whence rape-seed was exporting to England to 
supply oil for the cloth manufacture in England. He inquired 
why they did not use rape-oil, which they had at their door, in- 
stead of olive-oil imported from the East, through Trieste, and 
conveyed by long and expensive land carriage, making it several 
times the price of rape-seed oil. He was told that experience 
taught them, that rape-seed oil had not the smoothness of olive- 
oil ; that the fibre of the wool, when moistened by it, did not 
lie so well ; that the cloth was not so soft or so brilliant ; and 
that if their government taxed oil so as to put it out of their 
power to use it, they would not employ rape-seed oil, but 
abandon the manufacture of cloth. 



APPENDIX. 



183 



already advanced to 48/.*, but what limits are there to its 
rise? It might be supposed that the increase of price 
would, whenever it had passed the level of the duty on 
oil, attract oil to our market, so that the price of tallow 
would be lowered by the demand being divided ; but in 
practice this by no means happens. Speculations of this 
precarious nature are never undertaken without the pros- 
pect of enormous profits, if successful. Merchants and 
manufacturers are attached to their habitual routine, and 
so high a duty, even were oil introduced under its opera- 

* The Russian merchants, anticipating such a rise, held 
on, the price at that moment rapidly rose as stated in the 
text, but a large importation into England of other olea- 
ginous substances, and a most abundant home supply of 
tallow, checked the rise, alarmed the holders— the Russian 
reserved stock was thrown into the market, so that since that 
period, tallow has fallen 10s. per cwt., the loss falling entirely 
on the Russian proprietors and merchants. The reduction 
of the duty on oil, even such as it is, has still further depressed 
the market. A new source of supply is also opened in the 
provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia of finer quality than the 
finest Russian tallow. * A couple of vessels are at present 
expected, and in the precarious state of the market their 
arrival will probably reduce Russian tallow one or two shil- 
lings more per cwt. — every shilling reduced on the cwt., is a 
loss to Russia of 50,000/. Russia has therefore suffered, by 
these combined causes influencing the English market, to the 
amount of 500,000/., and perhaps another sum equal to the 
half of this by the reaction of this depression on the continen- 
tal market. If the Wallachian tallow now comes in, to cause 
a further reduction, Russia will practically feel what a thorn 
these provinces are in her side, and England may commence 
to perceive what the advantages are of which she has been sx> 
long deprived in the Ottoman dominions. 



184 



APPENDIX. 



tion to supply the place of tallow, would deter merchants 
from speculating in any other oil, save that which is of 
the best or most approved quality, or from accustomed 
ports, so that the demand would immediately raise the 
price of oil, at the particular marts whence the supply 
was habitually drawn. In support of this, I appeal to 
the fact, that in 1800 we were paying Russia 100/. per 
ton for tallow, while oil was retailing throughout the 
Levant at 35/., yet the French soap-boilers esteem oil at 
46/. worth tallow at 361. ; our soap-boilers know nothing 
of the use of olive-oil, in consequence of its systematic 
exclusion by the higher duty it pays than tallow ; in 
fact, by this unadvised, and, perhaps, heedless stroke of a 
legislative pen, we have raised the resources of Russia, 
during the last 33 years, by a sum which is certainly not 
below 50,000,000/. ! 

It must be borne in mind, that the question is not, 
which of the two — Russian tallow, and Turkish oil— we 
are to admit, and which to reject, but whether or not it 
is expedient or politic to admit Russian tallow on terms 
which are a virtual exclusion of Turkish oil. Let the 
tallow be admitted as heretofore, but let oil come in 
free. It will be readily admitted, that if the com- 
merce of England were left to the control of interests and 
intelligence alone, oil, in proportion to its abundance, and 
comparative lowness of price, would supplant all other 
substances of a similar nature. The demand for tallow 
is evidently increasing — Russia's powers of production 
are not — if, therefore, tallow were the best of all oleaginous 
substances which could be substituted for it — if it were 
desirable that Russia should be our sole market, even then 
would it be imperative on England to look for inferior 
substitutes, and a less advantageous source of supply. 

During the last eight years, almost every article that 



APPENDIX. 



185 



enters largely into commerce, has fallen very considerably 
in price, while tallow, on the contrary, has been increas- 
ing, and of course its relative value receiving greater 
augmentation than that indicated by the price current*. 

The effect of our Tariff has been — 
1st. To exclude England from the soap trade. Eng- 
land importing oil unrestrictedly would have supplied 
the whole of north and South America, and a great 
portion of Europe with soap. 
2nd. To give her worse and dearer soap for home 
consumption — either for general use, or for application 
to other manufactures. 
3rd. To induce her to use an inferior article in the 
preparation of her woollen manufactures. 



* This table has been 


comp 


iled from official returns and 


price currents, between th 


e year 


s 1825 and 1833. 




per cent. 






per cent. 


Alum has fallen . 


36 


Sugar, from 




13 to 33 


Copper ... 


24 


Cheese 




. 38 


Coals .... 


50 


Beef . 




. 22 


Borax 


46 


Anatto 




. 78 


Soda (carb. 80) . 


55 


Cochineal 




. 57 


Hops .... 


50 


Indigo 




... 53 


Iron, bars 


45 


Tobacco 




. 60 


pigs . 


52 


Gum Lac 




50 to 75 


Lead .... 


52 


Galls . 




. 47 


Red . 


40 


Rice . 




12 to 25 


White 


42 


Silk . 




30 to 70 


Leather 


27 


Wax . 




. 31 


Salt .... 


60 


Pepper 




. 20 


Spermaceti . 


41 


Tea . 




11 to 17 


Spirits 


33 


Coffee 




13 to 27 


but Tallow 


has increased 9 to 


15 




Soap 




2 to 


6 





186 



APPENDIX. 



4th. Ditto in dyeing. 
5th. Ditto for machinery*. 
6th. Ditto for light. 

7th. She has sacrificed 200,000/. yearly to Russia, 
in increase of price on the inferior article. 

8th. She has deprived herself of the advantages that 
would have flowed indirectly from the benefits from 
which she has excluded herself — increased capital, 
employment of shipping, and compensating demand. 

9th. She has transferred most important financial and 
commercial resources from a people she has to defend, 
to a government which she has to combat. 
The yearly imported consumption of England at 

present is — 

tons. 

Tallow . . . 50,000 

fPalm oil ... 10,000 

Olive oil . . . 5,000 

Fish oil 30,000 
Rape and Linseed oil . . 5,000 

100,000 

of this quantity, at least 50,000 tons are employed for 
soap, machinery, dyeing, lighting, and other purposes to 
which oil is more peculiarly adapted. The change from 
tallow to oil would of course be gradual, and the more 
so, as thereby the price of tallow would be lowered ; and 
this in itself is an immense advantage, while on the other 
hand, that of oil would be increased ; so that other 

* The objection to the use of olive oil for machinery is 
partly founded ; but if olive oil were fresh and cheap, it would 
be employed in this country as largely for machinery as on 
the continent. 

f Palm oil is charged only 2l. 10s. per ton. 



APPENDIX 



187 



nations would lose the unjust advantage over us which 
our regulations give them. This quantity, then, we may 
fix as the maximum of our probable demand, which, if 
realised, would be a transfer of the most lucrative branch 
of Russian commerce from Russia to Turkey. Let us 
therefore ascertain the actual amount and distribution 
of the oil trade in the Mediterranean, its capabilities of 
meeting an increased demand, the effect of such demand 
on price, the cost of production, the prospect and the 
means of increasing production. 



ACTUAL STATE OF THE OIL TRADE. 

Consumption. 

tons. 

Germany by Trieste . . 10,000 

Holland . . . 2,500 

St. Petersburgh . . . 2,500 

Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, &c. . 2,000 

England 5,000 

France, fo r soap . . 2.5,000 ) 
other purposes o,000 ) ' 

52,000 

SUPPLY. 

Kingdom of Naples and Sicily 
Spain, Corsica, and Sardinia 
Candia, and Greek Islands . 
Barbary Coast 

52,000 



30,000 
2,000 
10,000 
10,000 



This is an approximate average, taken between the 
years 1824 and 1828 ; since that period, the proportion 
furnished by the Levant has increased ; and besides the 



188 



APPENDIX. 



above, at least 3,000 tons are shipped directly from the 
coast of Asia minor to America, and to the Black Sea. 

LEVANT TRADE. 

It is impossible to pretend to any accuracy in endea- 
vouring to calculate the internal commerce or the 
actual production of Turkey, Barbary, and the Levant, 
but the following considerations will at least show how 
vast the field is. The foreign commerce, as above, amounts 
to 23,000 tons ; the coast and inland trade to as much or 
more ; let us say, therefore, that the oil which passes the 
native custom houses amounts to 50,000 tons : one 
quarter of the produce does not pass the native custom 
houses. 

The regions of European and Asiatic Turkey, the 
northern districts of Africa, over which the olive tree is 
scattered, must at least amount to 400,000 square miles. 
Now calculating (et infra) the produce of an acre entirely 
occupied with olive trees at three-fourths of a cwt. of oil, 
then, if only one-fiftieth of these regions were occupied 
with olive trees, we should have a produce of 200,000 
tons. Again, the population of these regions, which 
either grow or are in the immediate vicinity of olives, 
cannot be reckoned at less than 4,000,000 of families; 
and as the entire population not only consume oil exclu- 
clusively, for cooking, for soap, and for light, but eat 
the olives themselves as food, and as such consider 
them, next to bread, a necessary of life, it will not be too 
great an allowance to set down an oke, (2f lbs.) for the 
weekly consumption of each family, this will give 
250,000 tons. Of course it will be understood that these 
considerations are advanced merely to prove the vastness 
of the production, but by no means as calculations even 
remotely approximating to its real amount. 



APPENDIX. 



189 



The quality of oil of the Levant is excellent, although 
no care is taken of its extraction, or in keeping it after- 
wards. 

The olive is no less eminently calculated for the phy- 
sical than the political atmosphere of the East, so much so 
that it is the only species of culture that has outlived the 
last tweve years of confusion ; numbers of the olive-trees 
have of course been sacrificed ; but so much respect is 
paid to them, that they have been spared by all parties, 
unless when pressed by necessity. 

The Morea and continental Greece produced, before 
the revolution, 8000 tons ; — Candia has exported 
20,000 tons in one year. Some idea of the produc- 
tiveness of this magnificent island may be formed from 
this, that in 1828 the irregular Greek commission, which 
held precarious possession of one-half the island, raised a 
sum of 9 5 200,000 piastres, or 122,666/., from an export 
duty on oil, although the duty was not paid on the whole, 
and at the time, in many places, the olives were lying 
two and three inches thick on the ground. A great 
portion of the island is covered with forests of olive- 
trees, of the greatest beauty, and planted in long and 
majestic rows : and the wilder and loftier parts are 
thickly scattered over with sturdy plants of the oleaster, 
the oil of which is reckoned superior to that of the 
domesticated species ; its produce is too small to be 
available as a crop, but the tame olive grafted on these 
stems, bears abundantly in three or four years. 

The Ionian islands exported to Venice 8000 tons ; but 
the cultivation of the olive-tree was promoted by bounties, 
and maintained by penalties, which have been removed ; 
this forced production has therefore diminished to 4000 
tons. The island of Mitylene, and the coast of Aivali, 
can export, it has been supposed, in favourable years, 



190 



APPENDIX. 



20,000 tons — Egypt, which formerly imported, will soon 
be able to export. The coast of Barbary, according to 
the testimony of those engaged in the traffic, may be 
made to furnish, with proper administration, and with 
a steady and regular demand, and consequently with 
diminished charges, 80 to 40,000 tons. Putting these 
facts together, we may rest assured that England may 
triple or quadruple her demand for oil without unduly 
augmenting its price. A momentary increase of price 
would take place if a sudden demand were opened, but 
that increase would tell on France, and other countries, 
now enjoying, in all the manufactures requiring oil, an 
unfair advantage over us, but of our own creating. 

It will prove that such a mass of production and con- 
sumption must possess great elasticity, and, independently 
of the facilities of augmenting the production which 
shall afterwards be pointed out, it is clear that a slight 
increase of price in Europe, were the fiscal and habitual 
barriers removed, would suffice to draw westward some 
tens of thousands of tons annually even from the stock 
which at present exists. 

The chief obstacle to all improvement is, of course, 
want of capital among the cultivators. Though the 
cost price to our merchants, or at Malta, averages 20/. 
per ton, yet the cultivator seldom receives 12/. ; an 
increased demand will therefore benefit the cultivator, 
and indirectly improve the quality of the produce, without 
enhancing the price to the foreign merchant — perhaps 
even may we anticipate a reduction of price from the 
emancipation of the cultivators from accapareurs, and 
also from this, that the chief resource of the peasant, 
when his fields were plundered, being the olive and the 
mulberry, he had to look to these two articles for a larger 
share of his subsistence. 



APPENDIX. 



191 



An increased demand would benefit the producer, and 
improve the resources of the country : — first, by utilising 
their present resources; secondly, by improving their 
mode of extracting the oil ; thirdly, in the preparation 
of proper vessels for keeping and transporting it; and 
fourthly, by improving and extending the cultivation of 
the trees ; and an increased demand for oil would be 
more beneficially felt than any other, as, while it offers 
the same proportional rewards to labour and industry, 
it would instantaneously create value : in many parts of 
the country, the fruit of the olive-tree, moulders use- 
lessly on the spot where it grew. Open a demand for 
currants, and you benefit a few hundred proprietors. 
For silk, you require labour and capital to be advanced. 
For any agricultural produce, it must be sowed and 
watched, and waited for; but create a demand for oil, 
you utilise that which exists, which is immediately pro- 
ductive, which benefits the whole mass of labourers, and 
adds value to every acre of land*. 

The emblem and the gift of Minerva may be con- 
sidered the staple and the inheritance of Greece. The 
olive of Attica, multiplied under the too anxious care of 
Athenian legislation, still covers its valleys and its plains ; 
but in the Morea, its culture marks the sway of Venice ; 
and in the central parts, where that sway did not extend, 
there are scarcely any. The Turks, who in general left 
interests to adjust themselves, have left no practical 
records of social improvements introduced by their care ; 
perhaps the only instance of their direct interference is, 
against the culture of the olive-tree — they cut down 
30,000 in Hydra, that the Hydriotes might turn their 

* At the period that this paper was written, several projects 
had been entertained for benefitting Greece ; the reduction of 
the duty on currants, for instance. 



192 



APPENDIX. 



attention exclusively to the sea. The Venetians, who 
sought in their foreign possessions the means of pro- 
ducing cheap and abundant supplies, gave, as the Athe- 
nians, bounties for the planting of olive-trees, so that the 
Ionian islands, under their administration, became forests 
of them ; but they prohibited the exportation, except to 
Venice, which neutralised the benefits of the increased 
production ; and they rigorously prohibited their being 
cut down, so that, in process of time, in these islands, as 
in the plains of Athens, these trees, which are adapted to 
light and hilly soils, occupied exclusively the low and 
rich lands, and while they require light and air, and a 
free exposure, were crowded together in confined spaces 
and sheltered valleys, to the injury of trees and crops, 
and to frequent risks of entire failure ; because, forced in 
the early part of the season, they are subject to blights 
in March, which in some places destroy every third 
crop. 

COST OF PRODUCTION. 

Dr. Sibthorp estimates the produce of the best trees at 
gj cwts. (Walpole's Turkey, Vol. l H p. 162.) This may 
be a bare possibility ; at Naxos a gigantic tree is shown, 
which bears traces of the remotest antiquity, its trunk 
resembling net-work, which is said to produce that quan- 
tity. Beau jour strikes the average at 20 French lbs. ; 
and this was at Athens, under the unfavourable circum- 
stances above indicated. The average may be 30 lbs., the 
trees occupying the intervals of fields or ridges, or bor- 
dering vineyards, and receiving no other culture save 
that which, independent of them, was applied to the soil. 
But let us suppose that they occupied exclusively the 
soil, and allowing 120 trees to the acre, at 30 lbs. per 
tree, we shall have li tons per acre, and, as the produce 
is biennial, f of a ton annually, — say the culture of the 
acre, covered with trees, and the expenses of extraction, 



APPENDIX. 



193 



amount to 3/., which certainly is above the mark. Then 
allow 1/. 10*. government tax on land, trees, and tene- 
ments, this will give 4/. 10s. per acre, or 61. per ton, cost 
price ; but to this must be added interest on value of trees, 
which must vary with circumstances, and this variation, 
and the immediate adaptations of interests and expecta- 
tions to it, is, perhaps, one cause of the great elasticity of 
commerce and production throughout the East. 

On the spot where these details were collected and this 
calculation was made (Naxos, in 1829), the peasant 
sold his oil at 1^ piastre per oke, or 10/. per ton, and 
considered himself amply remunerated, although three 
months after, or in January 1830, it had risen in the 
neighbouring market of Syra to 22/. 

Perhaps the price of oil is more steady than that of 
any other article, and its value under the Republic of 
Venice* may be taken for a criterion of its future value, 
since then the price was sufficiently high to extend the 
cultivation of the olive-tree, and it seems likely that in 
future, the increasing demand for oil will raise its value 
above the regular rate of profit, as the shores of the 
Mediterranean, or rather the trees actually standing, 
whether domesticated or yet wild, will have, for fifteen 
or twenty years to come, the monopoly of the supply. 
The supply from Naples is increasing at the rate of 
two or three per cent, per annum. Cultivation, it 
is true, is increasing in France, and a considerable 
saving of oil, by the improved process of extracting it, 
has been effected. In Apulia and Calabria, within the 
last two years, a great number of olive-trees have been 
planted, and the French method of extracting has, two 

* The Ionian oil was estimated at Venice (in 1794), at two 

sequins the barrel, or 10/. per ton. 

o 



194 



APPENDIX, 



years ago, been introduced at Bari ; when it becomes 
general, the saving, both of expense and of oil, will be 
much greater than in France, as their previous method 
was more rude ; in the cultivation of the trees, also, there 
is great room and some prospect of improvement. 

But with the supply, the demand of France is increas- 
ing, so that there is no chance of exportation from that 
country, or even of a diminution of her present impor- 
tation of 30,000 tons ; on the contrary, the merchants 
of Marseilles conceive that their trade in oil and export 
of soap might be very materially increased. They have 
demanded free importation of oil, or at least, greater 
facilities than they possess at present (owing prin- 
cipally to the navigation laws, foreign vessels paying 
an additional 10 per cent., the trade being carried on 
in foreign vessels, the cargoes have to be transferred at 
Nice, Sardinia, &c, to French bottoms, and but for this 
facility of evading the law made to protect the interests 
of Marseilles, probably Marseilles would have had no 
participation in this immense and lucrative traffic), and 
showing that by lowering the price of the Levant oil, 
from which soap is made, that not only would great 
benefit flow to the internal soap trade, and its export to 
neighbouring countries, but that it would give to France 
the entire supply of the Brazils, and indeed of North and 
South America. 

In fact, the demand for oleaginous substances is un- 
equal to the supply. The demand outstrips the supply, 
as the table of prices above given must alone suffice to 
prove; this disturbance of industrial interests is no doubt 
occasioned by England's having restricted her enormous 
consumption to tallow from the north. There exists 
fortunately, however, vast stores of a superior substance 
available, but neglected, around the shores of the Levant. 



APPENDIX. 



195 



It is high time for England to cease to do herself this 
injustice. It is high time for her to become sensible of 
the advantages she has neglected — before the oil 
growing country passes under the dominion of the almost 
exclusive holder of tallow*. 

This exclusion might be intelligible, or at least would 
be on a par with other commercial follies, if England had 
oil grounds, but fortunately, England has none (except- 
ing Rape and Linseed). 

Do we debar ourselves from this most important article, 
to force into use the inferior but favoured produce of 
some country, unrestrictedly admitting our manufactures? 
Precisely the reverse — we use the inferior article from a 
country that excludes our cottons-)*, woollens, or hard 
ware. We exclude the better article from a country that 
takes what we have to give, without restriction, without 
embarrassing regulations, and almost without customs. 

But perhaps our foreign customers, the Americans, 
&c, prefer the soap made of tallow? just the reverse — 
America supplies itself from Spain, and from France, % 
which imports the oil we neglect, to the entire exclusion 

* The Government Bank has lately advanced 500,000/., to 
enable the Russian merchants to hold on their tallow, and 
force up its price ; this operation may put in the pockets of 
those interested at St. Petersburgh 2 or 300,000/. 

f Russia imported from England, in 1832, cottons, value 
1,259,964/., of which 1,136,787/. was-for twist, which she is not 
yet able to do without, but very soon will be, leaving 123,177/. 
for cotton stuffs, so large a portion of our former trade with 
Russia. Turkey, the same year, imported cottons 778,422/., 
of which, yarn 88,759/., leaving for stuffs, 689,663/. (Egypt 
and Barbary included) ; since then, the exportations to 
Russia are decreasing, as for the last ten years, and those to 
Turkey, increasing. 



196 



APPENDIX. 



of England. The small export of soap that takes place, 
is in consequence of the importation of palm oil from 
Africa, greatly inferior to the olive oil, but which pays 
only 2/. 10s. per ton. 

But then perhaps, by our actual system we secure a more 
steady and cheaper supply — far from it — to the nega- 
tive and privative injury inflicted on us as consumers, 
as manufacturers, and as merchants, by the use of the 
inferior article, must be added the positive loss incurred 
by the price, as regards its value, of that inferior article 
being higher than the other. 

Asa last reason that perhaps might be urged in favor 
of our present system, let us suppose it to be argued, 
that the rendering ourselves dependent on oil, might 
endanger this branch of industry, if supplies were cut 
off by war — the objection indeed could scarcely be 
seriously or honestly made, but how could our sup- 
plies in war be cut off? either by the refusal of the 
supplying country to permit the exportation, or by those 
supplies being intercepted by superior force at sea. This 
subdivision of the objection is a sufficient answer. But 
what was the fact during the war. We were paying 
100/. per ton to Russia for her tallow, while in the 
Levant, olive oil was retailed at the rate of 351. per 
ton, and not only was the sea open to us, but our vessels, 
which carried to Salonica, &c, goods to be smuggled 
into Europe, returning in ballast. Here we have an 
enormous production of a most essential object of con- 
sumption, a most essential ingredient entering into 
various processes, a raw material, necessary for various 
manufactures on which the prosperity and greatness of 
this country depends. Yet England does not share in 
the distribution of this object — she employs a substitute 
of which the supply is limited, and which is rising in 
price, while all other objects are falling. 



MAY 1 31949 



APPENDIX. 



197 



It is needless to enter into minute calculations, to prove 
what must be evident to whoever has given this or any 
similar question the slightest attention ; and that is, that 
our Tariff has produced this effect, and that for 20,000/. 
yearly accruing to the treasury (for this is the only 
motive although a fallacy in itself), the public fortune 
has been injured directly, and demonstrably to the 
amount of 200,000/., negatively perhaps to ten times that 
amount. Power given to a government that excludes 
our commerce from her territory into which new states 
are gradually incorporating, and the peace of the world 
placed beyond salvation, by the wealth furnished to the 
only aggressive power which wants but money to become 
irresistible. 



FINIS. 



LONDON : 

PRINTED BY T. BKETTELL, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET. 



